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A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

"Sovereignty" is something of a mythical concept. 2 For all the volumes
that have been written about it, the concept remains somewhat elusive. 3
Yet sovereignty remains a significant aspect of statehood, statecraft, and,
domestically, of constitutional federalism. The concept performs a variety
of functions, domestically and abroad. 4 Sovereignty channels legal and
political arguments regarding power and authority. It provides "a
recognized legal and political hierarchy," thereby contributing to stability
"by creating expectations of how political entities are to behave." 5
Sovereignty regulates the movement of goods and people. It contributes to
order by "creating a class of political entities that are expected to be

I. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
2. Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY
IN TRANSITION 115 (Neil Walker ed., 2003) (sovereignty has "acquired an almost mythical quality").
3. Recent treatments of the concept of sovereignty include: JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY
OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAVES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995); MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); F.H. HINSLEY,
SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed. 1986); ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1986); NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999); SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2; STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); CYNTHIA
WEBER, SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE, AND SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE ( 1995).
4. See generally FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3.
5. !d. at 141.
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permanent fixtures" in domestic and international contexts. 6 Sovereignty
levels the playing field by insisting on equality. It "promote[s] the selfdetermination of political communities." 7
In its classical sixteenth century formulation, "sovereignty" connoted
unlimited and absolute power within a jurisdiction. 8 Recent events,
however, particularly the formation of the European Union, have called
this conception of sovereignty into doubt. Members of the EU have joined
or "pooled" their sovereignty, an act which seemingly disqualifies them as
"sovereign," at least in the classical sense. International lawyers and
theorists have questioned whether international relations, in which nations
and nation-states are increasingly interconnected and exclusive power is a
fiction, have moved beyond the traditional Westphalian system of
"sovereign states. " 9 At the least, some believe it may be time to re-assess
and update the centuries-old idea of the sovereign state. 10 With all of these
changes, however, the ordering concepts of statehood and sovereignty
refuse to disappear. 11 "Sovereignty" has purportedly been transferred to
Iraq. 12 Nations, and territories seekin~ to become nations, continue to
advance claims to "state sovereignty." 1 On the world stage, it appears as
if the idea of "state sovereignty" will not be eradicated any time soon.
Indeed, if anything, the concept appears to be prospering.

6. /d. at 142.
7. /d. at 145.
8. See HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that "at the beginning, at any rate, the idea of
sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political
community").
9. See, e.g., CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 3 n.7 (discussing challenges to state
sovereignty in light of modem conditions). The Westphalian system of states followed the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War. See Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the
European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 9. For an argument that
international relations has reached a "post-sovereign" stage, see Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, PostSovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights Within the EU, in
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 167 ("the established pattern of sovereign states faces
practical and normative challenges").
I 0. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 3.
II. ld. at II ("Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at establishing order and clarity
in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent world.").
12. See G.A. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 4987th mtg. at 1 (2004) ("Reaffirming the independence,
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq") (emphasis omitted); see also Steven R. Weisman,
Congress Seeking to Clarify Iraqis' Role Under Self-Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,2004, at Al2; Steven
R. Weisman, The New Government Faces Bargaining Over Its Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at
A9 (reporting that Iraq's caretaker government would assume "full sovereignty" after June 30, 2004).
13. Quebecois, Basque nationalists, Palestinians, and Scots all continue to plead for sovereignty.
See Michael Keating, Sovereignty and Plurinational Democracy: Problems in Political Science, in
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 203-04 (2003) (noting the "paradox, that sovereignty is
said to be ebbing away, but new sovereignty claims are being made all the time").
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Much closer to home, the concept of "state sovereignty" also
stubbornly persists and prospers. The framers of the Constitution imported
the concepts of "state" and "sovereignty" from Europe. They then
proceeded to alter the concepts, first by binding states together in union,
and then substantially limiting not only their powers, but those of the
central government as well. The Constitution mentions "States" at several
points, so it seems at least certain that the states are intended to be a
permanent part of the governance structure. 14 Unlike the Articles of
Confederation, which expressly reserved the "sovereignty" of the states, 15
the Constitution does not even mention "sovereignty." Yet state claims to
sovereignty persist and are routinely recognized. The Supreme Court has
recently stated that the Constitution "preserves the sovereign status of the
States" by "reserv[ing] to them a substantial portion of the Nation's
primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
inhering in that status." 16 The idea of "dual sovereignty" 17-that whatever
they may have ceded, the states retain "a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty"-has provided the basis for recent Court rulings that "laws
conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty." 18 Indeed, it has
provided the basis for the recent "revival" in constitutional federalism.
Faced with persistent claims of "state sovereignty" the world over,
scholars have essentially been asking the same question: Are the states
sovereign? Yet surprisingly, to date no effort has been made by American
constitutional scholars to incorporate any part of the far more rigorous
thinking about state sovereignty done by international relations scholars.
This is curious for two reasons. First, as noted, the framers borrowed the
concepts of "state" and "sovereignty" from Europe. It would seem, then,
that we might benefit from knowing something about what has happened
to these concepts in Europe and elsewhere since the framing. Second, as
we shall see, the debates concerning the viability and substance of
sovereignty in the international relations and domestic constitutional
arenas have been remarkably similar. Scholars in both fields have
variously defended the concept of state sovereignty, denied its existence

14. See John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv.
27, 28-29 ( 1998) ("(T]he framers recognized that the states were to be a permanent feature of the
national political landscape.").
15. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated" to Congress.).
16. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,714 (1999) (emphasis added).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
18. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,925 (1997).
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except in its original classical form, and derided it as a "myth" or
polemical tool.
This Article is the first effort to bridge the scholarly divide by means of
a conceptual comparison of state sovereignty here and abroad. To be clear,
this Article does not claim that the substance of state sovereignty is the
same in all respects for states as it is for nations. 19 The states and nationstates are obviously vastly different creatures, with vastly different powers
and rights. However, their claims to sovereignty, the manner in which
these claims are made, and the implications of states' success in making
such claims, are indeed similar and thus worth comparing. This Article
will draw upon certain insights of international scholars in addressing
whether the American states are "sovereign," and if so in what sense.
Based upon an examination of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty,
this Article concludes that the states are indeed meaningfully sovereign.
Part II briefly introduces the concept of sovereignty. The literature and
critical analysis regarding sovereignty are voluminous and it would be
impossible to provide a general survey of the topic in this space. Part II
provides only a very brief introduction to the concept, focusing
specifically on its formal, classical iteration.
Part III describes and critiques various domestic discourses regarding
state sovereignty. The framers intimated that the states were "sovereign"
but failed to explain why or in what respect this is so; they thus
bequeathed to future generations "our oldest question of constitutional
law." 20 The Supreme Court has waffled famously on the issue, leading us
through eras that this Article labels "pre-sovereignty," "quasi-classical
sovereignty," "shared sovereignty," and, finally, "late sovereignty." The
modem era is characterized principally by bald Court pronouncements that
the states are indeed truly "sovereign." Scholars, in tum, have responded
to the Court's invocations of state sovereignty by denying that the states
are or can be sovereign. They have generally advanced three theories for
their argument, which this Article labels "Classicist," "Republican," and
"Skeptic." The Classicist fixates on the narrow, classical version of
sovereignty, which requires absolute and exclusive authority. 21 The
Republican invokes the idea that under the Constitution, it is the people,

19. Unless otherwise indicated by the context, this Article generally refers to nations as such, or
as "nation-states," and to the American states as "the States."
20. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
21. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1604 (2002)
(arguing that true sovereignty is exclusive and final within a sphere).
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and only the people, who are ultimately "sovereign.'m Finally, the Skeptic
asserts that the notion of "sovereignty" makes no sense at all, and persists
merely as a rhetorical plea. 23
The framers and other proponents of state sovereignty, including a
majority of the current Supreme Court, have not presented any coherent
concept of state sovereignty. As a result, critics exploit state sovereignty as
a rather easy target. If exclusive dominion and control is in fact the sole
basis for claims to sovereignty, then states surely cannot be deemed
sovereign today. The Classicist assumes that the concepts of statehood and
sovereignty are static, forever frozen in time. 24 "Federalism," however,
does not mean the same thing today as it did at the framing. Neither, for
that matter, do concepts like "privacy," "liberty," or "equality." So why
ossify sovereignty? If, as the Republicans insist, only "the people" can be
truly sovereign under the Constitution, then indeed there is little point in
discussing the sovereignty of states at all. Without disputing the
fundamental, Republican truth that "the people" are ultimately sovereign,
however, it is an inescapable fact that states exercise "sovereign" powers
and possess certain "sovereign" rights. 25 Finally, the Skeptic, who would
banish "sovereignty," must be convinced that sovereignty persists for
legitimate reasons and has an identifiable core. Much of the analysis that
follows seeks to respond to the Skeptic's concern that sovereignty is
essentially meaningless.
Part IV seeks to advance beyond these ultimately unhelpful approaches
and to expand domestic constitutional discourse regarding state
sovereignty by drawing upon some of the broad aspects of the global
reconsideration of the concept. The first thing to note is that state
sovereignty has always been a concept in transition. In international
spheres, sovereignty did not retain its classical form, which has always
clashed with pragmatic realities, for very long. In truth, sovereignty has

22. See Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 1113, 1150 (2001) ("It was 'We the People' who ordained and established the Constitution, not
'We the States."').
23. See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 2o 51, 59 (1999)
[hereinafter Hash II] (chiding the Court and others for making a "hash" of sovereignty, a concept "too
vague and anachronistic ... to allow us to reason about anything more than our propensity to keep
using it"). There are, as well, some who doubt the utility of maintaining a system that includes
purportedly "sovereign" states. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that decentralization would be a
far more efficient system than dual sovereignty).
24. See generally BARTELSON, supra note 3 (providing a detailed conceptual history of the
concept of"sovereignty").
25. See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental
"States' Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 213 (2004) (discussing the constitutional rights of states).
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never really been the ali-or-nothing, zero-sum proposition early classicists
theorized. Part IV examines some of the various post-classical meanings
that have been attributed to sovereignty, including the idea that
sovereignty involves de facto control over a domain, recognition of
authority within a territory, and the effective exercise of a state's "bundle
of competences." 26 It touches as well upon some theoretical developments
regarding theories of the locus and origins of sovereignty.
To place sovereignty in a modern and doctrinal perspective, Part IV
then focuses on recent challenges to nation-state sovereignty. In Europe,
the cradle of the concepts of "state" and "sovereignty," changes to
governance structures and the state system, especially but by no means
exclusively the ongoing experiment of the European Union, have
necessitated serious and sustained thinking about state sovereignty.
Although nation-states, unlike the American states, are of course not
subordinate sovereigns by constitutional edict, neither are they the
exclusive, free, and independent actors they once were thought to be.
Functions once reserved exclusively to the nation-state, such as national
defense and the coining of money, have been delegated in whole or in part
to supra-national institutions. Interventions in the internal affairs of
nations, in particular those stemming from concerns regarding human
rights, are now routine-a circumstance that substantially diminishes a
nation's "internal" sovereignty. These and other developments have led
some theorists to posit that a "new sovereignty" has taken shape, one that
is necessarily partial, incomplete, and divided. 27 Sovereignty today is not
based upon the classical notion of a nation's ability to dictate outcomes to
others, or to act as an exclusive and final authority. Rather, according to
some theorists, sovereignty has taken the form of a bargaining resource
utilized by nations on behalf of their citizens. 28 Sovereignty is a status
gained as a result of state practices, including the exercise of the "bundle
of competences" at a state's disposal.
In addition to undertaking to redefine and refocus sovereignty, some
international theorists have applied principles of social construction theory
to explain the apparent anomaly of diminishing nation-state power and
prospering sovereignty. 29 The final section of Part IV specifically

26. HANS BLIX, SOVEREIGNTY, AGGRESSION, AND NEUTRALITY 11-12 (1970).
27. CHA YES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 (1995).
28. See id. ("Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the vindication of the state's existence as a
member of the international system.").
29. See, e.g., STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3; ALEXANDER WENDT,
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Tanja E. Aalberts, The Future of Sovereignty in
Multilevel Governance Europe-A Constructivist Reading, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 23 (2004).
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examines social construction as an approach to the concept of state
sovereignty. One of the important insights produced by a social
constructionist approach to statehood and sovereignty is that these
concepts are not "brute" or inherent facts. The "state," for example, is
made up of territory, population, and government. But these material facts
do not define the "state" in its relevant international or domestic contexts.
Nor is "sovereignty" something inherent to statehood. It is, rather, what
social construction theorists refer to as an "institutional fact," one which is
deemed to exist by human agreement. International social constructionists
argue that rather than simply consider "sovereignty" either as an inherent
status or an obsolete or mythical construct, we must focus on what states
do and how they are represented to, and perceived by, the world and each
other. They suggest that state practices, along with justifications for state
sovereignty by jurists, theorists, and other officials, combine to construct
agreements that states are "sovereign," that they are, for example, in
control of a domain or entitled to recognition and deference. Ultimately,
then, it is not considered productive to ask whether states are "really"
sovereign, for "the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and
acceptance."30 In the end, sovereignty will not fade away because relevant
actors and communities have come to accept it as a necessary ordering
principle.
Part V draws upon these various developments in the theory and
practice of state sovereignty to advance toward a reconceptualization of
domestic state sovereignty. This reconceptualization takes into account
conceptual evolution and responds to the critiques of Classicists,
Republicans, and Skeptics. As a general response to state sovereignty's
detractors, Part V argues that state sovereignty can indeed, as the framers
posited, be partial, limited, delegated, and relational. It can be lodged (on a
representative basis of course) in the states. Thus, based upon the postclassical and post-modem developments discussed in Part IV, this Article
departs from the classical conception of domestic state sovereignty, which
required exclusive and final authority within a given sphere, enclave, or
territory. The remainder of Part V seeks principally to respond to the
Skeptics' arguments that state sovereignty serves no useful purpose and
has no meaning.
Following the work of social constructionists, Part V conceptualizes
domestic state sovereignty as a dynamic construct. The Article utilizes

30. W. G. Werner & J. H. de Wilde, The Endurance of Sovereignty, 7 EUR. J. INT'L. REL. 283,
304 (2001).
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social construction theory to demonstrate that American statehood and
state sovereignty are "institutional facts" that have been legally,
politically, and socially constructed over time. 31 The goal, in terms utilized
by a leading social construction theorist, is to understand the
circumstances (C) in which the state (X) "counts as" sovereign (Y). 32 The
Constitution sets the baseline by assigning states a prominent place in the
governmental structure. The remainder of the constructive process is
revealed through the lens of the variety of symbols or metaphors that have
been invoked to represent statehood and to sharpen state claims to
sovereignty over time. Eight symbols have been utilized to impose
functions and statuses upon the states. States have been likened to the
following: trustees, agents, communities, laboratories, corporations,
market participants, nations, and persons. These symbols represent the
principal claims or justifications for state sovereignty.
Social construction theory counsels close attention to this sort of
symbolism. As noted, however, a constructivist approach emphasizes that
"the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance."33
Accordingly, Part V examines state justifications, political and theoretical
discourses, and the practices of state and federal actors in order to
understand how it is that claims to state sovereignty persist, and often
succeed, despite the significant material and constitutional disadvantages
under which the states operate. This is a complex process which can only
be sketched here. It is also an ongoing process, as the states' sovereignty is
always, in a sense, "at stake." Part V makes this point by examining some
recent issues that substantially implicate state sovereignty, including gay
marriage; educational, environmental, and welfare policies; the death
penalty; and fundamental rights doctrine. And, of course, it also takes
account of the recent federalism revival in the work of the Supreme Court.
This Article concludes that there are actually "two sovereignties." On
one hand, the states are deemed "sovereign" insofar as they possess and
exercise a bundle of competences. States legislate, innovate, interpose,
negotiate, and function as independent communities. This will be referred
to as "competence sovereignty." This version of state sovereignty is
similar to the "new sovereignty" of nation-states, which eschews classical

31. I do not argue that the process of social construction of sovereignty is the same in the global
and domestic contexts. It obviously varies given, among other things, the fact that unlike putatively
"equal" nations, the states and the federal government do not operate on a level playing field. This
Article taps the principles of social construction-the basic idea-in an effort to explicate domestic
state sovereignty.
32.

JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 46-47 (1995).

33. Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304.
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notions of brute power and focuses on the results and recognition states
achieve in exercising their competences. On the other hand, sometimes the
states are recognized as sovereign, or such recognition is withheld, based
solely upon their status. The states are sovereign insofar as they resemble
or are "like" some other sovereign, such as a nation or person. Under this
"status sovereignty," states are deemed to be inherently entitled to
sovereign rights like autonomy and equality, and to possess sovereign
characteristics like "dignity," "respect," and "esteem."
The distinction between competence and status sovereignty is an
important one. If, as this Article suggests, state sovereignty is a dynamic
construct, then status sovereignty is not likely to survive as a meaningful
concept. Part IV advances several reasons why, particularly from the
States' perspectives, competence sovereignty is conceptually preferable to
status sovereignty in going forward.
Part V concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the
proposed reconceptualization of state sovereignty for states, scholars, and
courts. States must realize that their sovereignty is constantly at stake.
They must act with the knowledge that their exercise of sovereign
functions defines their sovereignty. Scholars should be looking at state
sovereignty not as a formal, dollars-and-personnel concept, but rather as a
dynamic, always changing and relative concept. Finally, courts should be
aware that status sovereignty is an inherently flawed conception. If the
states are to be pronounced "sovereign," it must be because they are
serving sovereign functions or furthering the values of federalism, not
because of some inherent status.
Finally, Part VI anticipates the argument that state sovereignty, even as
reconceptualized, ought to be banished from our constitutional discourse.
Viewed as the product of a dynamic process, rather than a status imposed
by judicial decree, domestic state sovereignty can serve many of the same
useful purposes that have been assigned to international sovereignty.
Perhaps above all, a shared understanding that states are "sovereign"that they exercise sovereign competences, are in a substantial sense in
charge of a domain, represent distinct communities, and are equal relative
to one another-contributes to the maintenance of order in a system of
overlapping and competing governance structures. Putting states on notice
that they have to earn their sovereignty will help to sustain a balance of
power. Putting federal authorities on notice that the states retain their
sovereignty will also contribute to the ordering of relations among
governments that share and pool their sovereignties.
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II. CLASSICAL SOVEREIGNTY-A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

"Sovereignty" is an immense topic with a four century-plus history. 34
In this brief introduction, the modest goal is to comment upon the origins
of the concept and to describe its formal, classical iteration. The focus is
purposeful. As we shall see, classical sovereignty has been the version of
the concept which has most influenced domestic constitutional discourses
regarding the states' claims to sovereignty.
Discussions of "sovereignty" generally acknowledge that the concept
was invented in Europe in the sixteenth century. 35 The French thinker Jean
Bodin, who advanced the first comprehensive concept of "sovereignty,"
defined it as the "absolute and perpetual power within a state." 36 Bodin's
conception of sovereignty emerged from a period of tumult and civil war
in France. To deal with this turmoil, the concept of sovereignty originally
reinforced the power of the king. 37 Bodin's thesis was that a unitary central
authority should wield unlimited power over citizens and subjects,
essentially unconstrained by law (except, perhaps, the laws of God and
nature). 38 The unitary sovereign's authority was divinely, rather than
democratically, bestowed. As Bodin declared: "We see the principal point
of sovereign majesty and absolute power to consist in giving laws to
subjects in general, without their consent."39
The principal marks of sovereignty for Bodin were "the power of
lawmaking, the power to declare war and make peace, the power to
establish offices of state, the ultimate right of judgment, the power to
pardon, the right of taxation, and the power to coin money."40 A true
sovereign could delegate some of these powers to subordinates, but could
not permanently transfer any of them without losing its sovereignty. The

34. The word "sovereignty" is taken from the French "souverain," which means "a supreme ruler
not accountable to anyone, except perhaps to God." FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 4.
35. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 15-16 (noting that European philosophers
developed the theory of sovereignty in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries).
36. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 1-4 (Julia Franklin ed., 1992).
37. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 4-5 ("On the heels of the dynastic and imperial
struggles of the Middle Ages, monarchs in early modem Europe advanced the notion of sovereignty to
strengthen their grip on the reins of the state and to counter feudal claims by the nobility and religious
claims by the papacy.") (footnotes omitted).
38. CAMILLERI & F ALK, supra note 3, at 18; see also Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, Post-

Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights within the EU, in
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 171 ("The sovereign is the agent or agency where the
buck stops and a final decision gets made.").
39. NANNERL 0. KEOHANE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE IN FRANCE: THE RENAISSANCE TO THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 71 (1980) (translating JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1577)).
40. SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 64.
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ultimate authority in the state, according to Bodin, had to reside in only
one place. By definition, then, classical sovereignty could not be divided
or shared.
In Leviathan,41 Thomas Hobbes, who also wrote against the backdrop
of war, constructed an "omnipotent sovereign" as the only alternative to
the anarchy of the "state of nature. " 42 By covenant, Hobbes posited that
men conferred all of their powers and strength upon one man or one
assembly of men. Like Bodin's, Hobbes's "sovereign" also wielded
absolute, unitary authority. With Hobbes, however, sovereignty became
"absolute" in a radical sense; "unlike Bodin he swept aside all limitations
on sovereignty by doing away with every right of the people."43 The result
was a "Multitude so united in one Person," called a "Commonwealth," a
"Leviathan."44 The sovereign could not be subjected to any criticism or
limitation. "No authority outside the state can sit in judgment on the state,
not even religious or moral conscience, or any criterion ofjustice."45
The classical version of sovereignty that washed ashore as the Framers
were taking up the task of drafting the Constitution posited that in all
forms of government, there is and must be a "final and absolute political
authority in the political community."46 William Blackstone, for example,
whose thinking was influential in the founding era, "defined 'sovereign
power' as 'the making of laws,' possession of which obliges 'all others
[to] conform to, and be directed by it."'47
For these and other early thinkers, "sovereignty" was simply a fact; it
was an inherent attribute of the monarchy and, later, the state. Sovereignty
could not be contested. Nor could it be divided, shared, diminished, or
limited. Classical sovereignty was legal; absolute; unitary; and, as a result
of these characteristics, necessarily indivisible. 48 As one scholar explained,
sovereignty in its classical sense is like marital status--one either
possesses it or one does not. 49

41. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tucked., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).
42. !d. at 149-52; see CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 19-20 (discussing Hobbes's theory of
sovereignty).
43. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 19.
44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968).
45. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 20.
46. HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 26.
47. H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV.
949, 986 (1993) (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 49 (1803)).
48. JAMES, supra note 3, at 50.
49. See Georg Sorenson, Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution, in
SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MILLENNIUM (Robert Jackson ed., 1999).
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III. DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSES

In domestic constitutional circles, the debate over "state sovereignty"
has moved but little from the concept's classical formulation. The
Framers, who were most likely forced by circumstances to be deliberately
vague about state sovereignty, did little more than pose the question of the
states' "sovereign" status. Judicial discourse has ultimately done little to
answer the question posed, routing through periods this Article calls "presovereignty," "classical sovereignty," "shared sovereignty," and a
"modem" era characterized by bare, and essentially opportunistic,
reminders that states are truly "sovereign." Finally, academic
constitutional and historical discourse has largely dismissed the idea of
state sovereignty, effectively splitting into "Classicist," "Republican," and
"Skeptical" camps.

A. The Framers
As the Constitution's structure demonstrates, the Framers ofthe United
States Constitution expressly rejected the classical sovereignty of thinkers
like Bodin, Hobbes, and Blackstone. Indeed, they purported to do
precisely what these thinkers said could never be done, namely to divide
and limit sovereignty. 50 They did so both horizontally, among levels of the
federal government, and vertically, reposing authority, power, and control
in the central government with a residual authority in the several states.
The Framers rejected the idea of a unitary sovereign, lodged significant
rights and powers both in the state and central institutions of government,
and then proceeded to divide authority further among these institutions.
In debates over the plan of the proposed Constitution, the Framers were
less than clear regarding the "sovereign" status of the states. At times the
states were referred to as "partial" sovereigns, while at other times the
Framers opined that sovereignty resided exclusively with "the people."51
Thus, Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 32 that "the State governments
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had,
and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to the United States."52
Madison said that "the States will retain under the proposed Constitution a

50. See Peter S. Onuf, State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 78-98 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (discussing
conceptual change relating to "state sovereignty" at the framing).
51. See Powell, supra note 4 7, at 985-87 (discussing early thinking with regard to the locus of
sovereignty under the Constitution).
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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very extensive portion of active sovereignty." 53 Similarly, in Federalist
No. 39, Madison declared that the federal government's "jurisdiction
extends to certain enumerated objects only," while the states continued to
possess "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." 54
But there were others, including Madison, who also touted strong
republican principles. Hence Madison's statement in Federalist No. 46:
"[T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in
the people alone .... " 55
When it came time to draft the language of the Constitution, the
Framers avoided the term "sovereignty" altogether. This was, one may
assume, a deliberate break from the troublesome Articles of
Confederation, which had expressly provided that each state "retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence."56 The drafters of the
Constitution chose to express and preserve state authority and state status
in a different fashion.
Where, exactly, the omission of"sovereignty" left the states has been a
matter of controversy since the framing. Indeed, it was thus that the
"sovereign" status of the states became "our oldest question of
constitutional law." 57 The Framers were so evasive in terms of state
sovereignty that there has been continual disagreement even as to the
origins of consent to the Constitution. Some view the Constitution as a
"compact among sovereign states,'' 58 while others have insisted that it is
not "an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute deriving
from the supreme sovereign legislature-the People of the nation." 59 This

53. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293-94 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 62, at 365 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("[T]he equal vote allowed to
each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual States and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty"); THE FEDERALIST No.
49, at 262 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("[I]n the new government, as in the old, the
general powers are limited; ... the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their
sovereign and independent jurisdiction.").
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
56. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II.
57. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
58. SAMUEL H. BIER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 2
(1993).
59. Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452 (1987); see THE
FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("Each State, in ratifying the
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its
own voluntary act."). The disagreement has not been entirely quelled by the Supreme Court's narrow
determination, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), that the states are not at
liberty to add to the qualifications for membership in the national legislature. The Court in making this
determination purported to resolve the debate over the origins of constitutional authority by vesting
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is a constitutional debate not likely ever to be settled to everyone's
agreement or satisfaction.
The Framers thus bequeathed our "oldest question of constitutional
law." Unfortunately, they did not provide an answer to it. Indeed, they
offered conflicting answers. As Professor Powell has noted: "The term
[sovereignty] was both central to the founding era's political grammar and
essentially ambiguous." 60

B. The Supreme Court
It is fair to say that the Supreme Court has, over time, been all over the
map when it comes to the concept of state sovereignty. Its various
approaches to the "oldest question" can be helpfully, if somewhat roughly,
distilled into four "eras" of sovereignty: Pre-sovereignty, quasi-classical
sovereignty, shared sovereignty, and late sovereignty.
In the pre-sovereignty period, the Court essentially refused to
recognize the sovereignty of the states. The Marshall Court was, of course,
too concerned with building a strong national government to recognize
broad claims of "state sovereignty." Thus, for example, the separate
opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia 61 all flatly rejected the state's claim to
sovereignty. Justice Randolph, among others, adopted the republican view
that the people possessed ultimate sovereignty under the Constitution; the
states, he said, were nothing more than "assemblages of these individuals
who are liable to process."62 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 63 the Court
observed that the Constitution is "crowded with provisions which restrain
or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest branches of
their prerogatives."64 Finally, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 65 the Court pointed out
that when the states joined the Union, "the whole character in which the
States appear, underwent a change .... " 66
In time, concerns over sustaining the national government subsided,
and an era of quasi-classical sovereignty dawned. In this era, the Court not
only recognized, but at times aggressively enforced, state sovereignty.

original consent in "the People."
60. Powell, supra note 47, at 987.
61. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
62. Id. at 423; see id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) ("No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution,
the sovereignty devolved on the people .... ").
63. 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
64. Jd. at 325.
65. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
66. Id. at 187.
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Early notions of state sovereignty were based roughly upon the formal,
classical model described in Part II. Thus, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Court sought to carve out separate "enclaves" for
distinct state and central sovereigns, each the final and exclusive authority
in their respective domains. Note that sovereignty here was exclusive, yet
divided. It was in this era that the Court infamously purported to, as the
Court recently put it, distinguish between "truly national" and "truly local"
concerns. 67 "Manufacture," for example, was considered an exclusive state
concern, while "commerce" was held to constitute an exclusively national
matter. 68 Many decisions of the 1930s stressed the "local" character of
various activities and conditions. 69 Federal regulation of manufacture or
mining, for example, was deemed to trespass on the sovereign authority of
the states to deal, again exclusively and finally, with local evils. 70
As events leading up to the constitutional crisis of 1933-1936
demonstrated, the quasi-classical era's seemingly firm concept of "dual
sovereignty" was in fact quite vulnerable to outside forces. The Court's
formalism with regard to sovereignty could not be sustained in the face of
the social and political realities of the Great Depression. "Dual
sovereignty" of this classical character ultimately succumbed to those
realities, and national authority expanded into areas once considered to be
exclusively matters of state concern. 71
The demise of quasi-classical sovereignty led to an extended period of
shared sovereignty. In the post-crisis era, which ran from the Court's
famous "switch" in commerce doctrine up to the "new federalism" of the
past two decades or so, "sovereignty" was a concept rarely spoken by
name. With the exception of a very brief experiment involving the revival
of the early, quasi-classical form of sovereignty, 72 state and federal

67. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
68. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., !56 U.S. I (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. I (1888).
69. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("the local character of mining, of
manufacturing and of crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with the
products").
70. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Carter, 298
U.S. at 293; see also id. at 295 ("[I]t is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike
the states, possesses no inherent power in respect to the internal affairs of the states").
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 120 (1942) (upholding regulation of intrastate wheat
production); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-25 (1941) (upholding federal regulation of
intrastate wages and hours); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 37 (1937) (overruling
prior precedents and accepting that Congress may regulate even intrastate activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
72. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) ("[O]ne undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will
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authorities during this extended era were deemed to be engaged in a
mostly "cooperative" endeavor. 73 In the era of shared sovereignty, there
was less talk of authoritative exclusivity and far more of teamwork and
cooperation, of a "cooperative federalism" in which Congress primarily
acted and the states essentially filled gaps. Thus, states were free to
exercise concurrent authority within the ellipses of federal regulatory
schemes. Of course, one may speak in terms of "cooperation," but the
doctrinal upshot of the intermediate era was a massive expansion of
federal authority. As one indication of this seismic shift, the Tenth
Amendment, the supposed repository of state sovereignty, was essentially
treated as nothing more than a "truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered."74
In the late sovereignty era, however, state sovereignty has managed a
steady return to prominence in federalism cases. There has been some
judicial flirtation in the late era with a revival of the quasi-classical version
of state sovereignty and separate enclaves. 75 But by far the more common
course in the late era has been for the Court to flatly proclaim that the
states are "sovereign," based solely upon their status as states. This,
indeed, has been a major pillar of the Court's recent, and much
commented upon, Anti-Federalist "revival."
In many recent federalism decisions, the Court begins with the premise
that the Constitution recognizes the "essential sovereignty of the States." 76
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the states entered the Union "with

work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work
overtime"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 531
(1985) (abandoning the National League of Cities approach as "not only unworkable but ... also
inconsistent with established principles of federalism").
73. See F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (describing Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act as an instance of "cooperative federalism"); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,289 (1981) ("[T]he most that can be said is that the Surface Mining
Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within the limits established
by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to
meet their own particular needs"); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (noting that AFDC
program was an example of"cooperative federalism").
74. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
75. Depending upon how one interprets them, in the two now-famous Commerce Clause
opinions of the modem era, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court may be signaling an interest in protecting exclusive state
sovereign enclaves like crime and marriage. Or the cases may simply suggest that there are limits to
Congress's commerce power. One of those limits is that Congress is empowered under the
Constitution to regulate "commerce," and neither gun possession near a school nor violent crime
constitutes "commerce" in the constitutional sense. See. e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard ofJudicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 97-98 (2001) (opining that
Lopez and Morrison are modest efforts to police the boundaries of Congress's commerce power).
76. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
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their sovereignty intact." 77 It has stressed in no uncertain terms that the
Constitution "preserves the sovereign status of the States" by "reserv[ing]
to them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status."78
The Court has recently described state sovereignty as a "fundamental
postulate[] implicit in the constitutional design." 79 It has relied upon that
"postulate" in an array of cases in which the states have been granted
"sovereign immunity" from citizen lawsuits. "The preeminent purpose of
state sovereign immunity," the Court has said, "is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities." 80 State
"dignity" has been a common theme in these cases; this value has been
repeatedly invoked but never elaborated upon. In any event, immunity's
"primary function," according to the Court, is "to afford the States the
dignity and respect due sovereign entities."81
Late state sovereignty is not limited to immunity from lawsuits. In
addition to protecting states from private suits, the Court has also held that
"laws conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty."82 It has treated
federal civil rights statutes that seek to empower citizens to sue states as
genuine threats to state sovereignty, and subjected these measures to
heightened judicial scrutiny. 83
In sum, the Court has varied its regard for state sovereignty over time.
In the late or modem era, the Court has shown more than the usual regard
for state autonomy, immunity, and other "rights" in its federalism
doctrine. 84 Indeed, the modem Court has substantially revived the
Madisonian notion that the states retain "a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty." 85 But the Court's proclamations of state sovereignty raise far
more questions than they answer. What is the nature of the states'
sovereignty? What is its origin or source? Its scope? How, ultimately, is it
to be enforced and protected?

77. Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
78. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added).
79. !d. at 729.
80. Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002).
81. !d. at 769.
82. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,925 (1997).
83. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2000)
(invalidating the citizen suit provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (invalidating citizen suit provisions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
84. See Zick, supra note 25, at 219 (discussing newly discovered "fundamental" rights of states).
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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C. Scholars

Scholarly commentary on the judicial revival of the "sovereign state"
in the late or modem era has been mostly disapproving. To be sure, there
are scholars who support the ideal of state sovereignty. But the
sovereignty they support either tracks closely the quasi-classical notion
that the Framers set aside explicit enclaves for states, 86 or focuses
primarily on how the states are faring in the judicially administered
distributional calculus commonly referred to as "federalism."87 However,
"federalism" and "sovereignty" are not the same thing; sovereignty, as this
Article will explain, is a much more complex concept than federalism,
which has to do mostly with the division of material power. 88 This section
focuses primarily on the detractors of state sovereignty, who appear to be
far greater in number in any event than its supporters. For some scholars,
the Court's recent invocations of state sovereignty are nonsensical,
rhetorical, even downright alarming. Three general approaches or theories
have developed, which this Article labels "Classicist," "Republican," and
"Skeptical." Each approach is briefly considered. 89
1. Classicists

One school of thought measures state sovereignty according to the
classical yardstick advanced by thinkers like Bodin, Hobbes, and
Blackstone. By this measure, "Classicists" maintain that the Supreme
Court's references to state "sovereignty" are an unfortunate and misguided
misnomer. In a recent article, for example, Professor Steven Gey asserts
that the country "is in the midst of a constitutional revolution." 90 Professor
Gey states that the Court "has used a broad conception of state sovereignty
to expand the power of state government . . . in virtually every area in
which the two governments operate."91 Professor Gey does not consider
sovereignty to be a background or insignificant principle in these
instances. Rather, he contends that the Court has relied substantially on

86. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 29-32 (discussing state sovereignty in terms of jurisdiction
of state and national governments).
87. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 75.
88. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1623 ("the real debate over the relationship between the national
and state governments involves the issue of sovereignty, not federalism").
89. The discussion here, as elsewhere in this Article, focuses on the concept of sovereignty each
approach embraces, rather than the Court's specific usage of the concept in any particular case, or a
scholar's critique of the doctrinal effects of its use.
90. Gey, supra note 21, at 1601.
91. /d.
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"state sovereignty" in cases broadening the states' sovereign immunity;
protecting states from federal "commandeering"; restricting federal court
equitable authority; and invalidating recent Commerce Clause
enactments. 92
For the Classicists, the Court's late conception of state sovereignty "is
presently an incoherent and largely mythical concept that makes it difficult
for the federal government to operate." 93 The reason the Court's
conception of sovereignty is considered to be "mythical" is quite simple; it
does not ultimately "stand in the way of federal primacy ."94 The putatively
"sovereign" states are only granted certain partial protections from federal
encroachments. They can still be sued, coerced, and subjected to federal
court jurisdiction. In the end, the only claim to "sovereignty" that
Classicists will accept as valid is one that hews to the formal definition of
sovereignty set forth by Bodin, Hobbes, and Austin and described in Part
I1. 95 "Accordingly," Professor Gey asserts, "a government entity can only
be deemed 'sovereign' ... if that government's power to adopt policies in
a given area is exclusive, if those policies are final, and if the government
has the authority to enforce the policies (in Austin's phrase) 'with evil or
pain [or] through fear of that evil. "'96 Because the states cannot claim to
have exclusive and final authority, or full enforcement autonomy, the
Classicist maintains that no state can claim to be "truly sovereign.'m
The Classicist sees sovereignty in black and white, as a brute fact or an
inherent quality of a specific form of government. For Classicists,
sovereignty is ultimately about material power-power that is exclusive,
final, and enforceable. It has nothing whatever to do with how local
governments function; "the debate concerns the location of ultimate
authority over policy, not the existence and usefulness of local government
per se." 98 Whatever benefits a federal system might provide, Classicists
maintain that the existence of sovereign states is not necessary to provide
them. 99

92. ld. at 1602.
93. !d. at 1601.
94. !d. at 1603.
95. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1629 (discussing Bodin and Austin).
96. ld. at 1631 (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 15 (1861)).
97. !d. at 1631.
98. !d. at 1623.
99. See id. at 1671 ("realization of those benefits does not require a system of judicially protected
state sovereignty"). See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23 (arguing that a system of sovereign
states actually decreases the likelihood that benefits will be experienced).
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In sum, the Classicist adopts the formal conception of sovereignty
wholesale. Classical sovereignty cannot be limited, partitioned, or
delegated. For the Classicist, "sovereignty is a mutually exclusive concept:
if one government has it, then the other does not." 100 Sovereignty is thus a
"zero-sum game." 101 Insofar as the Court's recent decisions fail to afford
the states less than absolute, exclusive power-in the regulation of
particular items or areas of commerce, for example, or in terms of their
immunity from lawsuits-then the Classicist maintains that the states are
not properly deemed "sovereign." 102

2. Republicans
A second academic response to the Court's recent invocations of state
sovereignty flatly denies that the states can be considered "sovereign"
under any theory, approach, or circumstance. As James Madison stated in
Federalist No. 46: "[T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may
be found, resides in the people alone." 103 This is the "Republican" theory
of sovereignty. For those at the founding who rejected "sovereignty talk"
as too confusing or misleading, as well as those who wished to avoid the
Anti-Federalist charge that the proposed plan of government would lead to
a "consolidation" or "annihilation" of the states, this was a very popular
argument. 104 For those who today are troubled by the idea that the states
are in any way "sovereign," the argument retains great force. 105
In its recent federalism cases, the Court has indicated on occasion that
the states retained the "sovereignty" they were expressly granted under the
Articles of Confederation when they ratified the Constitution. 106
Republican theorists like Louise Weinberg dismiss this "theory of the

100. Gey, supra note 21, at 1632-33.
101. !d. at 1631.
102. See id. at 1632 ("Any attempt to subdivide a territory's governance of different subjects
between two separate sovereign entities requires a clear, easily identifiable line between the respective
governments' areas of sovereign authority."); see also id. at 1641 ("In the end, a coherent theory of
state sovereignty must mean that states possess the authority to make final policy decisions with regard
to some function, and the federal government can do nothing about it.").
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
104. See Powell, supra note 47, at 985-87 (discussing early statements that "the People" are truly
sovereign).
105. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude For State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 81, 86 (200 I) ("[T]he notion that states are organically bestowed with a dignity
incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states are mere creatures of and
subservient to the truly sovereign people.").
106. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. ofNoatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (1991) (states entered the Union
"with their sovereignty intact").

250

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

83:229

preexisting state" as both "mythical" and "ahistorical." 107 Congress, the
theory posits, "preceded the states, and the Union preceded both." 108
Moreover, the Constitution, the Republican is quick to point out, does not
contain the word "sovereignty," and the Tenth Amendment reserves only
"powers" to the states, not "sovereignty." 109
As noted in the brief remarks regarding the Framers' own debate on
sovereignty, this "ultimate locus of authority" debate-whether the
Constitution is a compact among quasi-sovereign states or is based instead
upon the consent of the whole people of the Nation-has never been
settled definitively, and likely for some never will be. 110 There is ample
historical support for both positions.
In any event, as Michael McConnell has observed: "The important
question is not the locus of sovereignty prior to the Constitution, but under
the Constitution." 111 Republicans have an answer to this question as well.
In addition to rejecting as mythical the "pre-existing state," Republicans
also maintain that the states can make no valid claim to sovereignty under
the Constitution. Professor Weinberg, for example, criticizes the Court's
state sovereignty opinions for being based upon yet another "mythical"
theory, that of "state sovereignty." 112 The flaw is not, as Classicists hold,
that the states fail to meet the classical definition of "sovereign." Rather,
the point is that the states cannot make any claim to "sovereignty" because
"We the People" are the only recognized sovereign authority under the
Constitution. 113 This, the Republican claims, is "the Constitution's own
theory of sovereignty." 114 The central assertion of the Republican theory
boils down to this: "It was 'We the People' who ordained and established
the Constitution, not 'We the States. "' 115
It should be noted that not all Republicans take so stark a view of state
sovereignty. Others, like Akhil Amar, accept that state governments have

I 07. Weinberg, supra note 22, at 1151.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Compare id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's
authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated
people of the nation as a whole.") with U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995)
(concluding that ultimate constitutional authority resides in the people of the Nation as a whole) and
Blatchford, 50! U.S. at 779 (stating that states entered the Union "with their sovereignty intact").
Ill. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1484, 1489 (1987) (emphasis added).
112. Weinberg, supra note 22, at 1117.
113. ld. at 1149-50.
114. ld. at 1149.
115. Jd.atll50.
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"sovereign" powers. 116 But even these more moderate theorists ultimately
fall back upon the Republican principle of popular sovereignty. Professor
Amar, for example, has described the Court's conception of state
sovereignty as "oppressive," by which he means that the concept has been
utilized to defeat remedial claims brought on behalf of "the people." The
government's "sovereignty," he asserts, does not extend to alleged ultra
vires acts. 117 Professor Amar, like other Republican theorists, seeks in the
context of immunity "to counter the Supreme Court's version of
federalism and sovereignty with the framers' version-to replace 'Our
Federalism' with their federalism, and government sovereignty with
popular sovereignty." 118
In sum, Republican theorists insist that "sovereignty" ultimately lies in
the people alone, since only their say is final. For some theorists, this
renders state sovereignty a "myth" or "legend." For others, it colors the
manner in which judicial federalism doctrine ought to evolve and develop.
But uniformly, Republicans believe that the Framers themselves instituted
popular sovereignty, not government sovereignty.
3. Skeptics

Finally, there are scholars who take the position that "sovereignty" is
an altogether meaningless construct, one which has caused so much
confusion that it would be better if we simply abandoned it altogether.
Domestically, the historian Jack Rakove is the ablest spokesperson for this
theory. Professor Rakove has argued that courts, commentators, and others
have made a "hash" of sovereignty .119 Unlike other sovereignty theorists,
however, he has offered some provocative thoughts as to why, in light of
the obvious failure of the states to meet the formal, classical definition of
sovereignty, state claims to sovereignty persist.
Professor Rakove begins his attack on sovereignty where the
Classicists end theirs-by pointing out that from the beginning, "our
practice and theory have made a hash of the traditional concept of

116. See Amar, supra note 59, at 1426 (noting that the Constitution delegates "limited 'sovereign'
powers to various organs of government").
117. See id. at 1427 ("'We the People of the United States,' through the Constitution, have
delegated limited 'sovereign' powers to various organs of government; but whenever a government
entity transgresses the limits of its delegation by acting ultra vires, it ceases to act in the name of the
sovereign, and surrenders any derivative 'sovereign' immunity it might otherwise possess.").
118. See Amar, supra note 59, at 1426-27; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
(referring to "Our Federalism").
119. See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 35 (1998)
[hereinafter Hash 1]; Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23.
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sovereignty that the colonists inherited from European theorists." 120 He
notes that while this traditional conception of sovereignty "emphasized
sovereignty's unitary and absolute nature, ours parcels sovereignty out in
bits and pieces that are scattered throughout our system of governance, yet
somehow mystically reunited in the ineffable concept of an all-sovereign
American people." 121
Like the Classicists, Professor Rakove argues that the original
conception of sovereignty which we imported from Europe did not quite
"fit" our system from the beginning. Bodinian, Hobbesean, and
Blackstonian sovereignty, Professor Rakove notes, all were premised on a
unitary, absolute power that simply does not comport with our
constitutional structure. 122 Under the Constitution, by design, "sovereignty
itself would remain diffused-which is to say, it would exist everywhere
and nowhere." 123 Nor, however, does Professor Rakove accept that
sovereignty can regain its coherence by resorting to the "ineffable
concept" of "popular" sovereignty. 124 This is as much a "myth" for
Professor Rakove as the idea that states are "sovereign" in the traditional
sense. "Popular sovereignty may express a noble idea," he says, "but as an
analytical principle, it is vacuous." 125
Professor Rakove thus has "proposed that Americans should long since
have banished the word sovereignty from their political vocabulary." 126
Why, then, does sovereignty talk persist with regard to the states in our
legal and political discourse? As Professor Rakove frames the question:
"Why should sovereignty, a word which outlived its usefulness long ago,
have instead discovered the marvelous recuperative and self-inflating
powers that keep it alive today?" 127
Professor Rakove offers four reflections on this query. First, he
suggests that sovereignty, particularly "popular" sovereignty, has been a
"useful fiction" in explaining and justifying representative govemment. 128
It was, first and foremost, useful to Federalists who sought to escape AntiFederalist assertions that the Constitution would effect a complete

120. Rakove, Hash I, supra note 119, at 35. Professor Rakove limits his attack to domestic
governance; he does not contend that the term is inappropriate as applied to the United States as a
nation. Rakove, Hash JI, supra note 23, at 51.
121. Rakove,Hashl,supranote 119,at35.
122. !d. at 36-37.
123. !d. at 41.
124. !d. at 35.
125. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 51.
126. !d.
127. !d. at 52.
128. !d.
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consolidation and annihilation of the states. 129 This defensive conception
of sovereignty would, according to Professor Rakove, ultimately "rob the
concept of its substance while preserving only the name." 130 The
Federalists had their absolute, unitary sovereign ("the People"), but this
version of sovereignty was "a fiction that had little descriptive power." 131
Second, Professor Rakove posits that perhaps sovereignty has survived
because it has taken on a "new meaning which somehow fit the distinctive
oddities of American federalism." 132 In contrast to the classical meaning of
sovereignty, which positively determined where supreme authority
resided, this new meaning appears to have arisen for the opposite
purpose-"to deny some other locus of authority . . . that power." 133
Professor Rakove suggests that the American concept of sovereignty "has
always had a profoundly negative, defensive, reactive character." 134 Thus,
he says, sovereignty survives today "not because it accurately enables us
to map the active sources of legal and political power, but because it
ironically expresses the dominant anti-statist currents that have swirled
through our political culture since the eighteenth century." 135 Thus,
Professor Rakove suggests, "[s]overeignty now lay much closer to a
theory of resistance than of command" in which the states "would act as
an unchecked checker, the court of last resort in determining when an
exercise of national supremacy had gone a measure or two too far." 136 In
sum, then, sovereignty has been effectively inverted; it is the nullification
of someone else's power, not the affirmative exercise ofpower.
Third, Professor Rakove suggests that sovereignty has cropped up as a
convenient shorthand for the complex and unique division of powers
which the Constitution effects. He emphasizes that James Madison, in
setting forth the principles of divided authority in Federalist 39, makes
reference to "sovereignty" only once. 137 According to Rakove, "Madison
asks good-faith readers to think of the problem in other terms: as an
exercise requiring an explicit, empirical, and pragmatic mapping of the
actual distribution of power, not an appeal to the heavy artillery of a killer

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

/d. at 53.
/d.
Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 53.
/d. at 54.
/d.
/d.
/d.
Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 55.
See id. at 56 (discussing Madison's views).
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definition." 138 But as Professor Rakove recognizes, not every political or
legal thinker is a Madison; thus, "reasoning from a simplistic principle like
sovereignty was much easier than doing the heavy if prosaic lifting of
making federalism work by avoiding the allure of extreme
formulations." 139
Finally, Professor Rakove ascribes the resilience of "sovereignty" to
what he calls "linguistic creep." 140 Sovereignty, he says, "is one of those
terms that is inherently inflationary." 141 It is a concept that "begs to be
borrowed and assigned new and surprising uses, beckoning would-be
consumers to take it down from the shelf and put it to work." 142 Like
"rights talk," which places individual claims of right above all else,
"sovereignty talk" is absolutist and preemptive. 143 Ultimately, sovereignty
is invoked because "the term offers a measure of rhetorical or polemical
advantage." 144 Under this profoundly "skeptical" theory, "sovereignty
survived in American usage not because it retained any analytical or
descriptive power, but rather because it promised rhetorical and political
advantage to those who sought to use it." 145
In sum, the Skeptic adheres to the classical definition of "sovereignty,"
which holds that there must be one final authority with exclusive power.
With the Classicist, the Skeptic notes that the states cannot be "sovereign"
in this sense. What makes the Skeptic's approach unique is that it is
dismissive of the very concept of "sovereignty," including the "popular
sovereignty" of the Republicans. The Skeptic surmises that the persistence
of "sovereignty talk" stems from one or more of the following: (1) the
need for a "useful fiction"; (2) a new, negative redefinition of sovereignty
as a limit on central power; (3) a desire to avoid the serious work of
grappling with federalism's complexity; and (4) "linguistic creep." The
point, regardless of which surmise or reflection one accepts, is that the
concept of sovereignty is essentially devoid of real content and should be
"banished" from our political and constitutional discourse.
The trouble with the domestic discourses regarding state sovereignty is
that they do not lead us anywhere. The Framers bequeathed the concept

ld.
ld. at 57.
Jd.
Rakove, Hash 11, supra note 23, at 57.
ld.
Jd. at 58. For a critique of rights-centric argumentation, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE ( 1991 ).
144. Rakove, Hash 11, supra note 23, at 58.
145. ld.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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and question of state sovereignty. Defenders of state sovereignty,
including the Supreme Court, do not elaborate on what they mean by
"sovereignty." They seem to conflate "sovereignty" and "federalism," two
related but distinct constitutional principles. Federalism, the division of
power between state and federal levels of government, is indicative of
state sovereignty; it does not define it. Classicists end their examination
with the observation that states do not possess formal sovereignty.
Republicans cannot accept that state governments are "sovereign," since
only "the people" can make this claim. Finally, Skeptics are both trapped
in the Classicist fixation on formal sovereignty and stymied by their own
skepticism. They have given up on sovereignty altogether.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POST-MODERN STATE
The Framers of the United States Constitution imported the ideas of
statehood and state sovereignty from Europe. Yet no effort has been made
in any of the domestic constitutional discourses to ascertain what has
happened to these concepts in the last two centuries. Indeed, as Part III
demonstrated, most domestic sovereignty discourses still generally treat
the sixteenth century classical conception of state sovereignty as their
primary benchmark. This is so despite the rather obvious fact that the
states cannot meet the Classical model's requirements, a fact that the
Framers no doubt well appreciated. This Part looks beyond our borders for
assistance in understanding state sovereignty. The point of examining
international events and thinking is not to suggest that state sovereignty in
the domestic constitutional context necessarily means the same thing as
state sovereignty in international law and politics. Rather, the hope is that
an examination of serious scholarly treatments of international state
sovereignty might breathe new life into the mostly stale debate regarding
whether the American states are "really" or "truly" sovereign.
Given the expanse of sovereignty's conceptual history, the discussion
that follows is necessarily selective. I have in mind in this Part the
"sketchier sort of conceptual history-an outline that imposes coherence at
sacrifice to detail while marking more closely the moments of conceptual
change." 146 The first section of this Part examines what has happened, in
the most general terms, to the concept of state sovereignty since the
framing of the Constitution. Sovereignty has not been an idle or static
concept. In particular, the classical concept of state sovereignty upon

146. Nicholas G. Onuf, Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History, 16 ALTERNATIVES 425,428
(1991).
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which much of domestic sovereignty discourse is fixated was long ago
abandoned by international theorists, as well as practitioners of statecraft,
as unrealistic and contrary to fact. In its place, various indicia and
meanings of "sovereignty" have been proposed over time. International
relations theorists appreciate that we cannot fix the meaning of state
sovereignty for all times and purposes. But we can, as they have, come to
a general understanding of its core attributes. These include things like de
facto control of a domain, legitimacy, equality, and recognition. We can
also learn to think more deeply and flexibly about sovereignty's locus and
ongms.
The next section demonstrates that new challenges to state sovereignty
continue to necessitate critical thinking about the concept. One such
ongoing challenge is the formation and operation of the European Union
("EU"). 147 The EU is, in essence, a refutation of the classical model of
sovereignty. EU members have delegated or "pooled" their sovereignty in
the interest of an unprecedented degree of unification. As a result of this
transition, and other social and political forces around the globe, the
inquiry at the heart of this Article-whether the states are sovereign-is
not in any sense unique to American statehood and domestic constitutional
debate. Developments in the EU and elsewhere have caused some theorists
to posit that a "new sovereignty" has been forged, one that is based far less
on the dictation of outcomes or classical exclusivity and more on
bargaining, negotiation, cooperation, and earned recognition as a member
of the international community. 148
Serious and sustained challenges to nation-state authority
notwithstanding, most international relations scholars would probably
agree that the concept of state sovereignty persists, and even prospers. 149
Nation-states routinely claim the mantle of "sovereignty" whenever their
interests or prerogatives are threatened. Sovereignty thus remains a
powerful speech claim. This is no mere rhetoric. As recent events
regarding Iraqi "sovereignty" demonstrate, diplomacy, social discourse,

147. For discussions of the recent changes in European governance, see generally NICK BERNARD,
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002); BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons eta!. eds., 1995).
148. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 ("Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the
vindication of the state's existence as a member of the international system.").
149. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, And Globalization, And Human Rights,
EtCetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. I, 5 (1999) ("In general, I fear sovereignty as we have known it is
alive and well.").
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and even the course of world events are deeply affected by the invocation
and recognition of state sovereignty, whatever form it takes. 150
Redefining sovereignty can help to explain the seemingly anomalous
prospering of state sovereignty in light of diminishing state power and
authority. Another way to explain this anomaly is to focus on how it is that
"state sovereignty" is generated, practiced, and sustained over time.
"Social construction" is one non-skeptical, post-classical theory that seeks
to do this. International social constructionists have treated state
sovereignty as a variable, flexible construct rather than, as in the formal,
classical model, an inherent aspect of statehood and a "brute" material
fact. Social construction theorists interpret statehood and sovereignty as
dynamic constructs, as "institutional facts" generated over time through
such things as state functions, practices, public discourses, and statuses.
The final section of this Part describes both the general principles of social
construction and the specific manner in which this theory has been applied
to the concepts of statehood and sovereignty. Looking ahead, Part V will
draw upon the lessons of this Part in re-examining domestic state
sovereignty.

A. Post-Classical Sovereignty
It ought to be beyond debate that whatever "sovereignty" the American
states may possess, it is not the classical sovereignty of Bodin, Austin, and
Hobbes, which looked to a unitaiy, exclusive, and final source of
authority. Indeed, the Constitution does not lodge this form of sovereignty
in any source. It is, however, error to end debate in domestic constitutional
discourses with this truism. Far from being a fixed or static concept, state
sovereignty has always been an institution in process. Specifically,
international relations scholars have given substantial attention to three
matters, highlighted in this section, which have some bearing on general
discussions of state sovereignty: (1) sovereignty's indicia and meanings,
(2) its locus in various forms of governance, and (3) the origins of
sovereignty in civil society. To begin the process of reconditioning our
thinking about state sovereignty, some of these observations are
highlighted in the discussion that follows.
The indicia and meaning of sovereignty have, in fact, been constantly
evolving since Bodin offered the first comprehensive conceptualization in
the sixteenth century. As noted in Part II, Bodin, followed by Hobbes,

150. See sources cited supra note 12.
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proffered a concept of political absolutism. But as international relations
theorists have pointed out, even these theorists acknowledged limits, such
as the precepts of natural law, on sovereignty authority. 151 Later theorists
like John Locke posited still other limits, including the idea of "popular"
sovereignty. 152
Internationally, after the Middle Ages, claims to sovereignty were of
the classical sort, "ringing assertion[s] of absolute political power at
home." 153 After the creation of an international society, however, scholars
have noted that "the implications of sovereignty did not remain fixed." 154
Claims to "sovereignty," previously thought to be unitary and indivisible,
separated into two general spheres, with nation-states claiming not only
domestic ("internal") sovereignty, but also independence among other
states ("external" sovereignty). 155 Generally speaking, internal sovereignty
has come to be regarded as "supremacy over all other potential authorities
within that state's boundaries." 156 External sovereignty, by contrast, is
"actual independence of outside authority, not the supremacy of one state
over others but the independence of one state from its peers." 157
States in the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries were generally
able to limit interference by other states in their internal affairs, and to
insist upon external equality when dealing with other nations in the
international arena. 158 Sovereignty also enabled nation-states to maintain
classic prerogatives, such as coining money and maintaining military
force. It implied as well the ability to negotiate and ratify treaties which
could legally bind states. The state thus remained effectively "supreme"
over a given territory and population, and asserted unconstrained authority
except where it had consented to limitations. 159
Both internal and external sovereignty have, however, been far more
constrained and limited in reality than their ideal articulations would
suggest. 160 Internal sovereignty, for example, has been characterized as

151. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 4.
152. /d.
153. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 5.
154. /d.
155. !d.; see also HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 107, 122-32 (discussing distinctions between
"internal" and "external" sovereignty).
156. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 5 (emphasis added).
157. /d. at 37; see JAMES, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that states must not only claim their
independence from outside authorities; they must be able to assert their independence in practice).
158. See Robert 0. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States,
40 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 743 (2002).
159. Seeid.
160. As Hans Morgenthau stated: "At the root of the perplexities which attend the problem of the
Joss of sovereignty there is the divorce, in contemporary legal and political theory, of the concept of
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involving varying degrees of control over domestic affairs. It has been
described by scholars as "the situation of being in char§e of a domain"; 161
the "supreme power of deciding in a case of crisis"; 16 and as belonging
"to the authority that is both legitimate and supreme." 163 Scholars have
noted that history is replete with examples of states being recognized by
the international community as "sovereign" even though they lack
absolute and final authority with respect to certain portions of their
territories. 164 As commentators have suggested, "[h]ere, as elsewhere, the
actual behavior of states helps to shape the meaning of sovereignty." 165
Moreover, insofar as it requires absolute domestic supremacy, classical
sovereignty is seen by many as an indicator of dictatorships and
totalitarian regimes, "an evil to be avoided rather than ... an ideal to be
pursued." 166 This too has led scholars and diplomats to relax the
requirements of absolute and exclusive control when assessing state claims
to sovereignty. 167
Similarly, in "external" affairs, the classical notion of arbitrary and
absolute sovereignty was never really a feasible standard in practice. After
all, the states had to conduct relations with one another. Thus, limitations
on sovereignty began to appear in the form of institutions like "diplomatic
immunity" and the creation of embassy compounds, "islands of alien
sovereignty." 168 Again, to separate ideal theory from messy reality, the fact
is that "[t]he only way most states can realize and express their
sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate
and order the international system." 169 States have even gone so far as to

sovereignty from the political reality to which the concept of sovereignty is supposed to give legal
expression." HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 249 (1948); see also FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 38 ("In our view such declarations
seem overstated--evidence of scholars turning conditional thoughts into absolute standards.").
161. CHARLES 8. MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY: PAPERS ON FOREIGN POLICY 4
(1965).
162. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 746
(Richard A. Howard eta!. trans., 1967).
163. Id. at 739.
164. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 41-42 (citing as examples the governments of Peru,
Cyprus, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Somalia).
165. !d. at 42.
166. !d. at 43.
167. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 179 (noting that "the day of completely autonomous decisionmaking does seem, for most states on many issues, to be past.").
168. See Keohane, supra note 158, at 747.
169. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27; see FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 49 (noting
that "the international system is routinely described as a place of cooperation and competition"). As
discussed below, this has only become more true as global governance and other societal changes arise
and affect international relations. See infra notes 199-218 and accompanying text.
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do something that a classical conception of sovereignty would not permit
under any circumstance, namely to delegate powers over the state to an
external authority. 170 This has been the dominant trend with regard to
international organizations-the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund, for example-since World War 11. 171 "Should external
independence of action ever have approached absolute qualities, it has
now been seriously eroded." 172 In sum, "external" sovereignty, like
"internal" sovereignty, is "a matter of degree, not of bright lines." 173
In addition to its evolving indicia, the meaning of "sovereignty" has
also varied across time and circumstances. It would be impossible to
acknowledge each of the specific definitions and permutations that have
been proposed. 174 But generally speaking, as the society of nations and
nation-states crystallized, "the concept of sovereignty moved beyond
declarations of the rights of a sovereign to encompass novel ideas of
legitimacy, responsibility, and international recognition." 175 Over time,
sovereignty has denoted things like superiority within a territory; the
"capacity to make and give effect to public decisions"; and, as already
noted, "being in charge of a domain. 176 Some theorists have identified the
"core" aspects of sovereignty, such as "supreme political authority and
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within [a] territory," the
capacity to regulate movements across borders, the ability to make foreign

170. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). "[T]he
classic conception of sovereignty prohibits a government from agreeing to rules defining a process
over which it does not have a veto, that can confer obligations not specifically provided for in the
original agreement." Keohane, supra note 158, at 748.
171. Keohane, supra note 158, at 748.
172. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 49.
173. /d.
174. For example, theorists have drawn distinctions between "legal" and "political" sovereignty.
Legal sovereignty, very simply stated, is the power to enact enforceable laws. MACCORMICK, supra
note 3, at 127. Political sovereignty, by contrast, is "the capacity of the people to overcome divisions
and establish a political unity"; it exists where the will of the state is ultimately obeyed by the citizens
of the state. /d. Political sovereignty depends to a large extent on the strengthening of bonds between
the rulers and the ruled, the state and society. See Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and
Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights Within the EU, in SOVEREIGNTY
IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 171-72 (discussing distinction between political and legal
sovereignty). It is "interpersonal power over the conditions of life in a human community or society
... [and] the ability to take effective decisions on whatever concerns the common well-being of the
members, and on whatever affects the distribution of the economic resources available to them."
MACCORMICK, supra note 3, at 127.
175. ld. at 6.
176. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting CHARLES 8. MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF
SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1965)); see also K.N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96 (1979)
(linking sovereignty to the capacity of a state to "decide[) for itself how it will cope with its internal
and external problems").
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policy choices independently, and recognition by other governments "as
an independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention." 177
Some theorists have described sovereignty in de facto terms, such as
effective control over a domain, others in de jure terms, as for example,
constitutional independence. 178 Still others have focused on sovereignty's
traditional components-"rulers, allegiance, common history, the taking
of effective decisions, and the undertaking and implementing of
obligations." 179 Some scholars, taking a functional approach, have used
"sovereignty" to "denote the collection of functions exercised by a
state." 180 Similarly, sovereignty has been characterized as a "bundle of
competences," in the same manner that possession of property bestows a
"bundle ofrights." 181
Some scholars have specifically focused upon the distinction between
de jure and de facto state sovereignty. 182 States thus might be said to
possess both "legal" and "behavioral" sovereignty. 183 All states might be
said to be legally sovereign. They possess a "set of attributes that
constitutes the legal personality of a state." 184 These include such things as
legal competence to participate in the international system on an equal
footing with other states, consent to treaty obligations, the right to exclude
other states from interfering with internal matters, and control of their
borders. 185 Although all states possess these traits or competences, states
can and do differ in the extent to which they are able to exercise them.
Thus, we must look as well at the "behavioral sovereignty" of states, of
how they conduct themselves in the world. When we do so, we can see
that not all states have the capacity to fully exercise their sovereign powers
and rights. State sovereignty on this view is variable; indeed, "some states
are more sovereign than others." 186
The flexibility of the concept of sovereignty is its signature postclassical feature. This variability does not, however, demonstrate that

177. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782, 786 (2003) (quoting Richard N. Haass, former ambassador and director of Policy
Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State).
178. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 24 ("sovereignty consists of being constitutionally apart").
179. fOLWER & 8UNCK, supra note 3, at 6.
180. INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 3 (1974).
181. BLIX, supra note 26, at 11-12.
182. For a recent discussion, see Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
329 (2004).
183. /d.
184. /d.
185. /d.
186. !d.

at 329.
at 330.
at 329.
at 331-32.
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sovereignty means essentially whatever one wishes, and hence, nothing at
all. Although the indicia and formulations have varied over time and
across circumstances, "sovereignty" has commonly indicated some
amalgam of control, competence, status, rights, and recognition by
relevant communities. 187 As noted, there are few bright lines and even
fewer opportunities to empirically measure a state's sovereignty. It is not
always necessary, for example, that control over territory be de jure, nor
that it be absolute and exclusive. Recognition, and with it deference, may
come even if a government's control is somewhat marginal. A state that
exercises its "bundle of competences" will more often than not be
recognized as "sovereign" by its peers, meaning that it will be given
deference, respect, equality, or other rights, even if on a relative basis the
state suffers a deficit of power, or wealth, or force. Always, in the end, we
must attend to the actual behavior of states, which "helps to shape the
meaning of sovereignty." 188 As we shall see, at least according to some
theorists, being treated as if one is in control, or as if one has sovereign
rights, is what truly matters.
As noted, some domestic constitutional scholars insist that sovereignty
can reside only in "the people." The locus of sovereignty has also been the
subject of international scholarly attention. Originally, of course,
sovereignty resided in. the monarchy. Depending upon the form of
government, however, theorists have long acknowledged that sovereignty
might lie as well in a legislature, or in the people themselves, or both. 189
"Monarchical sovereignty has given way to popular sovereignty, and
popular sovereignty has come to be understood in terms of
representation-both political and symbolic." 190 As one commentator
observed: "[A]s states moved from absolutist to representative rule,
democratically elected governments co-opted a term that had originally
been linked with the supreme powers of a state's ruler and used it to assert
their own sovereign powers delegated to them by their citizens." 191
Republican objections notwithstanding, in terms of conceptual evolution,
it has not been at all unusual to speak in terms of "sovereign" governments
or states, recognizing of course the ultimate representative character of the
states' sovereignty.

187.
political
188.
189.
190.
191.

See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 45 ("Perhaps for many observers today domestic
supremacy amounts to little more than occupying the recognized seat of government.").
Id. at 42.
See WEBER, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing locus of sovereignty authority).
!d.
FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 6.
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Finally, international relations scholars have given the orzgms of
sovereignty far more considered attention than domestic constitutional
scholars, who are trapped between the positions that either "the states" or
"the people" consented to the Constitution and are thus "truly" sovereign.
Some international scholars have noted, in particular, that sovereignty
does not automatically arise whenever a state possesses a monopoly on
coercive power. Although the state and sovereignty reinforce one another,
there can be states (people, territory, and government) that are not in fact
"sovereign." 192 According to some scholars who have studied the origins
of modem sovereignty, a community must "recognize" the state before it
can rule effectively. 193 As one scholar stated:
It is when a sufficient element in the community in which the state
operates has sufficiently come to accept it and when, in the process
of becoming accepted to this sufficient extent, the state has adjusted
its forms and its outlook to the demands and conditions of the
community-it is then and only then . . . that the concept of
sovereignty has been newly coined. 194

Thus, sovereignty does not simply arise with the erection of a capitol,
the election of a legislature or an executive, or even the ratification of a
constitution. Rather, "[i]t is only when the community responds to the
state and the state responds to the community in which it rules that the
discussion of political power can take place in terms of sovereignty." 195
"Sovereignty," as should be obvious from even this brief discussion, is
a great deal more complex than domestic constitutional discourses
acknowledge. 196 One cannot, for example, define "sovereignty" in some
formalistic sense, or capture it by measuring guns, dollars, or personnel. It
is more than the product of some distributional calculus, for example, but
less than supreme and absolute authority within a territory. As one scholar
has observed, sovereignty is "a perpetually tentative undertaking; one can
only cite the latest edition and anticipate the next revision." 197 That does
not mean, as Skeptics contend, that sovereignty is therefore meaningless
or solely a rhetorical parry. It means, rather, that one must stay current
with the evolutionary progress of the concept. Meanings, even of basic

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
through
197.

See HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
!d. at 21.
!d.
/d.at21-22.
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 307 (describing sovereignty as "a prism
which many different legal or political problems might be examined").
FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at xi.
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constitutional concepts, change. "Our Federalism" is not the same today as
it was in, say, 1930. Neither, for that matter, is our "privacy." We can, as a
result of the evolution highlighted here, hopefully at least throw off the
classical straightjacket and see what else there might be.
B. The "New Sovereignty"

Historically, sovereignty "has been the source of greatest
preoccupation and contention when conditions have been producing rapid
changes in the scope of government or in the nature of society or in
both." 198 This is certainly the case across the globe in this modern era.
Domestically, the balance of power that resulted from the "cooperative
federalism" of the shared sovereignty era left the states in a substantially
subordinated position, leaving their "sovereign" status in some doubt.
Internationally, unique forms of governance have cropped up which have
further threatened the traditional prerogatives of states and, thus, the
concept of state sovereignty.
· The sovereignty oftoday's nation-state is beginning to bear far greater
resemblance to the framers' concept of a limited, partial, and divided
authority than to the absolute, exclusive, and final authority of the classical
model. As one international scholar noted: "One element of postmodern
statehood is that sovereignty is considered to be increasingly 'held in
common', 'pooled among governments, negotiated by thousands of
officials through hundreds of multilateral committees, compromised
through acceptance of regulations and court judgements. "' 199 In light of
the resulting limitations on state authority, the question now commonly
being asked, domestically as well as internationally, is whether the states
can still be considered "sovereign" at all.
To better appreciate the character and status of state claims to
sovereignty in the "post-modern" era, let us briefly consider the bestknown example of the trend toward limited and partial sovereignty-the
European Union. By way of a summary or overview, the EU is constituted
by the various treaties and laws that are uniformly applicable throughout
the European Union, which bind all the member states and their citizens. 200
These laws are interpreted by the European Court of Justice, which,

198. HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 2.
199. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 34 (quoting W. Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The
European Paradox, 47 POL. STUD. 503,519 (1999)) (emphasis added).
200. See JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2002).
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among other things, gives opinions to national courts in cases where there
are questions about the meaning ofEU law. 201
Pursuant to various treaties, EU member states have effectively agreed
to transfer authority to the EU in a range of policy areas-for exam~le,
intra-European trade, the environment, agriculture, and social policy.Z0 In
these areas, EU law supersedes national law. In other areas, national law
remains supreme. 203 Thus, member states have voluntarily surrendered
important aspects of their "internal" and "external" sovereignty to the EU.
According to one interpretation: "Sovereignty is pooled, in the sense that,
in many areas, states' legal authority over internal and external affairs is
transferred to the Community as a whole, authorizing action through
procedures not involving state vetoes." 204
In contravention of the classical model of sovereignty, this delegation
of authority has led to the development of a new level of supra-state legal
authority to which the member states are often subject. 205 The impact of
this new arrangement on European governance has been substantiaL EU
legislative institutions, for example, have been quite active. Until the early
1990s, the EU was adopting 6,000-7,000 laws every year; the number has
fallen significantly, by one count to about 1,500-1,800.206 The complex
structure of the EU consists of, among other things, the European
Parliament, a directly elected representative body. As the powers of this
body grow, the powers of the national legislatures may continue to
decline. 207 In certain areas, the European Commission, another institution
within the complex EU structure, is authorized to oversee negotiations
with third parties on behalf of all the member states.Z 08 In addition, the
Euro has replaced the national currencies of most of the member states. 209
Thus, the power to set fiscal policy, one of the traditional indicia of

201. See id. at 109-13 (describing the role of the European Court of Justice).
202. See Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, I EUR. L.J. 255 (1995)
(describing transfer of competences in various policy areas); see also McCormick, supra note 200, at
II.
203. See MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at II.
204. Keohane, supra note 158, at 8.
205. See SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSlTION, supra note 2, at 186-87 (noting surrender of authority by
member states over certain competences).
206. MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 89. By comparison, the United States House of
Representatives and the United States Senate each passed less than I ,000 pieces of legislation in the
latest year for which figures are available. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN, & MICHAEL
]. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 2001-2002 (2002).
207. The EU budget ($86 billion in 2002) gives EU institutions an element of financial
independence as well. McCORMICK, supra note 200, at II.
208. /d.
209. /d.
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national sovereignty, has been transferred to the European Central Bank in
Frankfurt. 210
The challenges to sovereign authority encompass more than changes in
regional governance structure. Indeed, derogations from the classical
model of sovereignty are everywhere. For instance, many nation-states
have voluntarily consented to a variety of obligations, including even
binding enforcement mechanisms, with regard to human rights. 211 As
Louis Henkin has reported: "In major regions of the world (Europe, the
Americas), states have submitted to comprehensive systems of
enforcement by commission, court, and political bodies, unthinkable to
'sovereignty' just a few years ago." 212 Another scholar has suggested that
"Europe, the cradle of external and unitary sovereignty, now serves as the
model of co-operative mutual interference." 213
In sum, EU member states have surrendered powers to decisionmaking systems that function beyond the level of the state. 214 Nation-states
have formally moved beyond the intergovernmental level to the creation of
supranational organizations and bodies of common law. 215 As one scholar

210. EU member states can still do almost everything that American states cannot do; they can
make treaties, for example, and they maintain an independent military. See McCORMICK, supra note
200, at 9-12 (discussing distinction between confederation and federation). In addition, again by way
of rough comparison, the EU institutions presently have few of the powers of the federal government
in the United States; they cannot levy taxes or operate a common military. !d. at II. The EU is thus not
a true federation like the United States. The EU cannot technically force members to remain so;
theoretically, but by no means practically, the member states can withdraw from the EU.
211. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31,4142 (1995/1996) (describing compliance and enforcement trend with regard to international human
rights).
212. !d. at 42. As Professor Henkin also noted, however, some concessions on human rights have
been over the strong objections of states who continue to invoke their sovereignty. See id. at 44 ("At
the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) some states led the attack on the idea of
human rights, and particularly on its enforcement, under the banner of 'sovereignty' ...").
213. Keohane, supra note 158, at 749.
214. Regional integration has occurred elsewhere around the globe, in the Americas, Asia, and
Africa for example. To date, however, the EU is the most highly evolved example of regional
integration in the world.
215. Some international scholars have described the EU and similar arrangements as a form of
"multi-level governance." See LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001). This descriptive theory depicts contemporary structures in EU
Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies. Under multi-level
governance, "decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels." Aalberts, supra
note 29, at 28. Thus, although the EU is not a federation, "supranational institutions have become
actors in their own right, playing an independent part in policy-making" and having substantial effects
formerly considered to be the exclusive domain of "internal" state sovereignty. !d. Subnational and
local governments have also gained in importance, resulting overall in a diminished role for nationstates. In many respects, "the traditional separation of domestic and international politics has been
undermined because of transnational associations." !d. Multi-level governance theory is based on the
idea of governance beyond the state-in other words, governance including the state, but as only one
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summarized the situation: "Overall, one can speak of a tripartite shift of
authority away from national governments: upwards, as a most direct
result of European integration; downwards, because of subnational
empowerment; and sideways to, for instance, public-private
partnerships."216 As a result, "states are only one among a variety of actors
influencing decision-making at a variety of levels, and do not by definition
have a final say."217 Nations have pooled, and thereby in some measure
limited and devalued, their "sovereignty." They have consented to
substantial interventions with respect to their "internal" sovereignty. All of
this has further widened the gap between political reality and the ideal of
classical sovereignty. "The capacity and right of existing states to exercise
supreme authority within their territory, control access to it, and speak for
their citizens outside it, have all become harder to sustain and justify."218
These and other post-modern developments have spurred some
theorists to reconsider the traditional, formal concepts of state sovereignty.
In particular, national interdependence, changes in governance structure
like the EU, and other forces have forged what some scholars have called
the "new sovereignty."219
In thumbnail form, the "new sovereignty" has two basic characteristics
that distinguish it from classical sovereignty. First, in contrast to classical
sovereignty, the new sovereignty "is not virginity, which you either have
or you don't."220 Sovereignty is not a "chunk" or absolute, but a "basket of
attributes and corresponding rights and duties." 221 This is not a new idea so
much as a return to a conception of sovereignty which had been eclipsed
for many years by the formal, classical model. As one scholar noted some
time ago: "[S]overeignty has traditionally been used as a term to denote
the collection of functions exercised by a state."222 Or as Hans Blix, the
official at the center of the pre-war weapons search in Iraq once said: "As
ownership is described as a bundle of rights, sovereignty may be described

among many actors, if still a key actor. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 28.
216. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 28.
217. /d. Intergovernmental theorists view these new governance arrangements as necessitating
bargaining, while states retain sovereignty. See, e.g., ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF
THE NATION STATE (1992) (describing intergovernmentalism theory). Supranationalists, by contrast,
view these new structures as obviating state sovereignty. See, e.g., R.A.W. Rhodes, The New
Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUDIES 652 (1996).
218. Bellamy, supra note 174, at 167.
219. See generally CHA YES & CHA YES, supra note 3.
220. Geoffrey Howe, Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain's Place in the World, 66 INT'L
AFF. 675-95 (1990).
221. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 70.
222. DELUPIS, supra note 180, at 3.
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as a bundle of competences." 223 Although sovereignty has been devalued
by new arrangements and political realities, it persists and prospers insofar
as these competences continue to be performed and used to sustain state
claims to internal sovereignty.
Second, the "new sovereignty" is not based upon a state's ability to
demand or coerce other states, or its exclusive control over policies or
other matters. Rather, the new concept of state sovereignty has been
characterized primarily in terms of a state's ability to act effectively within
international regimes. With few exceptions, nation-states cannot control,
coerce, or dictate like they used to. 224 In a word, sovereignty, once
exclusive and isolationist, has become "relational." 225 As Abram and
Antonia Chayes, leading proponents of a particular version of the "new
sovereignty," have explained: "[T]he only way most states can realize and
express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes
that regulate and order the international system." 226 Thus, states have to
maintain their sovereignty by actively practicing it, by propping it up and
maintaining it. 227
The "new sovereignty" is a substantial change from the classical
model. For one thing, sovereignty's traditionally negative, proscriptive
character has become more positive, proactive, and affirming. Sovereignty
is "a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that inhibits or limits our
capacity for action." 228 It is, to be sure, less of a sledgehammer or "slam
dunk" argument than is classical sovereignty. Sovereignty retains
considerable force and prospers insofar as nations support it by playing
functional roles and advancing winning justifications for being left alone
or being deferred to with regard to decisions and policies that affect them.
"Under conditions of extensive and intensive interdependence, formal
sovereignty becomes less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining
resource. " 229

223. BLIX, supra note 26, at 11-12.
224. Interestingly, the United States may be one of the exceptions to this general rule. Indeed,
some have noted the irony that the United States, which has always had a distributed sovereignty, has
conducted itself as a classical sovereign in foreign relations, while the states of Europe, which
originated the classical form of sovereignty, have pooled and limited their sovereignty. See generally
Keohane, supra note 158, at 744 (noting the irony of the United States clinging to a classical concept
of sovereignty in foreign affairs, while European states have adopted "pooled" sovereignty).
225. Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam: Abram Chayes, 114 HARV. L. REV. 682,685 (2001).
226. CHA YES & CHA YES, supra note 3, at 27.
227. See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at II (noting "the variety of
ways in which states are constantly negotiating their sovereignty"); id. at 12 ("sovereignty provides
textual and/or contextual prescriptions for what a state must do to be recognized as sovereign").
228. Howe, supra note 220, at 680 (emphasis added).
229. Keohane, supra note 158, at 748.
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Bargaining, of course, entails sacrifice. As the complexity of the EU
demonstrates, in order to preserve effective "behavioral"sovereignty
nation-states must give up some aspects of their formal, legal sovereignty.
Even powerful countries must support international cooperation if they
hope to preserve their policymaking autonomy. As Chayes and Chayes
have stated: "Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the vindication of the
state's existence as a member of the international system. ,mo
C. Sovereignty as a Social Construct

Developments in Europe and elsewhere have given rise to various
theories regarding state sovereignty. There are those who, without offering
a coherent theory of state sovereignty, nevertheless maintain that nations
retain their "sovereignty" despite the general erosion of their authority. 231
There are international Classicists who argue that sovereignty cannot be
shared, pooled, or negotiated. Since no state currently exercises exclusive,
final, and enforceable authority, these scholars suggest, no state is
"sovereign."232 There are international Republicans, who argue that the
concept of the sovereign state is, and in fact always has been, inconsistent
with republican and democratic principles, and an impediment to the
realization of human rights and general welfare. 233 And there are
international Skeptics, who argue that claims to "sovereignty" persist
primarily because they provide a rhetorical advantage. 234 This synthesis
should sound arrestingly familiar. Each of the domestic theories regarding

230. CHA YES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 ("[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations,
sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived selfinterest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of
international life.").
231. Intergovernmental theorists regard consolidation and interdependence as a form of
bargaining, while supranationalists see it as loss of sovereignty. See MILWARD, supra note 217
(intergovemmentalism); Rhodes, supra note 217 (supranationalism). Some scholars note that EU
members do in fact retain the final say as to whether they will remain members. It has been commonly
noted, however, that practical realities make withdrawal from the EU next to impossible. See, e.g.,
Bellamy, supra note 174, at 176 (stating that member states can formally, but not practically, withdraw
from the EU); MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 119 (noting that while withdrawal from the EU is
permissible, "it is practically unlikely, because the economic ties among the member states would
probably make it more costly to leave than to stay in").
232. See generally CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3 (questioning the continued usefulness of the
concept of sovereignty in light of interdependence and other developments).
233. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 211, at 33 ("But the benefits of a system in which states were
let alone were seen in state terms, with the individual an incidental, indirect beneficiary, and often not
a beneficiary at all.").
234. See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 170 (arguing that sovereignty is an incoherent concept).
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sovereignty discussed in Part III is indeed represented in international
scholarly discourse concerning state sovereignty.
As noted in Part III, however, none of these theories is capable of
advancing our consideration of state sovereignty very far, if at all. Part of
what the evolution of sovereignty in general, and the "new sovereignty" in
particular, demonstrates is that state sovereignty cannot, as Classicists
apparently believe, be fixed for all times and purposes. "Like all social
norms, the principle of sovereignty has a history, a history that has
involved the same sort of communicative processes that surround the
production of other social norms. " 235 Thus, "as the prescriptions for
sovereign recognition change, so does the meaning ofsovereignty."236
We might, as "new sovereignty" theorists have, go about untangling
the seeming anomaly of persistent state claims to sovereignty and
diminishing state powers by redefining sovereignty for a new era. It might
be helpful, in addition, to examine how state sovereignty is generated in
the first place, and ultimately sustained. This section looks to social
construction theory, which is well suited to this task. Some international
relations scholars have recognized that it is not particularly helpful to treat
sovereignty as something that can be measured or rigidly defined. They
have applied principles of social construction theory to examine statehood
and sovereignty as constructs, facts that are ultimately generated by human
agreement. This can help explain how it is that states continue to be
recognized and treated as "sovereign" despite their seeming loss of
classical authority. It can also help us to understand how something like
the "new sovereignty" might arise. The theory's sensitivity to the extent to
which state sovereignty is constructed enables us to track "important
qualitative changes in the meaning of both state and sovereignty."237
The section begins with a brief distillation of the basic principles of
social construction theory. It will then specifically examine how social
construction theory has been applied to the concepts of statehood and
sovereignty in the international context. Part IV will then return to
domestic constitutional concerns, incorporating the lessons learned in this
Part.

235.
236.
237.

/d.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 13.

/d. at 12.
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1. Some Basic Principles ofSocial Construction

Social construction theory essentially posits that "there are portions of
the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human
agreement," 238 that "[i]n a sense there are things that exist only because we
believe them to exist."239 Objects like money, property, governments, and
marriages have physical properties; but none of them can truly exist unless
we arrive at some agreement as to what it means to say that something is
"money," or "government," or what have you. These concepts are human
inventions.
John Searle, a leading proponent of social construction theory,
distinguishes two types of facts that order the world. "Institutional facts"
are those that "require human institutions for their existence." 24 For a
piece of paper to be a five dollar bill, for example, there must be the
"human institution of money."241 "Brute facts," by contrast, are those
which are not dependent on any human opinion.242 The fact that "hydrogen
atoms have one electron" is a "brute fact." 243 The fact that "the sun is 93
million miles from earth" is a "brute fact." 244 The fact that George Bush is
"president," by contrast, is an "institutional fact" because there must be
some shared understanding of what it means to be "president" for this
status term to have meaning. 245 To preview the discussion that follows,
social constructionists posit that "state" and "sovereignty," like
"president," are institutional, rather than brute, facts.
The distinction drawn is essentially one between matters of "brute
physics and biology" versus "features of the world that are matters of
culture and society."246 Searle and other constructionists are primarily
interested in how institutional facts are created. It is not necessary to grasp
all of the technical nuances and formal logic of social construction theory
to understand the basic process by which this occurs. According to Searle,

°

238. SEARLE, supra note 32, at I; see also P.L. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE ( 1991 ).
239. SEARLE, supra note 32, at I.
240. !d. at 2.
241. !d.
242. !d.
243. !d.
244. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 27.
245. !d.
246. !d. at 27. Social construction theory posits a need to "distinguish those true statements we
make that attribute features to the world that exist quite independently of any attitude or stance we
take, and those statements that attribute features that exist only relative to our interests, attitudes,
stances, purposes, etc." !d. at 12.
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the fundamental "apparatus" 247 necessary to account for and order social
reality includes three basic elements: (1) constitutive rules; (2) imposition
of function; and (3) collective intentionality.
Constitutive rules are critical to the construction of institutional facts.
These rules must be distinguished from mere "regulative rules." 248 A
regulative rule regulates antecedently existing activities. Hence, "drive on
the right side of the road" is a regulative rule; activity which precedes the
rule is being regulated. 249 Constitutive rules do not merely regulate.
Rather, they "create the very possibility" of certain activities. 250 Searle
gives as an example the rules of chess. 251 "Chess" cannot exist without a
set of constitutive rules to tell players and observers how it is to be played.
The rules constitute, in a sense, the game; they define it for us.
Institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules; "the
systems of rules create the possibility of facts of this type ." 252
The imposition of functions is the second critical element of the
constructive apparatus. The structure of social reality is by and large taken
for granted-"weightless and invisible"; as Searle notes, we don't reflect
on the ontology of "car" or "house" or "money" as institutional facts. 253
We see these and other objects in terms of their functions, not their
physical properties. 254 Some objects are constructed to serve specific
functions. In most cases, however, we impose some function or functions
on an object to understand it. As Searle notes, as we attribute functions to
an object (a river is used to swim in, for example), "we are situating these
facts relative to a system of values that we hold." 255 Imposed functions are
not always oriented toward some action. As Searle observes: "Sometimes
the agentive function assigned to an object is that of standing for or
representing something else."256 This type of imposition of function is
called "symbolism." 257

247. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 13.
248. ld.at27.
249. !d.
250. !d. at 28.
251. !d. at 27-28.
252. !d. at 28.
253. !d. at 4.
254. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 4. These are what Searle calls "observer-relevant" features of the
social world-they are "ontologically subjective." ld. at 9-10.
255. !d. at 14, 15. A specific feature (X) may malfunction; yet we will still consider a function of
the object itself to be X. !d.
256. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 21.
257. !d. at 21. Searle refers to symbols as a special class of "agentive function," with "agentive"
meaning matters of the use to which agents put specific entities. !d.
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Finally, the development of what Searle calls collective intentionality
completes social construction. Collective intentionality refers to the
"shared intentional states"-beliefs, desires, purposes258--of relevant
participant and observer communities. A "social" fact is, thus, any fact
involving collective intentionality or, to use another phrase, human
agreement? 59 With regard to institutional facts, collective intentionality
involves "the imposition of a collectively recognized status to which a
function is attached." 260 It is important to recognize that this does not mean
that the community of relevant actors or observers must be conscious that
they are collectively imposing a function or status; as Searle notes, in the
course of acting "they may simply evolve institutional facts." 261 "As long
as people continue to recognize [the object] as having the . . . status
function, the institutional fact is created and maintained." 262 "They do not
in addition have to recognize that they are so recognizing, and they may
hold all sorts of other false beliefs about what they are doing and why they
are doing it."263
With this basic apparatus, we can grasp the rudimentary process by
which institutional facts are generated. We first must conceptualize a
hierarchy of facts where brute facts precede institutional facts; in other
words, institutional facts essentially sit atop brute facts. 264 Currency, for
example, must exist in some physical form or another before we can
generate the institutional fact of "money."265 So too with "state," which
has a set of physical properties (territory and population, for example).
Once this physical realization is in place, the object (currency or territory)
is assigned a function and becomes, within a set of constitutive rules, the
construct we call "money" or "state."
Collective intentionality is a critical part of the movement from object
to institutional fact. 266 As Searle posits: "The key element in the move

258. !d. at 24.
259. !d. at 26.
260. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 41.
261. !d. at 47 (emphasis added).
262. !d. Searle uses the example of a boundary wall which has collapsed but is still treated as a
boundary by the community. It is intended to function the same way but the means by which it does so
is the collective recognition that the stones have a special status to which this function is attached. !d.
at 28.
263. !d. at 47-48.
264. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 34-35.
265. !d.
266. 'The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the
decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional
imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition."
SEARLE, supra note 32, at 41.
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from the collective imposition of a function to the creation of institutional
facts is the imposition of a collectively recognized status to which a
function is attached." 267 In essence, the principle of "self-referentiality"
posits that for X to be money, it "must be believed to be" money, or "used
as" money, or "regarded as" money. 268 As Searle states, "for social facts,
the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of
the phenomenon."269 Stated somewhat differently: "[P]rocess is prior to
product"; "social objects are always ... constituted by social acts; and, in
a sense, the object is just the continuous possibility of the activity. " 270
Searle reduced the basic process of institutional fact-generation to a
formula: "X counts as Yin C,"271 where X is the object, Y is the status
function, and C represents the circumstances or conditions under which X
takes on the status Y. For example, paper (X) counts as money (Y) under
certain conditions of commerce and exchange (C). Or, once again to
anticipate later discussion, state (X) counts as sovereign ( Y) under certain
conditions (C). 272 This process applies to institutions as well as objects.
Importantly, Searle notes that institutions, unlike certain other objects, do
not wear out as this formula is repeatedly invoked over time. Instead,
"each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution"; thus,
"constant use renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage,
property, and universities." 273 One can thus anticipate that repeated use
can do the same thing for institutional facts like "state" and "sovereignty."
There are two additional points which should be noted as a supplement
to this basic distillation of social construction; these will take on special
significance when we consider domestic state sovereignty as an
institutional fact. First, there is a significant linguistic component to the
generation of institutional facts. Indeed, Searle notes that "language is

267. !d.
268. !d. at 32.
269. ld. at 33. "Part of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party; part of being a
war is being thought to be a war. This is a remarkable feature of social facts; it has no analogue among
physical facts." !d. at 34. Searle also notes the possibility that a social fact can be created by means of
"performative utterances" or declarations. For example, the utterance "War is hereby declared" creates
the very state of affairs it represents. !d.
270. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 36. As Searle says, seeming to be F (the observer-relative feature)
"logically precedes" being F. Thus, "seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F." Id. at 13
(emphasis added).
271. !d. at 46.
272. Of course, "state" is itself an institutional fact. It is composed of physical properties like
territory and people. We can give the status function of state (Y) to a territory and population (X)
under certain circumstances, such as where the territory and population has come together under a
constitution or other consensual agreement.
273. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 57.
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essentially constitutive of institutional reality." 274 This stems from the fact
that for institutional facts, unlike brute ones, we need a system of
representation like language to convey and constitute the facts. 275 As a
result, "the linguistic element appears to be partly constitutive of the
fact. " 276 Symbolism is especially important to the process of generating
social constructs. "The feature of language essential for the constitution of
institutional facts is the existence of symbolic devices, such as words, that
by convention mean or represent or symbolize something beyond
themselves." 277 By "symbolism" Searle means that "there are words,
symbols, or other conventional devices that mean something or express
something or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves, in a
way that is publicly understandable." 278
The importance of symbolism makes perfect sense wheP_ we consider
that the process of institutional fact-generation requires shared
understandings. "Because the new status exists only by convention, there
must be some conventional way to represent the status or the system will
not work. "279 Thus, symbols are especially useful, indeed at times critical,
means for conveying social status constructions. 280 In terms of the formula
for generation of institutional facts: "Physically X and Y are exactly the
same thing. The only difference is that we have imposed a status on the X
element, and this new status needs markers, because, empirically speaking,
there isn't anything else there."281 Social construction theory sensitizes us
to the host of markers we otherwise take for granted. A passport, for
example, is not simply a document that permits us to leave and re-enter the
country. It is a status indicator, a "speech act" that combines with a host of
other markers to constitute institutional facts like nation and citizenship. 282
The second supplemental point is that, generally speaking, when in the
process of generating institutional facts we assign functions to an object or
institution, we generate power on its behalf. According to Searle:
"Because the creation of institutional facts is a matter of imposing a status
and with it a function on some entity that does not already have that status-

274. /d_ at 59.
275. !d. at 37.
276. !d.
277. !d. at 60.
278. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 60--61; see also id. at 66 (Linguistic symbols "symbolize
something beyond themselves, they do so by convention, and they are public").
279. !d. at 69.
280. !d. at 3.
281. !d. at 69 (emphasis omitted).
282. !d. at 119.
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function, in general the creation of a status-function is a matter of
conferring some new power."283 The creation of an institutional fact, such
as government or, indeed, sovereignty, is the conferral of power on the
institutions of government or the state. There is, Searle notes, one class of
exceptions to this typical conferral of power: "Some institutional facts
involve pure status with no further function." 284 These facts, and their
symbols, can be either honorific or critical, positive or negative.
To summarize: "The secret of understanding the continued existence of
institutional facts is simply that the individuals directly involved and a
sufficient number of members of the relevant community must continue to
recognize and accept the existence of such facts." 285 In other words,
"institutions survive on acceptance. " 286 As Searle notes, when de Gaulle
insisted during World War II on the "dignity" and "honor" of France, he
thereby "helped to re-create and maintain the French nation-state." 287 In a
similar fashion, the Declaration of Independence helped to create the
institutional fact of independence in circumstances in which that
institution did not yet exist. 288 Let us now see how this theory might apply
to the institutional facts of statehood and state sovereignty.
2. Statehood and Sovereignty as Institutional Facts
The many and increasing limitations on nation-state sovereignty call
into substantial doubt the classical conception of state sovereignty, which
is based upon the principles of absolute, unitary, and supreme power.
Indeed, many theorists see this conception as something of an easy target,
since "the day of completely autonomous decision-making does seem, for
most states on many issues, to be past." 289 As we have already seen,
classical sovereignty has not aged well.
In an effort to resolve the apparent tension between states' diminishing
power and the persistence, indeed prospering, of global "sovereignty talk,"
social construction theorists have offered an alternative to the classical
model. Social constructionists who focus specifically on statehood and
sovereignty expressly reject the reification of the state. 290 Their beginning

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

/d. at 95 (emphasis omitted).
SEARLE, supra note 32, at 96.
/d. at 117.
/d. at 118.
/d.
/d. at 118.

JAMES, supra note 3, at 179.
Reification is:
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premise is that state sovereignty is "an inherently social concept." 291 Social
constructionists look beyond material objects like wealth, power, and
territory in examining state sovereignty. Theirs is a dynamic theory of
social interaction. This means that state sovereignty cannot be defined for
all time; indeed, "the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a matter of
definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its
historical and culturally specific character. " 292 As two leading international
social constructionists have stated: "The modern state system is not based
on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a
normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society,
nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the
state)."293
Social construction theorists posit that "neither state nor sovereignty
should be assumed or taken as given, fixed, or immutable."294 The theory
"directs us to a consideration of the constitutive relationship between state
and sovereignty."295 It encourages us to "consider state, as an identity or
agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually
constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation."296
Adopting an approach that views all of international politics as socially
constructed, 297 these scholars have read statehood and sovereignty as
"institutional facts" rather than objects existing in the world as "brute
facts." 298 They have sought to explain the conditions (C) under which
brute facts like territory and population (X) "count as" a state (Y). More
importantly for present purposes, they have examined the conditions (C)
under which a state (X) "counts as" sovereign (Y). The extent to which
statehood and sovereignty are social constructs obviously differs in the

the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other than
human products-such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine
will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human
world and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to
consciousness.
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 238, at 106.
291. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at I.
292. R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 166
(1993); see also HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 126-57 (discussing the origins of modem sovereignty).
293. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 3.
294. Id. at II.
295. ld.
296. ld.
297. See generally WENDT, supra note 29 (arguing that all of international politics is socially
constructed).
298. See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3 (presenting various
social constructionist treatments of statehood and sovereignty).
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global and domestic contexts, as do the specific conditions that support the
generation of these institutional facts. 299 The general point, however, is
that statehood and sovereignty can be conceptualized as constructs.
In making this point, it helps to present the theory, as applied, in a
somewhat simplified, even mechanical manner. Thus, in terms of the basic
constructive "apparatus" described in the previous section, the constitutive
rules which make it possible to speak in terms of nation-state sovereignty
might be thought of as all of the sources of international law-treaties,
customary law, the state system itself-which together "create the very
possibility" of state interaction and claims to sovereignty. 300 Like the rules
of chess, this system of rules "create[s] the possibility of facts of this
type." 301 One of the important insights of constructionist thought in this
area is that sovereignty is relational; there must be a system of accepted
rules within which sovereigns relate to one another in order to speak of the
institutional fact of (internally and externally) "sovereign" states.
The imposition offunctions upon states is critical to the construction of
"sovereignty." Social constructionists "regard the state as an agent or
identity that may have specific roles designated to it by sovereignty."302
Nation-states earn their identities by performing certain basic functions
and having these functions associated with them over time. An example is
the inclusion or exclusion of citizens: "[E]stablishing the criteria for
national citizenship--whether in everyday discourse or by legal
proclamation--constructs the foundation of a state's identity, the
nation." 303 Similarly, "promises to provide protection from some foreign
'other' reinforce that identity."304 Although nations in the EU have lost

299. For example, international social constructionists maintain that the state itself is a social
construct. See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 3. They posit that "even
our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings, ... they are reified structures
that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness ... [which] were subsequently
diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted." Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 3 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 319, 322 (1997); see also Aalberts,
supra note 29, at 34 ("[T]he sovereign state should not be mistaken for a 'natural', consequently
unchangeable, being."); J. Anderson, The Shifting State of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodem
Territorialities?, 14 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 133-53 (1996) (examining territory as a
social construct). There is a substantial sense in which our understanding of the states is based upon
shared understandings. Nevertheless, the extent to which certain aspects of statehood like territory and
population can be considered constructs is not the same in the international and domestic realms. State
territories, for example, are far less flexible under the Constitution than they are in certain international
contexts. We may need to adapt social construction theory to make use of its general principles.
300. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 28.
301. !d.
302. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 13.
303. !d. at 13-14.
304. !d.
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certain sovereign functions-coining money, for instance-they have
undertaken a number of other functions, including representing national
interests in bodies like the European Parliament. As they perform these
functions, citizens, theorists, diplomats, and other states will eventually
come to associate their claims to sovereign status with the functions
performed. State identity is thus an ongoing process, a production that
evolves over time.
International social constructionists posit that state sovereignty is
constructed primarily "out of interaction with other states and with the
international society they form. " 305 According to these theorists, "[ s]tates
can be defined in terms of their claims to sovereignty, while sovereignty
can be defined in terms of the interactions and practices of states. " 306 The
premise is that "there is a close connection between what actors do [and
say] and what they are." 307 Social construction theorists primarily urge an
examination of "the variety of ways in which practices construct,
reproduce, reconstruct, and deconstruct both state and sovereignty." 308
Consider once again the emerging multi-level governance structures of
the EU. A positivist approach to sovereignty would focus on the empirical
realities of policy-making in the EU as central to the sovereignty issue. A
social constructionist, by contrast, posits that "a comprehension of
sovereignty as a social and political construct, existing merely by virtue of
(state) practice to accept this institutional fact for real, might be more
helpful when untangling the puzzle relating to emerging multilevel
governance structures in the states system in EU Europe." 309
In addition to state practices, social construction theorists emphasize
the language or symbols which are used to generate the institutional facts
of state and sovereignty. As one scholar has noted, the justification of
sovereignty has typically
taken the form of an appeal to higher-order values that define the
identity or raison d' etre of the state, whether they entail the pursuit
of justice, the achievement of civic glory, the protection of a
divinely ordained social order, or the advancement of individuals'
rights and the celebration of the nation. 310

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

!d. at 13.
!d. at II.
Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT,

supra note 3, at II (emphasis added).

Aalberts, supra note 29, at 33.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT,

supra note 3, at II.
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The character of justifications for state sovereignty are thus an important
part of the constructive process. For example, international social
constructionists have asserted that "an analysis of the justifications given
by states for the wars and interventions on which they embark is another
way to observe some of the practices that construct and reconstruct
sovereignty, as well as how these practices have changed over time." 311
Sometimes, for example, state justifications are based upon a symbolic
analogy to personhood; thus states, like persons, are said to have various
interests and "rights" to autonomy, equality, and independence. 312 In
urging self-determination as a part of state sovereignty, one scholar has
observed: "Within domestic society, the best way to further a moral claim
is to 'graft' it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized
human being, or to beliefs about the ideal community of such beings."313
Or, as another put it: "New ideas are more likely to be influential if they
'fit' well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical
setting." 314 Thus, part of the social construction of nation-states has
involved treating the states as self-determining and autonomous because
persons have these basic characteristics. 315 We shall see that this sort of
"grafting" is prevalent in the construction of domestic state sovereignty as
well.
Finally, the ultimate formation of a collective intentionality, or shared
understanding, of state sovereignty comes through the combination of
state functions, practices, and justifications. What sovereignty is and
entails depends upon states reaching a shared understanding of its
character. Social construction theory directs our attention in particular to
"the ways the meaning of sovereignty is negotiated out of interactions with
intersubjectively identifiable communities."316
The basic idea here is that "interaction forms the foundation[s] of
social reality." 317 As nation-states negotiate and participate in new forms
of governance structure, for example, they reinforce their sovereign status

311. /d. at 13.
312. See Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty, 27 REv.
OF INT'L STUD. 526 (2001) ("As theorists of communicative action observe, actors [seeking to justify
moral claims] usually try to associate their prescriptions with values that are already accepted as
normative within the relevant speech community.").
313. See id. at 527; see also id. ("Historically, the identity values defining ideal individuals and
states have been closely linked ... ").
314. KATHRYN SIKKINK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS: DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAZIL AND
ARGENTINA 26 ( 1991 ).
315. /d.
316. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at II.
317. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36.
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by exercising control over the process and touting their autonomy and
independence at critical junctures. 318 Even if nations cannot dictate terms,
for example within the EU, they can still substantially impact final
decisions as they form intergovernmental, and other, power structures. As
states interact with other states and institutions, they prop up and sustain
their sovereign identities; they communicate something about who they
are as they insist upon recognition. 319 The key to understanding
sovereignty as a social construct is that other nations come to recognize
and accept claims to sovereignty-whether one views this status as
indicating autonomy, or control, or equality-even though the empirical
realities do not dictate such recognition. 320 In other words, "[a]s long as
states accept and act upon each other as being sovereign, they are." 321
This does not mean, to respond to the Skeptic's concern, that state
sovereignty is a wholly subjective construct, or that it has no appreciable
effect on policy and power. Citizens, sub-state actors, and supra-state
actors all rely upon and respect state sovereignty even without the threat of
coercion or the use of force. Sovereignty may not be represented
materially, but it exists just the same. As one leading social constructionist
has noted: "Cultural phenomena are just as objective, just as constraining,
just as real as power and interest . . . The point is that the real world
consists of a lot more than material forces as such."322
In sum, through the lens of social construction theory sovereignty
"emerges as a product of knowledgeable practices by human agents,
including citizens, non-citizens, theorists, and diplomats. It is neither
natural nor ever fully 'completed.' It has to be actively propped up and
preserved, and its meanings and their referents vary across both time and
space."323 Sovereignty is social, invariably in process, and as such always
"at stake." 324 It is through interaction, practice, and justifications that

318. The theory is expressly critical of neo-realism, which combines the elements of
sovereignty-territory, population, authority, recognition-"into a single, unproblematic actor: the
sovereign state." STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 5. "What neorealists
fail to recognize, however, is how extensively the socially constructed practices of sovereignty-of
recognition, of intervention, of the language of justification--4:ontribute to the structures of
international society that exist beyond neorealist analysis." !d.
319. "When entities interact in their quality as states, their identity as sovereign states is
(re)confirmed." Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36.
320. "It is recognition ... that makes sovereignty, besides being a supposed feature of individual
states, an institution shared by many." !d. at 37.
321. !d. at 40.
322. WENDT, supra note 29, at 136.
323. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 18.
324. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 39.
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shared meanings with regard to statehood and state sovereignty arise.
Under social construction theory, sovereignty emerges not as the essence
of states, a "brute fact," but as a dynamic construct.
Social construction theory offers an alternative perspective--one that
helps move us beyond the major camps of state sovereignty detractors.
Parting company with Classicists, social constructionists do not see state
sovereignty as a brute, static fact of statehood. Rather, statehood and state
sovereignty are viewed as variable, constantly in process, negotiated, and
ultimately in need of active preservation. Note that this description echoes
the basic foundation of the "new sovereignty" described above.
Disagreeing with Republicans, international social constructionists· view
state and sovereignty as relational concepts, with states as the ultimate
locus of a representative sovereignty. Finally, eschewing the cynicism of
the Skeptic, constructionists assert that sovereignty matters because in the
"real world" sovereignty continues to be treated as if it matters.
V. TOWARD ARE-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DOMESTIC STATE
SOVEREIGNTY

This Part returns to the principal domestic constitutional concerns of
the Article. As noted, statehood and state sovereignty are imported
constitutional conceptions. If we are to continue debating "state
sovereignty" in constitutional discourse (and it certainly appears that we
are going to do so), we should consider whether the insights of those for
whom state sovereignty is a central concern might add something to our
understanding of the concept. This consideration does not mean that
sovereignty must mean precisely the same . thing for nations as for the
American states, or that statehood and state sovereignty are constructed in
precisely the same way domestically as internationally. 326 The idea, rather,
is that a different way of looking at the concept of sovereignty will benefit
our domestic constitutional discourse.

325. /d. at 35; see also id. (arguing that "structure has no meaning outside of a (state) practice to
accept certain concepts and institutions as a basic rule in international politics.").
326. For example, international social constructionists argue that the entire international political
system can be treated as a social construct. See WENDT, supra note 29. This Article does not assert that
the entire constitutional system of vertically distributed authority is a social construct. The
Constitution instructs and limits in a relatively specific manner as to many aspects of this distribution.
We know, for example, that the Constitution does not permit the states to conduct foreign policy on
behalf of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties).
Nor does it permit them to coin money. /d. Still, the Constitution does not tell us much of anything
about state "sovereignty," a concept even more readily characterized as an institutional fact than, for
example, "President."
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Based upon the discussion in Part IV, this Part puts to one side the
classical model of sovereignty. As noted, sovereignty has never in fact
been the bright line Classicists embrace. It is, rather, a still-evolving
concept that admits of no easy definition. We have to address state
sovereignty on its own terms, where it resides and where and how it is
manifested and practiced. As sovereignty has evolved, including into the
"new sovereignty" discussed in connection with international relations, it
has become less a static and formal concept than a dynamic institution.
That, in a broad sense, is the vision of state sovereignty this Part will
pursue.
Social construction theory and the concept of the "new sovereignty"
are ideally situated to examine the dynamic concept of state sovereignty.
Accordingly, accepting the demise of classical sovereignty and using the
work of international social constructionists as a model, this Part
conceptualizes domestic state sovereignty as a social, political, and legal
construct rather than a brute, inherent fact. It utilizes an adaptation of
social construction theory to sketch the construction of statehood and state
sovereignty. Social construction theory in particular enables us to move
beyond classical and skeptical arguments about whether the states are
"really" sovereign by demonstrating the construction and evolution of
state sovereignty. Using the essential elements of the constructive
apparatus, as described in Part IV-constitutive rules, imposition of
functions, and shared understandings-this Part examines the basic
process whereby the domestic state (X) counts as "sovereign" (Y) in
certain circumstances (C). It reads state sovereignty as an "institutional
fact" generated by imposed functions and statuses; a variety of legal,
political, and social discourses; and the dynamics of state practices and
interactions with citizens and other institutions.
Ultimately, the jettisoning of the classical model and the application of
social construction theory will accomplish three things insofar as domestic
state sovereignty is concerned. First, as it has in the international context,
they will reconcile the persistence of sovereignty talk in constitutional
discourse concerning the states with the limited and constrained powers
states actually possess. Second, they will provide an alternative to
Classicist, Republican, and Skeptical conceptions of state sovereignty.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, they will help to clarify the concept
of state sovereignty by explaining how it is generated and sustained. As
we shall see, all of these advances will significantly impact how state
sovereignty should be studied, practiced, and enforced.
In the end, application of social construction theory will expose two
different concepts of state sovereignty; one based upon state competence
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and substantially resembling the "new sovereignty" discussed above, and
the other a principally juridical construct based upon inherent status. After
comparing and contrasting these "two sovereignties," the Part concludes
with some thoughts regarding the implications of a new, socially
constructed state sovereignty for courts, states, and scholars.
A. A Post-Classical, Post-Modern Sovereignty

Internationalists have long understood that state sovereignty is a
variable construct that evolves over time and is, in some sense, always in
process and always "at stake." The sooner domestic constitutionalists
accept this, the sooner we can proceed with a meaningful discussion of
state sovereignty. This section speaks in broad terms of how we might
begin to reconceptualize domestic state sovereignty. The next section more
specifically applies social construction theory to the situation of the
American states.
The discussion thus far confirms what ought, in any event, to be
apparent from our own constitutional and jurisprudential history, namely
that sovereignty does not mean the same thing regardless of social,
political, or legal context. Broadly speaking, domestic state sovereignty
has indicated such disparate ideas as classical enclave exclusivity, the
exercise of sovereign competences or functions, equality among states,
and recognition of sovereign status. It has both internal (intrastate) and
external (interstate) aspects. Indeed, state sovereignty shares many of the
characteristics that have been ascribed to postmodem statehood more
generally: It "is considered to be increasingly 'held in common,' 'pooled
among governments, negotiated by thousands of officials . . . ,
compromised through acceptance of regulations and court judgements. "'327
Although diminished and shared sovereignty is a relatively recent
phenomenon for nation-states, it is part of the basic fabric of the
sovereignty of the American states.
Whatever sovereignty is or has become, a matter to which we shall
shortly tum, one version of sovereignty we can and should drop from
domestic constitutional debate is the formal or classical model. For one
thing, classical sovereignty was dead on arrival insofar as the plan of the
Constitution was concerned. It is not in any sense a fair barometer of the
concept's meaning or importance. Moreover, the conceptual evolution
described in Part IV demonstrates that states can be "sovereign" even if

327. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 34 (quoting William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The
European Paradox, 47 POL. STUD. 503, 506 (1999)) (emphasis added).

2005)

ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN?

285

they are not formally granted exclusive and final authority over a territory
or with respect to discrete enclaves of activity. States can be sovereign
even if they do not have the power to coin money, or raise an army. As
international relations scholars have recognized, when it comes to state
sovereignty, the reality has never been one of bright line rules, but rather
one of degrees. In this country, as in the rest of the world, sovereignty has
always been less about formalism, juridical or otherwise, than about state
practices and intergovernmental dynamics.
The Supreme Court's several failed attempts to enforce a classical
model of sovereignty, prominently in the early era and more fleetingly in
the "late" era, demonstrate the implausibility of the classical concept.
These failures indicate that the classical model of sovereignty cannot
properly account for social, political, and legal realities. The post-New
Deal revolution is strong evidence that the Court cannot construct classical
state sovereignty by simple judicial fiat. Concepts like the "new
sovereignty," as well as theories of social construction, teach that such
formalism cannot account for the institutional fact of state sovereignty,
which must be based upon broader understandings and must account for
political, historical, and social realities.
Social construction theory suggests that it is not productive to continue
thinking and speaking of state sovereignty in terms of material facts like
wealth and power, dollars and personnel, or the relative distribution of
these sorts of things. To a substantial extent, sovereignty is about respect
for and recognition of governments and communities that are at a
profound disadvantage on these terms. As discussed below, this respect
and recognition are products of what states do, how they are perceived in
the world, and how their claims to sovereignty are justified. This is why
nations with less than complete control over territory, or little wealth or
power, often nevertheless succeed in advancing claims to sovereign rights
and recognition. In order to appreciate what sovereignty is or means, we
have to account for social, political, and legal discourses and, most
especially, state and federal practices. We have to appreciate how
sovereignty is generated; how it becomes an expectation, an ingrained
norm of governmental and intergovernmental relations.
Indeed, one of the benefits that flows from reconceptualizing state
sovereignty in terms of concepts like the "new sovereignty" and social
construction theory is that we can better identify and study the concept.
Sovereignty becomes more accessible and meaningful when it is viewed
as a construct rather than a brute fact, as a dynamic process rather than a
static formality. The focus necessarily shifts to what states do, whether
that is litigating, bargaining, making claims to local control, acting as a

286

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

83:229

community, acting as the people's agent in supra-national institutions, or
acting as a trustee of local welfare. The continued performance of these
sorts of things props up the states' sovereignty, reinforcing that they are in
some meaningful sense in charge of a domain, in possession of a "bundle
of competences," or entitled to recognition by their peers or federal
authorities. In terms of social construction theory, we can better appreciate
that "each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that
institution. " 328
The Supreme Court, of course, plays a role in all this, chiefly in
validating state claims to sovereign status and recognition. To be sure, the
Court must stand ready to occasionally remind Congress that there are
limits to its sovereignty. By and large, however, meaningful and sustained
boundaries arise from things like state practices; political, academic, and
social discourses; and state justifications, not the handing down of judicial
decrees. The focus for scholars thus cannot be Court-myopic. The
discussion in Part IV suggests, rather, that we can locate state sovereignty
in a complex dynamic process involving, among other things, symbolism,
state practices, various discourses, and the normative basis for state
justifications. This dynamic is manifested in everything from judicial
opinions, to ordinary state legislation, to state negotiations with federal
regulatory authorities, to judicial deference and doctrine, to state
innovations and practices. Indeed, it is even manifested in such seemingly
trivial things as state speech acts like flags, license plates, and other
symbols. If we are looking for post-modem state sovereignty, we cannot
find it in the United States Reports alone.
Substantively, international relations theorists have discovered that
post-classical, post-modem state sovereignty can in fact be limited, partial,
and divided yet still support claims to state control and deference. The
heretofore curious nature of American-state sovereignty has thus become
something less of an anomaly the world over. Compromised or pooled
authority is still, as the experiment of the EU demonstrates, nonetheless a
form of sovereignty. Indeed, some have suggested that by pooling their
sovereignty, EU members have actually enhanced their authority by
enabling members to accomplish things together that they could not
achieve separately. 329 Whether or not that is the case, it is at least clear that
by voluntarily devaluing their sovereignty, nations have not thereby ceded
it altogether. Sovereignty has, true to its dynamic character, changed

328. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 57.
329. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 3, at 187 (noting that it may be the case that cooperation among
states enables them to do things in unison they could not otherwise do).
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shape. On one view, it has become a bargaining resource, a sort of earned
recognition. Whatever its form, it is clear that for nations, as social actors,
sovereignty retains significant meaning. The same is true within our
borders as well. That is why, despite skeptical disavowals, the concept of
state sovereignty will not simply fade away.
There is more here than a simple affirmation of the Framers'
prescience that states can be "sovereign" even if they are only partially so.
Viewing state sovereignty as a resource has important implications for
how state sovereignty can and will be exercised in the future. The
governors of California, Texas, New York, and Florida recently decided to
pool their political influence and form a group they call the "Big Four" to
lobby Congress on behalf of their states' interests. 330 They did this
apparently to counteract what they felt was the disproportionate influence
of the smaller states in securing federal funds and advancing their agendas.
This is an unusually flexible, if understandably pragmatic, sharing of state
sovereignty. It demonstrates, as does the EU, that states can sometimes
enhance their individual sovereignties by pooling or sharing their power.
States are doing this sort of thing in other, more ordinary, contexts as well,
such as "pooling" their resources in lawsuits designed to protect local
environments or to force federal policy changes. 331
In sum, thus far this Article has suggested that a re-conceptualization of
domestic state sovereignty must move beyond classical constraints and
recognize that sovereignty is a great deal more relative than, say, virginity.
The meaning of sovereignty has changed from one era to the next, in
response to historical, social, legal, and political circumstances the
Classicist largely ignores. As the EU and other global events have shown,
there is indeed a meaningful sense in which we can speak of "divided,"
"partial," and "pooled" state sovereignty. There is a sense, as well, in
which we can meaningfully speak of states as the locus of sovereignty, if
only in a representative sense. More important than fixing the meaning or
locus of state sovereignty, however, is understanding the process whereby
state sovereignty, in all these various forms, is actually generated and
sustained. In order to concretize these admittedly general observations, the
Article next turns to social construction theory.

330. See Raymond Hernandez & AI Baker, Governors Join As "Big Four"' To Pool Clout, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2004, at Bl.

331. See Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2004, at A15 (reporting that California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, Vern.ont, and Wisconsin had joined a lawsuit against companies emitting carbon dioxide).
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B. The Construction of the Sovereign States ofAmerica
This section, following the lead of a group of international relations
scholars discussed in Part IV, utilizes the principles of social construction
to demonstrate that domestic state sovereignty is an institutional, rather
than a brute, fact. It applies the basic apparatus of social construction to
the concept of American state sovereignty.
1. The Constitutive Rules of State Sovereignty
The Constitution, as mentioned, does not contain the term
"sovereignty." Sovereign statehood is a human invention, a legal, social,
and political object that has been constructed over time, based upon shared
understandings. Although the Constitution does not invoke "state
sovereignty," it does contain certain basic "constitutive rules" that allow
for its construction. Recall that "constitutive" rules, unlike "regulative"
rules, do not merely regulate activity. "Federalism," for example, provides
various regulative rules which have at various times curtailed and
expanded federal exercise of enumerated powers. These rules or standards
regulate institutional activity (commerce, for example) that would
otherwise occur regardless of the Constitution. Constitutive rules, by
contrast, do more than merely regulate existing activity. They "create the
very possibility" of certain activities. 332 As analogized by Searle, think of
the rules of chess as an example of constitutive rules. Without the rules of
the game, there would be no such thing as "chess." As for "chess," so too
for "sovereignty."
The constitutive rules with regard to state sovereignty are set forth in
the Constitution itself, in what constitutional scholars generally refer to as
its "structure." These rules make it possible to speak of the states as
"sovereign." Without these rules, the very notion of "dual sovereignty"
would not be plausible.
a. The Rule of Preservation
The rule of sovereign self-preservation is the most critical. AntiFederalists feared that the Constitution would utterly annihilate the states.
Yet with all of the changes that have occurred with regard to the regulative
rules of federalism, the constitutive rule of state preservation has remained
fixed in constitutional structure. It is at least clear, as the Supreme Court

332. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 28.
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has said, that "neither government may destroy the other." 333 The
Constitution, the Court declared in Texas v. White, "looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." 334
The Constitution reinforces the constitutive rule of state preservation in
various structural provisions. As the Court noted in Lane County v.
Oregon, 335 "in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of
the States ... is distinctly recognized." 336 The Constitution protects, for
example, the territorial integrity of the states. 337 State citizenship, as well,
is expressly recognized and carries with it certain privileges. 338 The
Constitution cannot be amended without the participation of the states. 339
Finally, the Guarantee Clause 340 "presupposes the continued existence of
the states and ... those means and instrumentalities which are the creation
of their sovereign and reserved rights."341
In order to protect their right to exist, states are entitled to defend
themselves against internal threats to integrity, peace, and tranquility.
Thus, states, like any other authority with "internal" sovereignty, may
prosecute criminals in order to preserve their existence, as well as their
internal "peace and dignity." 342 "Each [state] has the power, inherent in
any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against
its authority and to punish such offenses ... " 343 Although one hopes it
does not come to pass, states may also resist efforts by internal or external
forces to extinguish or annihilate them altogether. The Second
Amendment, whose meaning with regard to who retains the "right" to bear
arms has yet to be definitively resolved, contemplates the existence in all
free states of a "well regulated Militia."344 Moreover, states may also

333. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514,523 (1926).
334. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
335. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).
336. !d. at 76; see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77
B.U. L. REv. 1089 (1997) (noting the Court's embrace in federalism areas of the sort of penumbral
reasoning common to substantive due process precedents).
337. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction
of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.").
338. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2.
339. U.S. CONST. art. V.
340. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
341. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,414-15 (1938).
342. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,
90 (1985) (under "dual sovereignty" principle, state can prosecute person for crime even if another
state has also prosecuted for same offense).
343. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
344. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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expect that central governmental power will be used to protect their
existence should it be threatened. 345
The first constitutive rule with regard to statehood, and the one that
more than any other indicates that states are intended to be a permanent
part of the plan of government, is the rule of preservation. Whatever else
the central government may be empowered to do, it may not destroy the
states.
b. The Rule of Separateness

It would make little sense to preserve the states if the central sovereign
could simply dictate to them such basic principles as the formation of their
governments. The Constitution thus sets forth, in various structural
provisions, a constitutive rule of separateness. This rule, like the rule of
preservation, provides support for state claims to "internal" sovereignty.
The Constitution contemplates that state governments will be
composed of legislative, judicial, and executive branches. 346 It gives no
authority, however, to the central government to dictate who may serve in
state governments, where they may serve, the manner in which they shall
be chosen, what their basic qualifications must be, or how these
institutions of government are to be funded. 347 Thus, as to all of these
things, the states must have the final say.
As the Supreme Court has said, these are "functions essential to
separate and independent existence."348 The Constitution by negative
implication provides that these functions must remain within the exclusive
control of the states. In this sense, the rule of separateness makes it
possible to speak in terms of"state sovereignty."

345. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.").
346. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[t]he Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution").
347. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (the "power to locate its own seat of
government, and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to
appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers"); see
also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548,570-71 (1900); Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892).
Only the states, for example, may establish the qualifications for voters for state and local elections.
348. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,76 (1868).
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c. The Rule ofParticipation
The Constitution also plainly provides that states possess the right to
participate in the governance of the Nation. In matters both small and
large, the Constitution sets forth a rule of political participation which
allows us to speak in terms of "sovereign" states.
Article V absolutely and unequivocally guarantees to each state equal
suffrage in the Senate. 349 This guarantees that each state will have an equal
vote in all matters of national governance. It requires that all states be
granted an equal opportunity to be heard on legislative proposals. Unlike
states' representation in the House of Representatives, which, because it is
based upon population, varies, the right to equal suffrage in the Senate is a
constant and an absolute. 350 Unless a state consents to its waiver, this right
cannot be diluted or abridged. In this sense we can begin to speak in terms
of the "external" sovereignty of the states; each state has the right to have
its vote counted equally among its "peers."
Article V also grants states the right to participate in the constitutional
amendment process. 351 It guarantees that the states shall have a substantial
voice in all fundamental proposals to alter the basic charter of government.
This right, too, is subject to neither abridgement nor denial. In addition,
Article II of the Constitution preserves an important role for the states in
the selection of the president. 352 State electors are appointed, and must
meet in their respective states to cast their votes for president. States thus
play a critical role in the selection of the nation's chief executive.
The rule of political participation preserves a substantial role for the
states in national governance. The constitutional structures that comprise
this rule place the states at the center of the Nation's political activity. The
states have the final say in important decision-making not only at the local,
but also at the national level.

349. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate").
350. See THE fEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), at 365 ("[T]he
equal vote allowed to each State [in the Senate] is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty.").
351. See id. (providing that proposed amendments may be ratified by the legislatures of three
fourths of the states, or by conventions in three fourths of the states).
352. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ I, cl. 2 (requiring the choice of state Electors).
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d. The Rule of Interpretive Independence
Article III of the Constitution sets forth the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 353 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the "judicial power of
the United States" does not generally extend to matters relating solely to
the constitutions or laws of the states. 354 By clear negative implication, and
as an incident of federalism, the Constitution provides that the states
should generally be free to interpret their own laws and constitutions. 355 So
long as no federal constitutional right or power is implicated, the states
possess interpretive independence.
This is a significant, although often underappreciated, aspect of state
sovereignty. It means that so long as no federal constitutional right or
power is implicated, the states are the final interpreters of their own laws
and constitutions. For example, the New York courts recently invalidated
that state's death penalty scheme, a decision that, since it was based solely
on state law, could not be appealed to the Supreme Court. 356 The
Constitution's constitutive rule of interpretive independence empowers the
states to decide such pivotal issues for themselves, free from federal
interference.
These are the constitutive rules-preservation, separateness,
participation, and interpretive independence-which make it possible to
speak in terms of a "dual sovereignty" under our constitutional system.
These rules do not define state sovereignty. They do, however, establish a
legal and communicative baseline for our thinking about statehood and,
thus, ultimately about state sovereignty. Some of the rules, like those
involving participation and interpretive independence, position the states
as final decision-makers. Some, like separateness, invoke "internal"

353. See U.S. CONST. art. lll, § 2, cl. 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority ... ").
354. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (noting that the Court generally defers to
state courts on the interpretation of state law); Minnesota v. Nat'! Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)
("It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state
constitutions."). There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. The most famous such exception in
recent years is, of course, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In that case, the Court refused to defer to
the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida election law. See id. at 115 ("To attach definitive
weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has
actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the
explicit requirements of Article 11.").
355. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (recognizing that the Court acts as an
'"outsider[]' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction"
and that deference to state courts "helps build a cooperative judicial federalism").
356. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) (invalidating state deadlock instruction).
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sovereignty, while others, like equal participation, sound in "external"
sovereignty. There is enough in these constitutive rules, this constitutional
structure, to at least permit talk of the "sovereign" states in a de jure sense.
To get at the heart of the "institutional facts" of statehood and state
sovereignty, however, we must examine the remainder of the constructive
process. To do this, we must consider the imposition of functions upon the
"state," the language and form of state justifications for sovereignty, the
variety of discourses on state sovereignty, and the dynamic process of
state interaction with citizens and institutions.
2. Sovereign Symbolism: Imposition ofFunction and Status

With the basic constitutive rules in place, this section will further
elaborate the circumstances (C) in which the state (X) is considered to
possess the status of sovereign (Y). 357 By way of review, recall four
general principles from the discussion, in Part IV, of social construction
theory generally, and of the construction of nation-state sovereignty in
particular. First, statehood and sovereignty are variable constructs; their
meaning changes depending upon, among other things, the functions or
statuses imposed upon them. Second, the specific manner in which state
sovereignty is justified or represented, including the symbols or metaphors
used to depict it, are of critical importance in understanding the
construction of statehood and sovereignty. Third, as Searle notes, these
symbols and justifications usually result in the transfer of some power to
an object. 358 The exception is a class of status symbols, which can be
either positive or negative in character and substantive effect and which
relate more to sheer status than to power or function. Fourth, and finally,
the meaning of an institutional fact like sovereignty ultimately depends
upon the formation, over time, of shared understandings or agreements by
relevant communities that states are entitled to be recognized and treated
as sovereign.
The state consists of certain brute, empirical facts. Each state has
territory, people, and a government. In terms of moving beyond these

357. Recall that X is the object, Y is the status function, and C is the circumstances or conditions
under which X takes on the status Y. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 46. The "state" is also, of course, a
construct. Its empirical elements (X}--territory, population, and government--constitute a "state" (Y)
under certain conditions (C). In the interest of economy, that process is not elaborated here. For a
discussion in the international context of the social construction of the state itself, see Alexander B.
Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary
Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 81.
358. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 95.
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brute facts, and demonstrating the general process by which statehood and
state sovereignty are constructed, we are fortunate to have a rich
symbolism in constitutional discourse. States have been depicted or
represented using no less than eight symbols or metaphors. We can map
the general construction of statehood and sovereignty by tracking these
symbols, noting the functions and statuses they impose on states and the
way they have been used to justify, or at times to refute, claims of state
sovereignty. These symbols represent functions, values, and statuses that
are attached to states and which delineate state sovereignty. In order to see
clearly how it is that state sovereignty is ultimately accepted or agreed
upon, however, we must in addition examine the practices of states, the
various discourses in which their sovereignty is debated, and the effect
these and other forces have on the ultimate recognition of state claims to
sovereignty.
As it happens, the eight symbols of sovereign statehood that have been
most prominent in constitutional discourse can be readily divided into
those which impose specific functions on the states, and those which are
based exclusively upon status. As we shall see, this makes it possible, in
the end, to characterize modem state sovereignty both in terms of state
competences and in terms of pure state status.
a. Functional Symbols

Recall that the Classicist would separate state function or competence
from the concept of state sovereignty, arguing in essence that the states
would perform many of their various functions whether or not they were
considered "sovereign." 359 Social construction theory, by contrast, holds
that it is primarily through the imposition of functions that institutional
facts like sovereignty are ultimately generated. State function and state
sovereignty are thus conceived as relational; the identity roles assigned to
states are therefore intimately tied to their most effective claims to
"sovereignty. " 360

359. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1670-75 (arguing, in response to normative justifications for state
innovation and attention to local problems that "the realization of those benefits does not require a
system of judicially protected state sovereignty"). Note here the narrow emphasis on judicial
enforcement of state sovereignty. Classicists like Professor Gey are not concerned with whether or not
the states enforce, or construct, their own sovereignty through the functions they perform.
360. Recall that in forming a shared understanding of an institutional fact like state sovereignty,
the community of relevant actors or observers need not be conscious that they are collectively
imposing such a function; in the course of acting they may simply evolve institutional facts. SEARLE,
supra note 32, at 47. "As long as people continue to recognize the [object] as having the ... status
function, the institutional fact is created and maintained." !d. Searle uses the example of a boundary
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(1) State as Trustee

Early defenders of the constitutional design, eager to rebut arguments
that the states would be wholly annihilated in the new government,
conceived of the federal and state governments as "but different agents
and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated
for different purposes."361 Defenses of the plan of the constitutional
convention routinely emphasized that states would be considered
"sovereign" insofar as they served the people's local and, hence, most
basic needs. As trustees, states were supposed to administer the day-to-day
needs of the political community. 362 The Constitution, Madison stated,
"leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all
other objects" of legislation not among the enumerated powers of the
central government. 363
Recall that the origins of sovereignty in civil society depend to some
extent on the community's recognition of the sovereign authority of the
government. 364 In administering local welfare, the Framers believed that
the States would be the most recognizable forces in people's lives. The
state-as-trustee metaphor represents the early belief that the States would
have a "superiority of influence" with the people; this, it was believed,
"would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national
government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the
attention of the State administrations would be directed. " 365 So long as the

wall which has collapsed but is still treated as a boundary by the community. /d. at 39. It is intended to
function the same way but the means by which it does so is the collective recognition that the stones
have a special status to which this function is attached. See id. at 39. Moreover, these communities "do
not in addition have to recognize that they are so recognizing, and they may hold all sorts of other false
beliefs about what they are doing and why they are doing it." /d. at 47-48. Again, to utilize one of
Searle's examples, we may actually, although quite mistakenly, believe the King to be divinely
appointed to rule. See id. at 96. So long as we believe it, however, and act upon that belief in
submitting to the King's authority, then it matters not that we are mistaken in our belief. See id.
361. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987).
362. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 296 (James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987) (noting
that state power would "extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State."); see also John C. Yoo, Federalism and Judicial Review, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 164 (Mark R.
Killenbeck ed., 2002) ("Broadly stated, the Framers understood the Constitution to grant the national
government primarily those powers involving foreign relations. The states would retain primary
jurisdiction over almost all other domestic matters, such as taxation, judicial administration and law
enforcement, and social and moral legislation.").
363. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987).
364. See discussion supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
365. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987) (emphasis
added).
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states actively attended to local matters like taxation, crime, and morality,
they would be recognized, both by the people and by the central
government, as "sovereign." They would enjoy the benefit of a special
attachment to the people. 366
In the early days of the republic, it was hoped or believed that citizen
"affection, esteem, and reverence" for their state governments "would
insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render
them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union." 367 But the Framers
recognized that the states' sovereignty might be diminished, or transferred
to the central government, should the states fail to effectively use what
would become known as their "police powers." 368 Indeed, critics of the
concept of sovereign statehood have noted that "local" needs are, more
often than not, today met by central authorities. 369 The power that has
accrued over time to the national government has significantly blurred the
distinction between what is "local" and what is truly "national." There is at
present scarcely an area of our lives which is not affected by federal rule
or regulation.
Social construction theory can help us to understand why, in light of
this seeming diminution of state power, the states continue nevertheless to
be regarded as "sovereign." The theory posits that sovereignty cannot be
measured as a "brute" fact; it is not a matter of dollars and cents, or
relative manpower, or a demarcation of supposed "enclaves," or even
numbers oflaws or regulations. We cannot say, for example, that the states
are only "forty percent responsible" for local welfare and thus not truly
"sovereign."370 Rather, we must examine, with regard not only to the

366. Based upon this rough division of functions, Hamilton reasoned as follows:
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood,
to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to
feel a stronger bias toward their local governments than towards the government of the
Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration
ofthelatter.
THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (James Madison) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987).
367. !d. (emphasis added).
368. The same point applies to other structures of shared sovereignty. Although EU institutions
are not today capable of overshadowing their national members, this may not always be the case.
369. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 929-30 (discussing rise in national administrative
power).
370. Rubin & Feeley suggest that sovereignty is a function of the "control over appointed
officials, public resources, and regulatory rules." !d. at 931. No doubt, as a simple matter of resources
and brute strength, states are at a sizeable disadvantage. A social constructionist would submit,
however, that the matter is not one of quantitative comparison--of physical, political, and
administrative power. See id. at 929-31 (suggesting a typology of powers in which states are inferior).
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trustee function but also the remaining functions that have been imposed
upon the states, the discourses, dynamics, and practices which generate
and ultimately sustain state claims to sovereignty.
The imposition of the function of trustee is, of course, deeply ingrained
in our constitutional, political, and social discussions. We are indebted to
the Framers for this. Their understanding has been brought forward by
academic discourse, which has a tendency to pay homage to the Framers'
statements and opinions. This discourse has typically touted trusteeship, or
some version of it, as one of the virtues of vigorous statehood. 371 Various
theories, including most recently economics and public choice theories,
have been utilized to explain why some decisions are better left to local
decision-makers. 372 Indeed, although there is no quantitative measure for
this, it seems that most theorists support at least the rudimentary
proposition that there is a role for the states as "trustees" of local welfare.
So do most members of the current Supreme Court, although they actually
say so on a relatively infrequent basis. Every now and then, however, the
Court reminds us that there may be some areas of local control, like crime
and marriage for instance, that Congress may not encroach upon. 373
At various critical points in our history, political discourse has
similarly emphasized the importance of local control. "States' rights" has
been a rallying cry, for example, for supporting state control of matters
like morality and education. 374 Of course, most rightly rejected the racist
agenda some sought to further under the banner of "states' rights" and
state sovereignty. 375 Still, the sentiment at the heart of the justification for
local control was one with seemingly broad appeal in other contexts. One
could certainly disagree with Governor Wallace's persistent refusal to
permit desegregation of the schools yet still accept the idea that there
ought to be some limit to central intervention in the "internal sovereignty"
of the states.

It is a matter of the way in which states use the power and authority they do have, how they assert their
sovereignty, and how others accept state claims to sovereignty.
371. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 525-30
(1995) (discussing traditionally stated values offederalism).
372. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward A Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 27490 (1990) (elaborating on the conditions under which local law dominates national law).
373. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (gender-motivated crime);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,563-64 (1995) (gun possession and local safety; marriage).
374. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN
IMPERIO, 1776-1876 (2000).
375. See WILLIAM RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGINS, OPERATION, AND SIGNIFICANCE (1964)
(examining connection between "states' rights" and racism).
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More benignly, and no doubt to greater effect in terms of constructing
state sovereignty, presidents and other public officials have regularly
touted the "devolution" of power from the federal government to the
states. This is now a ritual of presidential and other politics. President
Nixon declared: "It is time for a New Federalism in which power, funds,
and responsibility will flow from Washington to the states and to the
people. " 376 President Reagan in the 1980s and the Republican-controlled
Congress in the 1990s also aggressively pushed agendas of
"devolution."377 This was partially reflected in the discretion granted to
states to, for example, set eligibility requirements for federal welfare
programs. 378 Even within this federal regulatory scheme, states managed to
exercise substantial control over welfare policy. Midwestern and Southern
states, for example, "took a harder line [than federal regulations required],
reflecting a tougher work ethic."379 With these and other transfers of
power, "state governments have become increasingly competent in
economic regulation and public administration."380 The "devolution"
agenda remains popular today with the Bush Administration. 381
More generally and closer still to the ground, again as part of what we
might consider their "internal" sovereignty, states (and, by delegation of
authority, localities) actively exercise their so-called "police powers."
These powers affect such critical life decisions as who may marry or
adopt, whether one may seek assistance in ending a life, and whether the
state itself may take life as punishment for criminal behavior. 382

376. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227, 288 (1996) (quoting President
Richard Nixon).
377. See generally id. See also JOHN J. DilULlO & DONALD F. KETTL, FINE PRINT: THE
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1995).
378. See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 257-92 (1998) (describing the "evolutionary devolution" of the mid1990s).
379. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN
AMERICA 191 (1992).
380. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C.
L. REv. 663,672 (2001).
381. See Felicity Barringer, Bush Seeks Shift in Logging Rules, N.Y. TiMES, July 13, 2004, at AI
(reporting that the administration has proposed a rule leaving it to state governors to determine what, if
any, limits there should be on logging in national forests).
382. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding a state legislative "consensus" that
execution of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (I 997) (canvassing state laws on assisted suicide); Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of
Children and Family Servs. 377 F.3d 1275 (I Ith Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida's ban on adoption by
practicing homosexuals).
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Notwithstanding the undeniably enhanced federal role in virtually all
matters of governance, the ubiquitous exercise of these and other state
"police" powers reinforces the states' trustee relationship with citizens.
The object of regulation does not necessarily have to be something as
critical as birth, death, or marriage to contribute to sovereignty's
construction. We do not usually focus upon such seemingly trivial things,
but even when states issue driver's licenses, or liquor licenses, or
prosecute crimes, or prohibit smoking in bars, or the use of hand-held cell
phones while driving, they are in effect making effective claims to
sovereign control. Each such exercise or practice of this imposed function
reinforces the institutional fact of the "sovereign" trustee acting in
pursuance of the general welfare. This occurs, as social construction
theory posits, whether or not we are conscious of the process.
We must, as some of these examples demonstrate, be generally aware
of the influence of the media in the constructive process. In particular,
controversies which stem from the states' police powers and which play
out on a grand public stage, nationally or regionally, for example,
reinforce on a broad scale the perception that the states retain substantial
control over matters of local welfare. This perception is a crucial element
of the construction of state sovereignty, since "for social facts, the attitude
that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the
phenomenon."383 The current debate regarding whether homosexuals
should have the right to marry is only the latest example. The focus in this
de bate has primarily been on the acts of state (and in some cases sub-state)
officials in Massachusetts, New York, and California. There has been
national debate, to be sure, but it has been mostly a reaction to events and
circumstances in the states. The states effectively set the agenda in this
debate over morality; indeed, even if there is to be a constitutional
amendment, the states will be intimately involved in shaping policy. This
is, of course, nothing particularly new. The states have a long history of
regulating local morality in such areas as assisted suicide, narcotics
legislation, and public nudity. Over time, we have all come to expect that
the states will largely control this agenda, and to a substantial extent have
the "final say" with regard to morality. 384
Far more than citizen perception is being affected and generated in
these contexts. Over time, the imposition of the trustee function, and more

383. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 33.
384. Even silly proposals, such as the recent measure proposed in the Louisiana legislature to ban
the public wearing of "low rider" pants and other revealing clothing, help to reinforce the notion that
local values and morals are the domain of the states.
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importantly its repeated exercise by states, has a real and substantial effect
on the attitudes and perceptions of supra-state regulators, who often reach
an understanding that deference to state "trustees" on such matters is
generally appropriate. 385 Federal courts, for example, are both loathe to
interfere with the exercise of state police powers and increasingly likely to
look to state examples when fashioning new constitutional rules. Thus, for
example, when the Supreme Court examined a claim to a "right" to
assisted suicide, it canvassed state laws to determine what state practices
had been on the matter. 386 This has now become a regular practice of the
courts in deciding whether certain unenumerated rights exist under the
Constitution. Similarly, when the Court was asked to decide whether the
Constitution prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded, it based its
decision on the number of state laws that prohibited the practice. 387
It is not only the federal courts which respect and recognize the states'
claim to trusteeship with regard to "local" matters. While federal
regulators are often less reticent than the courts to interfere with the state's
role as trustee, the pragmatic truth is that it is often just plain bad politics
to do so. As a result, the vast array of state general welfare laws are not
subject to any federal influence or intervention whatsoever. In other areas
once thought to be truly local, such as education, states may no longer
exercise exclusive control. But this does not mean that they make no valid
claim to "sovereignty" in such areas. States, like modem nations
participating in supranational institutions, can be powerful and effective
negotiators on behalf of their citizens. The course of the No Child Left
Behind Act, a recent major federal overhaul of public education, is one
case in point. 388 The path of this law demonstrates that the federal
government is not at liberty to simply enact such measures and then
wholly disregard the objections of the states. Since its passage, the No
Child Left Behind Act has been subject to sustained and vocal state
criticisms. 389 Federal authorities thus have had little choice but to negotiate
with the affected states. As a result, numerous exemptions to federal rules

385. See. e.g., Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Press Ahead on Anti-Gay Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al5 (noting opposition to federal solution to gay marriage by, among
others, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who noted that "[t]he regulation of marriage has long
been under the purview of the states ... and I believe that is where it should remain").
386. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (canvassing state laws on assisted suicide).
387. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (invalidating legislation which provided for the execution of the
mentally retarded, based primarily upon the Court's finding of a state legislative "consensus" that such
punishment was deemed cruel and unusual).
388. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001).
389. See Sam Dillon, President's Initiative to Shake Up Education Is Facing Protests in Many
State Capitols, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at Al2.
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and regulations have been granted. 390 This is not an aberrant pattern. The
same process has affected other areas of traditionally "local" concern.
Federal welfare, environmental, and labor regulations, among others, have
all been significantly altered in response to state concerns.
States thus may not exercise exclusive control in these and other areas,
but federal authorities feel compelled, politically and otherwise, to
negotiate with them and often to accommodate their concerns. State
sovereignty in this sense is like the "new sovereignty" of nations, who can
no longer dictate outcomes but who nevertheless exercise sovereign
prerogatives through such things as cooperation and bargaining. The
perception that the states are "sovereign" trustees is thus inter-subjective;
it is shared by states, federal courts, federal regulators, and citizens. This
understanding is not some academic construct; it has tangible, objective
effects in terms of the shape of policies that affect local concerns. In sum,
it is the "shared understanding" that states are in some sense "sovereign"
that keeps the federal government from simply dictating terms to them.
The examples could well be multiplied many times over, and in a
variety of policy areas. In these and other generally non-transparent ways,
the idea that the states are "sovereign trustees" has become, over time, a
shared understanding. One aspect of state sovereignty, namely control
over local welfare and conditions, or "internal" sovereignty, has been
constructed as a result of historical, academic, judicial, and political
discourses, and more importantly as a result of continuous state practices
like the exercise of their police powers and the securing of exemptions
from federal regulations. States are thus regarded as, and ultimately treated
as, "sovereign" not because they have a monopoly with regard to local
concerns or the ability to stave off all federal regulation, but because there
is an agreement that they are the most legitimate locus of authority with
regard to issues of local welfare.

(2) State as Agent
As mentioned, the Framers considered the states to be "but different
agents and trustees of the people .... " 39 I As trustees, states function as the
primary administrators of local health, safety, welfare, and morals.

390. Diane Jean Schemo, Rules Eased On Upgrading U.S. Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2004, at
A20; Diana Jean Schemo, 14 States Ask U.S. to Revise Some Education Law Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2004, at A16; Diana Jean Schemo, New Exceptions in Testing Law For Some 111 or Injured
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A14; Diana Jean Schemo, States' End Run Dilutes Burden
For Special Ed, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2004, at AI.
391. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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Sovereignty in this sense is effective control over internal concerns like
health, safety, and morality. The imposition of the agency function
contributes further to the construction of state sovereignty. In terms of
agency, the states serve, or again are at least perceived to serve, as buffers
and representatives in interactions with other states and with the central
government.
The agency function, like the trustee function, originated with the
Framers. Elaborating on what the states were intended to become,
Alexander Hamilton asserted that the states would be the "voice" and
"arm" of the people's discontent should the central government overreach
its proper boundaries. 392 As always, Anti-Federalist opponents of the
constitutional plan put the matter in stronger terms. Fisher Ames of
Massachusetts, for example, considered the states to be the "safeguard and
ornament of the Constitution;" "they will afford a shelter against the abuse
of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights." 393
The form this "avenging" would assume was not made entirely clear,
although it was ominously noted at the time of the framing that the state
militias would substantially outnumber federal armies. 394 More
optimistically, however, the states were intended to function as agents
primarily by interposing themselves between local citizens and overzealous federal regulators. Like the imposition of the states' trustee
function with regard to local concerns, the imposition of this function has
been critical to sovereign statehood from the beginning.
Today, state-as-agent is every bit as deeply ingrained in our legal and
political culture as state-as-trustee. The Framers provided the broad picture
in terms of expectations. But state-as-agent, like state-as-trustee, has been
sustained over time as a result of legal, social, and political discourses, as

392. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), at 206 ("Power being almost
always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general
government.").
393. 2 JOHNATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 46 (1836).
394. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 301 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (projecting
a federal army of twenty-five or thirty thousand, opposed by "a militia amounting to near half a
million of citizens with arms in their hands"); THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 206-07 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting difficulty in raising and maintaining large federal ar.ay,
and ability of states to defend themselves against any such force); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at
157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting that states might be "dangerous rivals to
the power of the Union").

2005]

ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN?

303

well as state and federal practices. "States' rights" controversies, from
nullification to secession to desegregation, were grounded upon the idea
that meaningful "state sovereignty" was necessary to constrain the federal
government, and ultimately to preserve individual liberties. 395
Constitutional theorists have long contributed to the imposition of the
agency function in their work as well. Scholars routinely emphasize that
"checking tyranny" is a critical role for the states. 396 On occasion, the
Supreme Court also reminds us that we need truly sovereign states in order
to check central authority and preserve individual freedom. 397
As was true with respect to the state-as-trustee function, the imposition
of the state-as-agent function is not solely a matter of historical, political,
judicial, and academic discourses. Especially in the past few decades, it
has become critical for states to put theory into practice, to become active
and effective advocates for state interests. The Supreme Court pushed the
agency function to the fore in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 398 where the Court abandoned a short run at instituting a form of
"quasi-classical" sovereignty in which it identified exclusive state enclaves
that Congress could not encroach upon in exercising its commerce
power. 399 The Court held instead that the states would henceforth be
responsible for negotiating and protecting their own sovereignty,
principally by utilizing the tools provided in the constitutional structure
and through their effective advocacy in the political process. 400
Some feared that in light of the relatively few actual "safeguards" the
Constitution and political process provided the states, the balance would
tip even more substantially in favor of federal regulators. There can be
little doubt that the balance of material power rests comfortably in favor
of Congress. But again, as a social construct and institutional fact,
sovereignty is not solely or even primarily about material facts like wealth

395. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Krarnnick ed., 1987)
(noting that with states "a double security arises to the rights of the people").
396. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism As Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REv. 541, 546-47
(1995) (arguing that autonomous states "temper the direction of federal law by supplementing federal
legislation and regulating areas that Congress has not preempted" and that "state and local
governments are vigorous lobbyists and litigants").
397. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,921 (1997) ("This separation of the two spheres is
one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
181 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991) (cataloguing benefits
of federalism, including preservation of individual liberty).
398. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
399. See id. at 531 (abandoning the "traditional governmental functions" test as "unworkable" and
"inconsistent with established principles of federalism").
400. See id. at 552-53 (describing structural and political safeguards).
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and personnel. It is, rather, about the dynamics of what the states do, and
how citizens and institutions perceive them as a result. There is more than
ample anecdotal evidence to support the perception that states act as
effective buffers and emissaries on behalf of their citizens. 401
The states' agency function is manifested in two primary contexts. The
first we might call "interposition."402 When a state interposes its
"sovereignty" against a claim of federal authority or jurisdiction, it
contributes to the perception that it is a vigilant and effective agent for the
people. Sometimes these interpositions are of a rather striking character.
For example, the governor of Nevada has refused to permit federal
authorities to store nuclear waste in his state, arguing that the waste had
not been demonstrated by adequate scientific evidence to be safe. 403 This
standoff with the President and several federal agencies received
significant national attention. It exhibited a single state official standing
firmly and, to the home constituents, bravely against an encroachment by a
powerful federal government. High-profile episodes pitting state officials
against federal "encroachers" contribute to the perception that "sovereign"
states are a necessary bulwark against central overreaching.
States "interpose" in other ways as well. For instance, vertical
jurisdictional battles among state and federal prosecutors are routine
aspects of federalism. Here the states do not seek to prevent federal
authorities from exercising their own sovereign powers, but to stake their
claim to an equivalency in terms of executive authority. For example, not
willing to be overshadowed by federal prosecutors, state prosecutors have
asserted their state's jurisdiction and interest, as a "separate sovereign," in
prosecuting notorious criminals like Timothy McVeigh and Terry

40 I. One may accurately observe that the examples here and elsewhere are anecdotal episodes.
One might argue that these examples do not convey the "real" balance of power between the states and
the federal government. But one of the principal tenets of social construction theory is that this sort of
"reality" cannot be known as a "brute fact." What matters is the perception, or shared understanding,
that states serve these functions. And that perception, in turn, does have real, objective consequences
in terms of effects on policy outcomes and citizen loyalties. The perception that states are effective
agents may, in the end, be mistaken. As social construction theory posits, however, relevant observers
may mistakenly believe that an object (state) serves a particular function (agency). What is important
is that the observers treat the object as if it serves this function, and as deserving of the status the
function imposes. In terms of construction, "the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and
acceptance." Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304.
402. This is not the same "interposition" that was once advocated by extreme states' righters,
essentially the claimed right of the states to declare federal laws null and void. The concept is, rather,
interposition as buffer.
403. See Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (invalidating plan for storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain site in Nevada).
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Nichols. 404 These sorts of literal and figurative "turf wars" lead, over time,
to the imposition of the agency function. Citizens grow to expect their
state officials to defend the moral interests of the locality and its interest in
justice, separate and apart from any national interests. These and other
interpositions reinforce the states' separateness, their independent right to
a form of"external sovereignty" and equality.
The second manner in which the agency function has been imposed on
states is far more common than interposition. This we will call the states'
"emissary" role. The basic idea is that state officials serve as emissaries or
representatives of their citizens in the political process. They privately, and
often publicly, negotiate and bargain with federal authorities regarding the
implementation of federal policies. Each time they bargain and negotiate,
the states reinforce their "sovereign" status as representatives of separate
legal and political communities, as protectors of their citizens' interests.
States, of course, lose many of these battles. The political reality, however,
is that the states' most significant victories are likely to be publicized. So,
for example, returning again to the No Child Left Behind legislation,
publicity regarding successful state negotiations leading to exemptions, or
alterations, or additional funding communicates that the states can indeed
serve as effective emissaries. 405 States routinely bargain with and cajole
federal authorities to alter and amend not only educational, but also
welfare, environmental, and other federal requirements and regulations.
Although they do not exclusively control the agenda, or the outcome, with
regard to these policies, states do have a real, substantial, and public effect
on the shape and direction of policies. States contribute to the structure of
the negotiation process as well; by actively exercising the agency role,
they maintain their status as members in good standing in the federal
system.
This is a different conception of state sovereignty, one that sheds the
classical focus on exclusivity and brute power and examines instead the
dynamics of state behavior and its effect on policy outcomes and
governance processes. Insofar as states are perceived as legitimate and
effective agents on behalf of their citizens, they are granted recognition as
sovereigns and treated as if they are in control of a domain. This concept
of state sovereignty begins to resemble in a significant manner the "new
sovereignty" of nation-states. "Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the

404. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) ("When a defendant in a single act violates the
'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
'offences."') (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,382 (1922)).
405. See sources cited supra at notes 388-90.
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vindication of the state's existence as a member of the [federal]
system. " 406
(3) State as Community
A simple conception of "community" is a unified group of individuals
sharing common interests, living in a common location. 407 In the most
rudimentary sense, the states readily meet this definition; they are separate
communities. States are physical places marked off by boundaries. They
have their own charter documents, or constitutions. They set their own
rules of membership, which they call "citizenship." And, perhaps most
importantly, states have recognizable members-their citizens. 408 The
addition of a formal governmental structure transforms the state into a
particular type of community. As the Supreme Court has observed: "A
state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of
free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized
under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and
established by the consent of the governed.'>'~ 09
There are two principal implications, in terms of "sovereignty," of
states taking on their roles as separate communities. First, each state
community constitutes a separate, distinct, and equal locus of authority
with respect to other states. The states, "as political communities, [are]
distinct and sovereign, and consequently foreign to each other.''410 Thus, as
separate sovereign communities, the states enjoy a measure of "external"
sovereignty with regard to one another. Except insofar as the Constitution
requires unity or recognition, the states are legally and politically
independent of one another. 411 They can and do "protect" their citizens by

406. CHAYES & CHA YES, supra note 3, at 27 ("[F)or all but a few self-isolated nations,
sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived selfinterest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of
international life.").
407. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 226 {1976) (defining "community" as,
inter alia, "a unified body of individuals"; "the people with common interests living in a particular
area).
408. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1868) ('The people, in whatever territory
dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or
united by looser and less definite relations, constitute the state.").
409. !d. at 721 (emphasis added).
410. Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 54 (1838); see also Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,567 (1911).
411. Some of these limits on interstate "external" sovereignty are expressly set forth in the
Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); U.S. CoNST. art. IV,§ 2, cl.
I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
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refusing to give effect to policies of other states with which they disagree.
Iowa, for example, is not compelled to follow Massachusetts or Hawaii in
honoring the marriages of two men, or two women. 412
The second general implication, in terms of sovereignty, of state-ascommunity is that the states are generally perceived as serving many of the
same functions as other typical communities. Judicial and scholarly
discourses regularly emphasize that as communities, states do such things
as encourage political participation, foster respect for local concerns, offer
choices to citizens, and foster competition. 413 There have been many
variations on these themes, too many to describe here in full detail.
Constitutional scholars have suggested, for example, that the states, like
other communities, permit the accumulation of "social capital," which
enables citizens to overcome the usual obstacles to collective action. 414
Others have posited that states, like other communities, may play a
formative role in individual development, or "may help foster civic
identities that overlap with more deeply felt identities in ways that create
cross-cutting allegiances."415 There is no way to empirically test these
various assertions and theories. Nor is there any point in doing so, insofar
as state sovereignty is conceived as a social construct. The point is that
over time these and other "community" functions have been effectively
imposed on the states; they constitute, in part, circumstances (C) in which
the states (X) are deemed to count as sovereign (Y).
Active states continually prop up their sovereignty by demonstrating
their community bona fides. The nation recently witnessed California's
citizenry expressing its social, economic, and political discontent in the
gubernatorial election that resulted in the recall of the incumbent governor

several States".). Others, like the so-called "dormant" commerce clause, have been imposed as a
matter of judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding
that protectionist state legislation is per se invalid).
412. In this particular case, note that the community function also reinforces the states' role as
trustee of local morality. As the discussion has demonstrated, states can, of course, serve more than
one function at once.
413. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("It assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; ... and it makes government more responsive by putting
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."); see also Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism For A Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. I, 3-10 (1988) (discussing
the "values" of federalism); Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (same).
414. See Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument For Federalism, II S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 27 (2001) (arguing that "federalism also promotes the kinds of social relationships that allow
citizens to overcome collective action barriers and get things done").
415. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 938; Sorenson, supra note 49, at 98.
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and the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger. To be sure, not all elections
receive this sort of attention; most do not involve such colorful characters.
But the California election was one example of what states are understood
to provide in terms of opportunity for political participation. The
opportunity need not relate to an election of national concern or curiosity.
State and local elections receive plentiful local media coverage, and
anyone who is paying the slightest attention will be aware that an election
is taking place. Even if citizens are not inclined to participate, the state at
least offers them the opportunity, and they know that this is so. Ballot
initiatives and statewide referenda regarding issues of state and local
concern such as taxes, affirmative action in public education, assisted
suicide, and "medical marijuana" also focus substantial attention on states
as political communities. So long as states continue to offer and encourage
these sorts of opportunities, they will continue to be perceived as
sovereign political communities.
The same can be said for the imposition of other community functions,
including fostering respect for local concerns, offering meaningful choices
to citizens, fostering competition, and fostering civic identities. There are
those who assert that the states do not actually provide such benefits, that
they are, for example, too overshadowed by federal authority and too
homogenous to serve as real choices or effective communities. 416 We
cannot empirically demonstrate that states do or do not perform these
functions. There are, however, sufficient indicia of state engagement and
heterogeneity to argue that a shared understanding has in fact arisen with
respect to these elements of state sovereignty as well.
As the discussion of the trustee and agency functions demonstrated, 417
states do pay attention to and pursue local community interests and
concerns, often with substantial vigor. Moreover, it would appear that
states offer enough choices and foster sufficient competition to at least be
perceived as unique communities. Some states have income and sales
taxes, some do not; some permit the use of medical marijuana, some do
not; some allow assisted suicide, others proscribe it; some states permit
homosexuals to marry, most do not; some states have what we might
considered a recognizable religious identity, most are secular and
indistinguishable on this basis; some states rely upon agriculture, others
industry; some states have what might be considered "liberal" cultures,

416. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 920 (arguing that "we have a national political culture,
and no state is likely to take advantage of the normative independence that serves as federalism's
raison d' etre to suppress local variation") (emphasis added).
417. Seesupranotes 184-90,203-10.
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while others are considered to be generally more "conservative." The
distinctions could be multiplied many times over.
Is some critical mass of people going to move from one state to another
because of these or other differences? Probably not, but this again misses
the point of conceiving of sovereignty as an institutional fact. 418 These and
other distinctions would seem to be at least sufficient to lead to the
perception, among citizens, political leaders, many if not most academics,
and most judges, that states comprise unique, separate communities that
offer different choices in terms of living experiences. This is something
one would surely not have to belabor with two citizens, one from
Massachusetts and the other from Mississippi. This is certainly not to deny
that there is a substantial degree of homogeneity among the states,
particularly in terms of economic considerations and policies. But there is
sufficient demarcation to give rise to the perception that it makes a
difference which state's membership one chooses to join. Because there
are separate communities out there, one is at liberty, if sufficiently
motivated, to pack up and move. 419 As the Supreme Court stated in
McCulloch v. Maryland: 420 "No political dreamer was ever wild enough to
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of
compounding the American people into one common mass." 421 That
statement remains as true today as when it was made, very early in the
conceptual evolution of statehood.
Finally, in terms of the imposition of community functions, the states
are said to do such things as foster civic identities and even contribute to
individual development. It is not at all difficult to see how this perception
might arise. The states themselves contribute to the imposition of such
functions in carrying out activities most of us do not consciously think of
as claims to sovereignty. For example, flagship state schools are
recognizable arms of the state that contribute substantially to education,
one of the most important aspects of personal development. In addition to
offering a discounted but quality higher education, these state institutions
often foster strong loyalties among their alumni. Even such seemingly
trivial objects as state flags, license plates, and slogans all contribute to
civic identity and personality. These state symbols are intended to

418. Corporate citizens, of course, are quite likely to be swayed by distinctions among states with
regard to tax, employment, and property laws, for example. In this sense, states function as
communities that offer what are sometimes make-or-break choices.
419. See McConnell, supra note III, at 1503 (noting that "[t]he main reason oppression at the
federal level is more dangerous is that it is more difficult to escape").
420. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
421. !d. at 403.
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engender citizen loyalty and identification; they are in that respect very
subtle claims to sovereignty, but claims nonetheless. Objects and symbols
like the vilified confederate flag, the license plate motto "Live Free or
Die," and the slogan "Don't Mess With Texas" are mostly
underappreciated currents of an ongoing state sovereignty discourse.
These things are far from trivial. They contribute substantially, if not
always consciously, to the shared perception that states are sovereign
communities and that membership in those communities has special
meaning. 422
In sum, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove with any
empirical precision that the states actually serve the various community
functions often attributed to them. But it is not at all hard to believe that
through social, political, judicial, and academic discourses, as well as
continuous state practices, the states are perceived as existing to serve a
variety of functions typically associated with other communities. Insofar
as they do so, states stake out claims to recognition as sovereigns. And
insofar as their sovereignty is recognized and acted upon, the states are in
fact "sovereign."

(4) State as Laboratory
A final function that has been imposed upon states is perhaps the best
known, but least understood. States have been said to function as
"laboratories" from the earliest recorded moments in constitutional
discourse. Alexander Hamilton argued that states would supply model
legislation "which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the
federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them into
one general act."423 On one view, then, a diversity of sovereign state
lawmaking laboratories would contribute to the content of federal law.
But others have argued that there is value in experimentation itself.
One of the principal arguments in favor of "sovereign" states was that
"federalism enables a people to try experiments which could not safely be
tried in a large centralized country."424 Justices Holmes and Brandeis
popularized this version of state-as-laboratory in their Lochner era

422. This is not to suggest that everyone agrees with the claims such symbols make, or that the
state by making such claims exercises precisely the sort of influence that, say, a family or religious
community does in terms of identity formation and individual development. These sorts of things do,
however, contribute to the imposition of community functions with regard to the states.
423. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 340 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
424. I JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 353 ( 1888).
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dissents, 425 which would ultimately become celebrated for repudiating
Lochner's economic substantive due process. Holmes specifically objected
to the Court's invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause "to prevent the making of social experiments . . . in the insulated
chambers afforded by the several states."426 Justice Brandeis considered it
"one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. ,,4 27
The persistence of the laboratory metaphor is a testament to the social
construction thesis. The symbol has an uneven history. The framers
supported it, as did Supreme Court luminaries like Brandeis and Holmes.
But the modem Court has been stingy with its references to the laboratory
function. It is mostly mentioned in passing in concurrences and dissents. 428
Some academics have questioned the utility of this particular
representation of state function since what is happening in the "real world"
of state legislation is nothing like the controlled environment of the
scientific laboratory. 429
Still, state-as-laboratory continues to exert influence on how the states
are perceived, and how their "sovereignty" is represented. Social,
academic, and political discourses, and the dynamics of state practices
have combined to support the perception that the states are critical
innovators. Various discourses continue to emphasize that the states ought
to be provided the breathing room to decide certain matters in the first
instance. 430 Again, the debate over gay marriage demonstrates the
entrenched nature of the laboratory function. Politicians who favor
permitting the states to deal with this issue without federal interference
generally tout some version of the "laboratory" function to channel their

425. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
426. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
427. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
428. See James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories" Metaphor In State Constitutional Law,
30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 483 (1996) (noting that the laboratory function does not provide the
foundation for Supreme Court holdings). The Court does sometimes mention the laboratory metaphor
in passing, as one of the many benefits of federalism. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (federalism "allows for more innovation and experimentation in government").
429. See Gardner, supra note 428, at 480-82 (1996) (arguing that states are not engaged in
scientific experimentation in any sense, but a loose form of policy experimentation); see also Rubin &
Feeley, supra note 23, at 923-24 (noting lack of controls and central direction in state
"experimentation").
430. See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1750-76 (2004) (describing and elaborating on the state-as-laboratory
metaphor, and examining the Supreme Court's invocation of this functional symbol).
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argument against federal action. 431 The idea that states sometimes act as
laboratories of experiment has seeped into our social discourse. 432 Many
academics, who may well be aware that the laboratory metaphor is
technically flawed, nevertheless support the idea that the states should be
permitted to "experiment" before a national solution is implemented. 433
Recall as well that social construction theorists who have studied state
sovereignty in the international context stress that in a significant sense
states are what they do. States, functioning as trustees, continue to
legislate with respect to novel social and economic issues like the death
penalty, involuntary institutionalization, assisted suicide, medical
marijuana, stem cell research, environmental concerns, criminal
sentencing, and a host of other matters. Their efforts can have several
tangible effects. First, other states may follow a bolder state's lead. 434
Second, Congress is often constrained from interfering with these state
efforts, partly, to be sure, from its own crowded agenda, but also because
the matter is simply perceived to be one for the states to address in the first
instance. This may be a matter of congressional deference, or an artful
dodge of an issue for which Congress lacks political appetite. In either
case, the result is that state law is essentially preserved, or "final." Finally,
once the states address a novel concern, the courts pay particular attention
to the innovations the states have attempted. 435 These innovations are not
always upheld, but they are generally treated by the courts with deference
and respect. The shared understanding or agreement that states should be

431. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Press Ahead on Anti-gay Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al5 (quoting then-Democratic Senate Leader Tom Daschle: "The regulation of
marriage has long been under the purview of the states . . . and I believe that is where it should
remain.").
432. See, e.g., David Ginn, editorial, NORTHEASTERN NEWS, Dec. 3, 2003, available at
http://www.ny-news.com/main (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) ("I was recently reminded that one of the
major advantages of our federalist system is the freedom it gives states to experiment with different
policies. Seen in this way, states are laboratories where creative solutions to social problems can be
tested out.").
433. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist,
and Anti-Democratic, available at www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/040923paper.html (Sept. 23, 2004)
("While respecting the power of the states to determine their own policies on matters as fundamental
as property, criminal, and family law means there is a lack of uniformity in these areas, the
corresponding benefits of state experimentation and local control have always been regarded as
overwhelmingly compensating advantages of our federal system.").
434. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Several States Likely to Follow California on Car Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES, June II, 2004, at C4; Adam Liptak, Justices' Sentencing Ruling May Have Model in Kansas,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at Al2 (reporting that Kansas had overhauled its sentencing procedures in
anticipation of Supreme Court ruling, and that other states would likely follow its lead).
435. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005) (citing state laws as basis for
national consensus against execution of juvenile offenders).
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allowed the breathing space to address novel issues substantially affects
the legislative terrain.
Events regarding gay marriage in Massachusetts, as well as in
communities in California and New York, can hardly be characterized as
"experimentation" in the controlled laboratory sense. There is little
efficiency in proceeding in this haphazard fashion. 436 But efficiency is
only one goal. The value in experimentation, or innovation, or whatever
one chooses to call what the states are doing, at least from the states' point
of view, is that it reinforces one of the states' competences to such an
extent that states gain citizen loyalty and a further measure of control over
a critical local domain. The idea that marriage is a concern with regard to
which the states should be allowed to innovate or "experiment" in the first
instance remains politically, academically, judicially, and culturally
popular. California's recently enacted stem cell research initiative437 can
also be viewed in this light. Despite federal misgivings, California asserted
its sovereign prerogative to "experiment" in this morally charged but
scientifically promising field. Aside from the substantial profits that stand
to be made, California positioned itself, in the eyes of its citizens and those
in other states, as a proactive sovereign. Insofar as the states are perceived
as innovators in this fashion, they will continue to be regarded as at least
partially "sovereign."
In sum, state sovereignty as an institutional fact arises from the various
functions imposed upon the states. Social construction theory, and
conceptions like the "new sovereignty," posit that states are in substantial
part what they do. Thus, sovereignty does not arise from the states'
exclusive authority, nor from some measure of their material resources or
power. We ought not ask whether the states are "really" sovereign, for "the
reality of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance."438 The state (X)
counts as sovereign (Y) as, and to the extent that, it performs the various
functions described above (C). It counts as sovereign as, and to the extent
that, shared understandings arise to the effect that states are entitled to
deference with regard to local concerns and form legitimate sovereign
polities entitled to recognition from other states and federal authorities. As
in the international context, social construction theory can help to
reconcile the continued recognition of state claims to "sovereignty" with

436. As Rubin & Feeley note, "true federalism allows governmental sub-units to choose different
goals, not to experiment with different mechanisms for achieving a single one." Rubin & Feeley, supra
note 23, at 924.
437. See CAL. CONST., art. 35, § I ("California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act").
438. Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304.
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their substantially limited powers by focusing attention on the dynamic
process of sovereignty's construction.

b. Status Symbols
All of the aforementioned functional symbols transfer some power or
other to the states-for example, to control local affairs, interpose, provide
community benefits, or innovate. All of these powers are aspects of a
state's sovereignty. As Searle noted, institutional facts do not always
involve imposition of power; some are based upon status. An imposed
status can be either positive or negative. 439 The use of status to construct
state sovereignty has been less prevalent than the imposition of powers
and functions. As we shall see, this has been almost exclusively a juridical
process. 440 "Sovereignty" in this context depends upon a purported shared
understanding that a state "takes on" the status of some other object or
institution that is itself thought to be sovereign. Thus, the state (X) counts
as sovereign (Y), or does not, where it is judicially determined that the
state resembles, or does not resemble, some other sovereignty-bearing
object (C). The use of status as a constructive element has come to define
a version of state sovereignty distinct from that associated with the
functions discussed above.
(1) State as Corporation

In terms of pure status, the states did not begin from an exalted
position. The early colonies were merely a specie of the corporate form.
Colonial constitutions, like the Massachusetts Bay Company Charter, were
specifically "designed as corporate charters."441 In early discourse, states

439. See SEARLE, supra note 32, at 96-97. For example, one can be voted either "most popular"
or "least popular" person in one's class. !d.
440. This is a situation unique to American state sovereignty. The European Court of Justice, for
example, "has been remarkably frugal in its discussion of sovereignty." SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION,
supra note 2, at 12.
441. Amar, supra note 59, at 1432-33. The corporate form was chosen largely for pragmatic
reasons-it was most familiar to the colonists. See id. (examining corporate form). Organizationally,
the colonial charters were the precursors of state governments. They instituted hierarchical leadership.
!d. The corporate officers would later become state governors, deputy governors, and so on. !d. The
charters set forth the boundaries of authority for these early officers. They laid the basic ground rules
for a hybrid form, which was both a "profit-seeking entity" and an early form of governance. !d. The
early adoption of the corporate form was mostly significant because it hinted at the framers'
experimental version of sovereignty, one which broke significantly with classical thought. Because
they contained implicit boundaries for the exercise of sovereign power, corporate forms were an early
break from English notions of absolute sovereignty. See id. at 1434-35 ("Within the limitations of
their charters, governments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of
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were often treated as no more "sovereign" than ordinary corporations.
James Madison, who sometimes vouched for the "sovereignty" of the
states, once expressed the view that there existed a "gradation" of
authority "from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty."442 "The states,"
Madison insisted, "are not in that high degree Sovereign"; "they are
Corporations with the power of Bye Laws." 443
This line of thought greatly influenced the early Supreme Court's
treatment of claims to sovereign statehood. Recall that there was in the
Court's sovereignty discourse a period of "pre-sovereignty."444 Early state
claims to "sovereign immunity" fell victim to the imposition of the
corporate status. If a state was only as "sovereign" as an ordinary
corporation, then the state could be sued, just as any ordinary corporation
might be.
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 445 the Court held that citizens from one state
could indeed sue a foreign state in federal court. Despite their varying
views on other matters (each justice wrote separately), the justices in
Chisholm largely agreed that corporate status should be imposed upon the
states. 446 Georgia creatively justified its claim to sovereignty by seeking to
"graft" arguments for nation-state sovereignty onto its immunity
defense. 447 The state insisted that to permit the suit to proceed would
constitute an offense to the state's "dignity."448 The Court soundly rejected
this justification, holding that it would constitute no offense to state
"dignity" to subject the states to suit at the bidding of foreign citizens:
[T]he obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society ...
[demand that] in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand;

the delegation itself."). Corporate officers who ventured beyond these boundaries were acting ultra
vires. Thus, the concept of limited sovereignty found early expression in the symbol of the corporate
body. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776--1787 (1969). Indeed,
"dual sovereignty" would later be defended on the ground that sovereignty could be incomplete, even
divided, as it was in corporations.
442. I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 463-64, 477, 479 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966).
443. !d. at 477.
444. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
445. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,447 (1793).
446. See id. (Opinion of Iredell, J.) ("Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be
restricted or transcendent, is in this sense 'a corporation."'); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.) ("[A]II
states whatever are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, what are their powers?").
447. See Reus-Smit, supra note 312, at 357 (noting that "the best way to further a moral claim is
to 'graft' it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized human being").
448. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 456 (Wilson, J.) (discussing state claim to "dignity").
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for where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually
sued, though not personally, sued... Will it be said, that the fifty
odd thousand citizens in Delaware being ... associated under their
charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an individual
on an equal footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure
would not comport with the dignity of the former? 449
As a mere corporate form, in other words, the state was held to possess
no more "dignity" than a bank, a railroad, or a stockyard. Like those
entities, the state had to yield to individual justice, citizen dignity, and the
450
larger "purposes of society." The states, being mere corporations, were
merely, as Justice Wilson stated in Chisholm, "the inferior contrivance of
man."451
Chisholm would, of course, later be overturned by the Eleventh
Amendment, 452 and the Court has since piled on a number of state liberties
from suit, including many which go well beyond the text of the
amendment itself. 453 The modern Court, as we shall see, has drastically
reversed Chisholm's early prioritization of "dignitary" interests; today it is
largely the state's dignity which prevails over that of its citizens.
Corporate symbolism would today be considered an outright insult to the
states, as the character of their sovereign status has undergone a
remarkable juridical change.

(2) State as Market Participant
The discussion thus far has emphasized that state sovereignty is not an
inherent aspect of statehood, but a flexible construct. Perhaps no symbol

449. /d. at 472.
450. !d. The idea that states were merely corporate forms influenced congressional thinking as
well during this early period of history. The concept was relied upon by Congress in enacting
important civil rights legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1781. Some sponsors and
supporters of the enactment expressed the view that states would be covered by its proscriptions,
which extended to all "persons." See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78-84 (1989)
(Brennan, J.) (describing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1781). According to the
Dictionary Act of 1780, which purported to provide definitions in aid of statutory construction,
"person" included corporations and bodies politic. See id. (describing the Dictionary Act). Based upon
the Dictionary Act, there was at least some indication that states would be covered by the Civil Rights
Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 661--62 (1871) ("What is a State? Is it not a body politic
and corporate?") (Statement of Sen. Vichers); id. at 696 ("A State is a corporation.") (Statement of
Sen. Edmunds).
451. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455.
452. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
453. See infra notes 494-98 and accompanying text.
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or marker demonstrates this fact more clearly than that of state-as-"market
participant."
Unlike the other status indicators, state-as-market participant does
involve the transfer of some power to a state, although it is not sovereign
power. Rather, this status provides states the power to act like any other
corporation in the marketplace. The modem state enters markets of all
kinds, purchasing goods and services just as any ordinary corporation
does, and often on as large a scale. According to the "market participant"
doctrine, where the state acts as a "market participant" rather than a
"sovereign regulator," it is permitted to restrict the flow of commerce in a
manner that would otherwise be proscribed under the so-called "dormant
commerce clause" doctrine. 454 The "dormant commerce clause" essentially
prohibits state economic protectionism and measures which effect an
undue burden on interstate commerce. 455 Where the state is labeled a
"market participant," the limits of the dormant commerce clause no longer
apply and states can impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce. 456
The so-called "market participant exemption" is grounded in both the
history of the Commerce Clause and principles of state sovereignty. 457 As

454. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (holding that the distinction between
"states as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law");
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (distinguishing between state as regulator and
state as participating in the market for Commerce Clause purposes); see also l LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 6-ll, at 1088-95 (3d ed. 2000). A similar distinction is found in
antitrust law under the state action doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (distinguishing
between a state authorizing private parties to act anticompetitively and a state itself regulating
commerce).
455. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that economic
protectionism is subject to a "per se rule" of invalidity); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 350-54 (1977) (invalidating state law which had an undue burden on interstate
commerce).
456. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 398 (1989) (arguing that the market-participant exemption
reflects "a sound, if complex, accommodation of competing constitutional values"); Mark P. Gergen,
The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1097, 1097 (1988) (noting the "uneasy tension
between the rule of interstate equality, which would brook no differential treatment, and the concept of
state sovereignty, which would allow unrestricted preferences").
457. As the Court has stated:
There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to
operate freely in the free market ....
Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of
each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people,' and 'the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.'
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919))
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the Supreme Court said in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 458 "the commerce clause
was directed, as an historical matter, only at regulatory and taxing actions
taken by states in their sovereign capacity."459 Thus, rather than existing as
an inherent aspect of statehood, "sovereignty" is treated, in this context at
least, as something which the states are or are not in possession of at any
given moment. There are, at least according to the Court, apparently
situations in which a state acts in its sovereign capacity, and situations in
which it takes on some other distinct character.
In the end, however, what the states can or cannot do remains a
question of their status. Whether a state will be permitted to disrupt the
flow of commerce hinges entirely upon the formal category into which it
is placed by the courts-"market regulator" or "market participant." As
the precedents indicate, this threshold inquiry does not involve any
identifiable bright lines; it is hardly self-evident which role the state may
be playing in any given situation and no set of factors seems to be
determinative. 460 In social context, at least, one can well imagine that outof-state firms which are disadvantaged by a state's protectionism might
draw the line between regulation and participation differently than the
courts. Consistent with other status considerations, courts fix these sorts of
lines without regard to impressions, appearances, or processes. The status
is judicially determined, as the courts see it.
Corporate status in this context is a positive symbol from the states'
perspective. Under the market participant exemption, the Court "has
shielded from commerce clause attack blatant favoritism of local
interests."461 The state is "sovereign" to the same extent that a corporation
is; thus insofar as a firm would enjoy the autonomy of the market so too
will a state acting as a "market participant." The exemption operates with
something of a counter-intuitive backwardness insofar as sovereignty is
concerned. It permits states to serve certain of their "sovereign" functions,
such as structuring relations with their citizens and providing for the
458. 447 u.s. 429.
459. !d. at 436-37 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 454, at 336).
460. See White v. Mass. Council ofConstr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,214-15 (1983) (upholding a
City of Boston executive order requiring any construction projects funded in whole or in part by the
city to employ a workforce composed of at least half Boston residents as not violating the Commerce
Clause); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 (holding that South Dakota's policy of limiting sales of cement
produced in a state-owned plant to state residents during times of shortage was permissible
participation in the market, rather than regulation); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
810 (1976) (holding that Maryland was acting as a market participant when it provided bounties for
the destruction of inoperable automobile hulks, which effectively encouraged the processing of these
hulks by in-state processors).
461. Coenen, supra note 456, at 397.
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general welfare, so long as the Court concludes that a state is not acting in
its usual "sovereign" capacity.

(3) State as Nation
In recent years, states have aggressively invoked their "sovereignty" in
a variety of contexts. These claims have met with substantial success; so
much so that some scholars have talked in terms of a federalism
"revolution.'.-462 The manner in which states have justified, and the Court
has increasingly validated, state claims to "sovereignty" has been a
significant element of the recent federalism revival. Status has been a
critical aspect ofthis revival.
In holding, for example, that Congress cannot "commandeer" state
officials to enforce federal regulatory policies, the Court has emphasized
that states are not "mere political subdivisions of the United States," or
"regional offices," or "administrative agencies of the Federal
Government."463 As the Court stated in Printz v. United States, 464 which
held that Congress could not "commandeer" state executive officials to
enforce federal policies: "It is an essential attribute of the States' retained
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous ... " 465 The
Court has also increasingly upheld claims that the "dignity," "respect,"
and "esteem" of the states must be protected, even at the expense of
citizens' claims to injury at the hands of state officials. 466 The language of
justification the states and the Court have used has puzzled scholars, who
have offered several theories regarding the Court's aggressive support of
state autonomy, and its reliance on language of "dignity" and "esteem" in
particular. 467 If the putatively "dignified" states are not political
subdivisions or regional offices, then what status do they possess, what
may they be likened to?

462. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1601 ("It is now apparent that the United States is in the midst of a
constitutional revolution.").
463. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (opinion of White, J.).
464. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
465. /d. at 928.
466. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) ("[T]he
primary function of sovereign immunity is . . . to afford the States the dignity and respect due
sovereign entities.").
467. See, e.g., Judith Resnick and Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921 (2003) (identifying "role dignity" in
discussions of sate sovereign immunity); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1121, 1127 (2000) ("Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to
corporations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.").
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Some scholars have suggested that the Court has begun to impose a
status akin to that of nations upon the states in order to explain or define
their "sovereignty."468 There is some historical support for such an
imposition. What we now know and refer to as "the states" might have
been called something else entirely when the Constitution was framed:
subdivisions, protectorates, provinces, or districts, for instance. The
framers in all likelihood used "state" purposefully. The Constitution's
drafters were well versed in the law of nations. 469 It is, thus, no mere
coincidence that "state" also happens to be the term used to describe and
analyze the Westphalian system of sovereign states and nation-states
which developed in the seventeenth century. 470 There is, in fact, substantial
evidence that the Framers were aware of, indeed many had read,
Emmerich de Vattel's treatise, The Law of Nations, which itself did not
distinguish between "nation" and "state."471 It is at least plausible, then,
that the Framers to some extent relied upon the conception of "state" as it
had been developed at the time within the law of nations.
Physically, as well, the American states possess the elementary aspects
long thought to confer the status of nationhood; namely territory,
population, and government. 472 "In the Constitution," the Court has
observed, "the term state most frequently expresses the combined idea ...
of people, territory, and government."473 Vattel described nations as
"bodies politic, societies of men united together for the purpose of
promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their
combined strength."474 States meet this definition as well.
The imposition of "nation" status upon the states is significant in two
contexts. First, in their relations with one another, states have been

468. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State
Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027 (2001-2002) (comparing state sovereign immunity with
principle of international law at time of framing); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and
Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819 (I 999) (comparing references to "States" in Constitution to
international nation-states); Peter Smith, States As Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89
VA. L. REV. I (2003) (locating dignity language in the law of nations, specifically the law of foreign
sovereign immunity).
469. See Rappaport, supra note 468, at 830-38 (noting the framers' familiarity with international
legal texts and principles).
470. See id. (arguing that "state" was used by the founders more or less synonymously with
"nation").
471. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1863).
472. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 13; see also Keating, supra note 13, at 204.
473. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,720-21 (1869) (emphasis added).
474. DE VATTEL, supra note 471, §§I, 4 ("Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so
many free persons living together in the state of nature.").
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assigned an "external" sovereignty similar in some respects to that
possessed by nation-states. The "several states are of equal dignity and
authority, and [because] the independence of one implies the exclusion of
power from all others[,] . . . the laws of one State have no operation
outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity."475 This
sovereign equality is "a principle inferred from the constitutional structure
and borrowed from background assumptions of the law ofnations."476 The
Court has borrowed principles of international law, including territorial
limits and sovereign equality, in resolving disputes (i.e., border claims)
between states, determining the contours of the doctrine of inter-state
immunity from suit and, prior to the mid-twentieth century, in fashioning a
doctrine of personal jurisdiction. 477
The second context, at least according to one theory of the "dignified"
state, is the presently in-vogue doctrine of "sovereign immunity." Peter
Smith has recently suggested that the Court's repeated references to state
"dignity" are drawn from the law of nations, specifically the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. 478 This doctrine shields sovereign nations
from lawsuits in foreign courts, at least under most circumstances. 479 The
relationship is, as Professor Smith acknowledges, only implicit; the Court
has not explicitly invoked nation status on behalf of the states. He argues,
however, that sovereign "dignity" is a basic principle of the doctrine of
foreign state sovereign immunity. 480 Although it is "impossible to know
precisely what the Court intends when it relies on the concept of state
dignity in the state sovereignty immunity cases," Professor Smith argues
that the Court's "rhetorical clues suggest that it is drawing support from

475. Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908) (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1877)); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) ("Neither state can legislate for, or
impose its own policy on the other."); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) ("When
Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all
the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the
cession .... ").
476. Bradford Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1323 (1996); see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) ("[T]he constitutional equality of the
states is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was
organized."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I (providing for equal representation for states in the
senate); U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring state participation in constitutional amendment process); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. I (preserving the territorial integrity of the states).
477. See Smith, supra note 468, at 81-87 (discussing cases and doctrine).
478. See id. at 7 (arguing that recent sovereign immunity precedents treat states as nations).
479. See id. at 36-47 (discussing foreign state immunity and law of nations).
480. See id. at 7 (arguing that dignity "has an established meaning, with established implications,
in the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity").
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the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity and the law of
nations." 481
Whether or not the Court is imposing the status of nation, however,
Professor Smith ultimately concludes that this status would not support the
Court's state sovereignty immunity holdings. The concept of the state as
figurative nation-state can work, he argues, only if the Court is willing to
insist that states are fully sovereign nations within the meaning of
international law. 482 This argument, as Professor Smith notes, would run
counter to the significant constitutional divestiture of state sovereignty in
matters of foreign affairs, as well as the post-ratification understanding of
state sovereign authority. 483 More importantly, as Professor Smith also
observes, the metaphor would run counter to the law of nations itself.
Under that body of law, Congress is entitled to subject foreign nations to
suit in domestic courts. Thus, the state-as-nation metaphor "clearly should
lead to the conclusion that Congress can subject the states to suit in federal
court. "484 This, of course, is precisely the opposite conclusion the Court
has reached over and over again in recent sovereign immunity cases.
Nationhood status has plainly been imposed upon states when they
interact with one another. As they interact, states are equal, independent,
territorially-bound, sovereign units. It is also possible that nation status
is-to a limited degree-being imposed upon the states to support such
things as state "sovereign immunity" from lawsuits.
(4) State as Person

Given the apparent inability of state-as-nation to explain the results in
some recent cases, we should perhaps seek other explanations for the
markedly improved status of the states. I have argued elsewhere that the
whole of the federalism "revival" can plausibly be attributed to an effort to
impose the status of personhood on the states. 485 That theory will be only
briefly sketched here.
The Anti-Federalists argued forcefully in favor of respect not only for
state dignity, but also for state "morality" and "rights."486 Given their

481. !d. at 77 (emphasis added).
482. See id. at 88 ("[T]he Court's implicit suggestion in relying on the states' dignity is that the
states are analogous to independent sovereigns within the meaning of customary international law").
483. See id. at 92 (noting that Constitution "specifically divested the states" of powers of foreign
diplomacy and commerce).
484. !d. at 99 (emphasis added).
485. See Zick, supra note 25.
486. See id. at 229.
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familiarity with the law of nations, which as Professor Smith observes
includes such concepts as state "dignity," it is a plausible interpretation of
their writings that the Anti-Federalists were among the first to compare the
states to nations. This comparison, in turn, would have formed the basis
for the idea that states were akin to persons. Early international relations
theorists, who wrote during the period of the monarchy, often likened
sovereign nations to persons. 487 Thus, it is equally plausible that these
early constitutional theorists were advocating a respect for state liberty that
mirrored the rights possessed by persons. 488 Indeed, at the earliest
moments, state sovereignty was justified with reference to such individual
characteristics as personality, dignity, morality, and rights. 489
Echoes of these sorts of justifications have surfaced in recent years as
the states have aggressively advanced constitutional claims usually
associated with persons. For example, the states have asserted
constitutional rights to autonomy, equality, and due process. 490 Recall the
specific insight of social constructionists regarding this sort of tactic:
"Within domestic society, the best way to further a moral claim is to
'graft' it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized human
being, or to beliefs about the ideal community of such beings.'.491 Or, as
another scholar put it: "New ideas are more likely to be influential if they
'fit' well within existing ideas and ideologies in a particular social
setting."492 A significant part of the "new federalism" agenda has been to
graft individual notions of self-determination, autonomy, and equality onto
state arguments for constitutional rights.

487. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that early theorists conceived of a state
as '"a living, articulate force, a historic individual with a personality and will of its own"') (quoting
KENNETH DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE: A STUDY OF AN IDEA AND AN
INSTITUTION 103 (1980)). Indeed, the nation-as-person metaphor can be traced back to de Vattel, who
invoked it to argue on behalf of the "equality" of nations. See Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and
Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 121
(discussing origins of the nation-as-person analogy); see also Douglas G. Smith, Interstate Commerce
and the Principles of the Law of Nations, 2004 UTAH L. REv. Ill, 126-29 (discussing de Vattel's
conception of states as persons).
488. Nationhood and personhood are closely linked symbols. International relations theory, for
example, has long analogized nations and persons. See. e.g., CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 29
(noting that early international theorists contended that the state was a person with "personality" and
"interests").
489. See Zick, supra note 25, at 233-34.
490. See id. at 220-21 (describing newly discovered "fundamental rights" of states).
491. Reus-Smit, supra note 312, at 527.
492. KATHRYN SIKKIRK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS 26 ( 1991 ); see also Reus-S mit, supra note 312,
at 527 ("Historically, the identity values defining ideal individuals and states have been closely linked

...").
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The result, in terms of constitutional doctrine, has been the generation
of a series of state constitutional "rights" which resemble in many
important respects the "fundamental" rights of persons to things like
autonomy, equality, and process. In other words, as I have argued
elsewhere, statehood has essentially become the "new personhood."493 The
Court has increasingly expended its considerable capital not on expanding
fundamental individual rights but on recognizing state claims to
fundamental constitutional rights. As it has evolved recently, state
sovereignty has come to closely resemble personal sovereignty.
Thus, the states currently enjoy a person-like right to order the intimate
affairs of their sovereignty: Congress must at least be perfectly clear in its
intention to invade such sacred state enclaves as deciding who may serve
in positions of state authority and on what terms. 494 Through the vast
expansion of "sovereign immunity," states have gained what looks more
and more like a right to respect and consideration equal to that of the
federal government. States cannot be treated by Congress as "second
class" sovereigns. 495 The anti-"commandeering" cases have produced a
state right to something like the physical autonomy persons enjoy under
various provisions of the Constitution. 496 The Court has also held that the
states may not be "mentally" coerced into waiving their constitutional
rights. 497 Finally, procedural protections have been erected to protect the
states from "charges" that they have engaged in unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and other
Reconstruction Amendments. 498

493. Zick, supra note 25, at 223.
494. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)(asserting that the setting of qualifications
for state judges "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity").
495. See Zick, supra note 25, at 259-67 (discussing state right to "equality"); see also Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749-50 (1999) (noting that the federal government enjoys immunity from suit
and stating: "In light of our constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States,
we are reluctant to conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege."); id. at 748
(stating that immunity's central purpose is to "accord [] the States the respect owed them as members
of the federation.") (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993)).
496. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot
compel state legislature to enforce federal regulatory programs); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
905 (1997) (holding that state executive officials cannot be "pressed into federal service").
497. See College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
687 (1999) (concluding that "the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of
waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from
otherwise lawful activity").
498. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (invalidating
provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act which subjected states to lawsuits); City of Boerne
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The language of justification, values, and the substance of protections
which together comprise the recent renaissance of "states' rights"dignity, esteem, equality, autonomy, internal ordering, and procedural due
process--can thus plausibly be read as an attempt to impose the status of
person upon the states. Grafting these and other personal characteristics
upon statehood has led to a substantial revival of state sovereignty in a
number of constitutional contexts.
In sum, state sovereignty has been given meaning and substantive
effect not only through the imposition of various functions but also
through the imposition of formal statuses. If a state is a "market
participant," for example, then it may impede commerce; if it is a "market
regulator," then it generally may not do so. More substantively, states,
once treated as possessing no more "sovereignty" than an ordinary
corporation, have recently become nation- or person-like institutions with
"rights" and claims to personal values like "dignity," "esteem," and
"respect." State sovereignty is manifested in this regard in the rights to
autonomy, immunity, equality, and process states have been held to
possess. This is another way in which the states, which do not possess
classical sovereignty or substantial power relative to federal authorities,
are nevertheless still considered to be and ultimately are treated as
"sovereign."
C. The "Two Sovereignties "
The upshot of the evolution of the concept of domestic state
sovereignty is that there are currently two rather distinct versions of state
sovereignty circulating in constitutional discourses. These "two
sovereignties" are based upon the shared understandings that have arisen,
or are presently in process, from the imposition upon statehood of, on the
one hand, various competences, and on the other hand, a variety of courtimposed statuses. State competences include such things as police powers,
agency and community functions, and legislative and judicial innovations.
The institution of state sovereignty is generated, and sustained, as a result
of the continuous and vigorous exercise of these competences.
Sovereignty based upon status, by contrast, is essentially an equation of

v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's powers
under the Reconstruction Amendments must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"). In deciding whether a
legislative enactment of this sort is "congruent and proportional," the Court does not defer to
Congress; it conducts a "close review" of the legislative record. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at
645.
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the sovereignty of the states with the sovereignty enjoyed by other
purportedly similar objects, such as corporations, nations, or persons. The
first of these sovereignties we will call competence sovereignty and the
latter status sovereignty.
Competence sovereignty substantially resembles the "new sovereignty"
described in Part IV. It arises from the proactive exercise of the functions
associated with the symbols of trustee, agent, community, and laboratory.
Through these functions, or "bundle of competences,"499 states actively
prop up and preserve their sovereignty. They become, and are regarded as,
legitimate authorities for, and recognized representatives of, distinct
political communities. States earn deference from courts, politicians, and
sub- as well as supra-state institutions by bargaining, negotiating,
providing remedies and outlets for political participation, and so forth.
Competence sovereignty is deeply ingrained in our constitutional and
political systems. It arises, ultimately, from shared understandings that a
state, to borrow from some of the many available definitions of
sovereignty, is "in charge of a domain," 500 has the "capacity to make and
give effect to public decisions," 501 has the ability to regulate movements
across borders, and is "an independent entity entitled to freedom from
external intervention." 502 Even though the Constitution formally places
states in a subordinated position relative to federal authorities, state
sovereignty continues to prosper as a result of the social and political
dynamic described above. State sovereignty constructs reality for federal
and state authorities, as well as for citizens. That is why the concept
persists and prospers despite the relative disadvantages of states.
Notice that competence sovereignty is not narrowly defined or
confined to issues of wealth or exclusive power. It is in the nature of a
bundle or basket of competences or functions states perform to greater or
lesser degrees, rather than a "chunk" of stone that may be won or lost. 503
This version of state sovereignty comports with what we actually see in
terms of state and federal practices; it jibes with the messy constitutional
system we actually have rather than an unattainable and unrealistic
sovereign monolith. On this view, the sovereignty of the state depends

499. Bux, supra note 26, at 12.
500. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF
SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1965)).
50 I. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19.
502. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782, 786 (2003).
503. See FOWLER & 8UNCK, supra note 3, at 64 (distinguishing the "basket" and "chunk"
approaches to state sovereignty).
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upon its competence in carrying out the functions of statehood. We can
monitor and analyze state sovereignty by studying institutional behavior
and state performance. States can prop up their own sovereignty by
attending to sovereign functions, even those that may seem trivial or, in
the short term, ineffectual.
Status sovereignty, by contrast, has nothing at all to do with the actions
of states, or the dynamic between the states and federal authorities. Status
sovereignty resembles the more traditional idea of inherent respect and
recognition for states as states. It is, in this respect, precisely the negative
proscription on federal authority the Skeptics have denounced, rather than
a positive resource for states to utilize. It is propped up and maintained
primarily as a result of states defending lawsuits in which courts decree
that the states are immune from things like judicial processes and
"commandeering." Status sovereignty often means that states cannot be
held accountable for, among other things, their alleged civil rights
violations.
There is nothing inherently dysfunctional or disturbing about the
existence of two different iterations or conceptions of domestic state
sovereignty. After all, state sovereignty is a polysemous construct. But in
fashioning a reconceptualization of state sovereignty, we should take
advantage of the full range of insights that concepts like the "new
sovereignty" and social construction theory offer for scholars, states, and
courts. This should include insights regarding the circumstances in which
state sovereignty is generated and, more importantly, how it is sustained
over time. Based upon these insights, there are several reasons why, in
terms of proposing a reconceptualization of state sovereignty, competence
sovereignty is to be preferred over status sovereignty.
First, if one accepts that state sovereignty is an "institutional fact" that
depends upon the generation of shared understandings, the primary
problem with status sovereignty is readily apparent. Status sovereignty is
imposed upon states almost exclusively by judicial fiat. It has been the
product, so far, of the mostly implicit treatment of states as being "like"
nations or persons or market participants. If there is a shared
understanding on these terms, it is most likely not one shared by many
outside a majority of the Court and, of course, the states whose immunity,
or autonomy, or other right or power, happens to be vindicated.
Competence sovereignty, by contrast, is the product of a much broader
dynamic process of generation which includes social, academic, judicial,
and political discourses as well as ongoing state performance and
practices. The core "bundle of competences" that states are understood to
possess have a long and distinguished history; they have, as the discussion
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above showed, been associated with statehood at least since the framing of
the Constitution. These functions or competences, in contrast to judicial
comparisons of states to nations or persons, are thus deeply ingrained,
mostly agreed-upon aspects of state sovereignty. They rest, therefore, on a
much more solid foundation than does pure juridical status.
Second, status sovereignty, unlike competence sovereignty, has not
been justified by reasoned judgments. Indeed, the Court never explains the
basis for its invocation of state sovereignty in the immunity and autonomy
cases. It is difficult to reach a shared understanding of what the states'
sovereignty entails absent at least some principled discussion of its
normative justification. Repeating over and over that the states are
"sovereign, " that they possess "dignity" and "esteem," and that they are
entitled to "respect," falls far short of a reasoned justification. Indeed, it is
precisely this sort of claim to state sovereignty that lends credence to the
Skeptic's complaint that sovereignty is nothing but empty rhetoric or a
disguise for power politics. The principal infirmity of the Court's status
sovereignty is not, as some Classicists claim, that it is only a partial
defense for states; sovereignty can be partial and yet still quite effective. 504
It is, rather, that the status imposed upon the states lacks sufficient
justification or reason. It never becomes a part of any dynamic
constructive process. It is not vetted, justified, or filtered. What makes a
state "like" a nation? Or a person? The Court never says. The justifications
for state competences and functions, by contrast, have been articulated
over an expanse of time in a variety of social, political, and judicial
discourses. They have survived the test of time.
Third, as noted, status sovereignty is entirely passive in character. It
exists not to provide the states with power or authority, but rather, as
Professor Rakove posits, "to deny some other locus of authority ... that
power."505 Status sovereignty does not require that the states do anything
at all, other than simply exist, to prop up or sustain their sovereignty.
Institutional facts like state sovereignty thrive on performance, interaction,
and repetition. The international concept of the "new sovereignty"
demonstrates that most states, even powerful nation-states, cannot sit back
and rest upon some sort of negative sovereignty status shield. The new
sovereignty, unlike the old, is not absolute or defensive. It is proactive,
and maintained largely by the states themselves. If it were not sustained in

504. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1641 ("In the end, a coherent theory of state sovereignty must
mean that states possess the authority to make final policy decisions with regard to some functions,
and the federal government can do nothing about it.").
505. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 54.
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this manner, nation-state sovereignty would likely atrophy, or worse.
Status sovereignty carries "defensive emotive associations" which not
only encourage the passivity mentioned above, but also stifle creative
thinking about "a ground for a forward policy of one's own." 506 These are
particular perils for the American states' sovereignty, which is only
guaranteed, in constitutive terms, in the most rudimentary and thin sense
and otherwise requires constant state attention, maintenance, and repair.
Fourth, status sovereignty gives rise to a substantial moral objection.
The objection, highlighted by the Court's recent immunity, anticommandeering, and "due process" precedents, is that status sovereignty
encourages bad behavior by states. It is something of a license to behave
in a manner that is disrespectful, even dismissive, of the rights of
individuals. In domestic terms, it conjures the "states' rights" of old, with
its racist agenda and disregard for human rights. Sovereignty of this
character thus "has a baleful influence on men's minds"; 507 it encourages
the attitude that citizens are subservient to state interests rather than the
other way around.
This relates to a fifth, and for present purposes final, problem with
status sovereignty, which is that a judicially maintained negative "rights
talk" for states will, in all likelihood, not be sustainable over the long term.
Nation-states have come to tolerate substantial interventions into their
"internal" sovereignty in terms of enforcement of human rights. 508 There is
no reason to expect that the states will continue to be shielded from
liability for alleged violations of their citizens' rights. Indeed, there are
already signs that the Supreme Court is wary of taking status sovereignty
to its logical extreme, which would prohibit Congress from authorizing
any private lawsuits to remedy or prevent state civil rights violations. The
Court has recently balked at the opportunity to take status sovereignty this
far. 509 History suggests that the formalism of status sovereignty will, in the
end, suffer the same fate as prior formalistic iterations of sovereignty.

506. JAMES, supra note 3, at 260.
507. !d. at 257.
508. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International
Legal System in the Twenty First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 279 (2002).
509. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (permitting private suits against states pursuant
to Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Nev. Dept. Of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 734 (2003) (permitting private suits against states pursuant to Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 1941, 1946 (2004) (upholding federal statute
authorizing federal prosecution of bribery even absent connection between forbidden conduct and
federal funds).
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Even if its energies inclined in this direction, the Court should cease
this project. A negative, discussion-ending status sovereignty plays right
into the hands of Skeptics. As the Skeptics point out, "reasoning from a
simplistic principle like sovereignty [is] much easier than doing the heavy
if prosaic lifting of making federalism work by avoiding the allure of
extreme formulations." 510 Status sovereignty is precisely the sort of
concept that "begs to be borrowed and assigned new and surprising uses,
beckoning would-be consumers to take it down from the shelf and put it to
work." 511 It would be far preferable, not only from the standpoint of
acknowledging the constructed nature of state sovereignty, but also for the
overall health of our constitutional system, that states should be
encouraged to assert their sovereignty in a much more proactive and
dynamic fashion. 512
Of course, as some Classicists posit, states will continue to function
whether or not they are labeled "sovereign." But this misses a critical
point, namely that the states' functions are an integral part of their claims
to sovereign respect, recognition, and control. Yes, states will always
perform some of these functions because this is, in some measure, why
states exist in the first place. Better, however, they do so knowing that
their own sovereignty is what is "at stake" and with some appreciation
with regard to how they can contribute to its construction and prosperity.
The more states rely on status sovereignty to bail them out, the more
complacent they will become, and the weaker their claims to sovereignty
will ultimately be. Moreover, a state that is aware of the need for
proactivity will exercise its sovereignty in novel ways. The coming
together of the "Big Four" states, discussed above, is a good example of
this. 513 Professor Amar has suggested that states "can gain political
goodwill by arming their citizens with remedies for constitutional wrongs
threatened or perpetrated by federal officials."514 He contends that state
sovereignty, applied in this positive fashion, can become what it once

510. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 57.
511. !d.
512. This is not the same as suggesting, as others have, that the Court justify its "federalism"
decisions with respect to the normative values associated with federalism or "dual sovereignty." See,
e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism, 68 U. CINN. L.
REV. 245, 246 (2000) (noting "how the theme of deference to the states has drifted from normative,
structural analysis to a states' rights approach"). It certainly should do so, and this would, of course,
contribute to the construction of competence sovereignty, not least by adding an important judicial
discourse to that dynamic. This would help, but it would not suffice to establish state sovereignty.
Sovereignty is not a matter of judicial fiat; it is ultimately a state-administered, state-driven institution.
513. See supra notes 330--31 and accompanying text.
514. Amar, supra note 59, at 1428.
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was-a "tool[] to right government wrongs." 515 Whatever means they
choose, with whatever specific policy goals, states must endeavor to turn
sovereignty from a negative proscription on federal power into a positive,
functional resource.
As the ongoing experiment of the European Union suggests, a state can
be successful and vigorous without traditional "sovereign" prerogatives
like legal supremacy, coinage of money, and genuinely independent
military forces. Social construction theory suggests, however, that in order
to be meaningfully "sovereign," the post-modem state must ultimately
appear to be able to respond adequately to the expectations-economic,
political, and social--of the community. For the American states, this
means that they must continue to maintain a meaningful independence
relative to other states and sub-state actors. They must be able to influence,
but not necessarily dictate, policies with regard to fundamental matters
like birth, marriage, and death. They must continue to resist and alter
supra-state (federal) mandates affecting fundamental goods like education
and welfare. They must be able to engender citizen loyalty. Finally, they
must overcome their natural inertia and risk-aversion to serve as a
potential source of solutions to the social and economic problems of the
present and future. The "new sovereignty" of the states requires that states
consistently, and preferably aggressively, act as sovereigns in order to be
recognized as such.

D. Implications
This section summarizes the implications, for states, scholars, and
courts, of the reconceptualization of sovereignty proposed in this article.
As has been the case in international fields, the new domestic state
sovereignty has substantial implications for statecraft, scholarship, and
jurisprudence.
With regard first to states, the new sovereignty requires a level of
proactivity and creativity that a status-based sovereignty does not States
have to be aware that their sovereignty is a resource, that it can be shared
with other states and pooled in unique arrangements. States must realize
that their sovereignty is always at stake. The positive news is that a state's
"sovereignty profile" is to a large degree something that it can actively
influence and maintain. This does not require that a state always "win" in
disputes with federal institutions, only that it assert its interests, and those

515. ld. at 1429.
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of its citizens, forcefully and publicly. The new sovereignty requires that
states act with the knowledge that actions and appearances count. They are
part of the constructive process that produces state sovereignty.
As for scholars, those who accept that states can in fact be "sovereign"
can gain some insights from the new sovereignty into where, in fact, the
states' sovereignty resides. Scholars should not be counting brute facts like
dollars, goods, troops, legislative enactments, and personnel in
determining whether the states remain sovereign. Nor should
constitutional scholars be concerned solely with formal indicia of
sovereignty. Sovereignty occurs on the ground, in functions, relationships,
and dynamics, rather than in brute materials. Scholars should be looking
for instances in which states share or pool their sovereignty and exercise
their sovereign functions. They should be thinking about, and perhaps
proposing, novel methods for states to share their sovereignty, as
European states have done and continue to do.
Finally, courts should recognize that status sovereignty is inherently
flawed. The specific reasons were provided above. Above all, status
sovereignty misconceives what sovereignty is. It is a construct that can
only come about through the development of shared understandings over
time. Sovereignty cannot simply be imposed or declared. And it should not
be used as a defense, a mechanism for preserving formal state prerogatives
that have little or nothing to do with either federalism or sovereignty, at
least as properly conceived. If they wish to sustain the states, courts need
to develop a more positive, normative vision of state sovereignty and
federalism.
VI. WHY STATE SOVEREIGNTY STILL MATTERS
It remains to be considered whether, if state sovereignty is not or at
least should not be conceptualized as a sledgehammer as it was in the
Classical model, it plays any useful role in constitutional discourse or
practice. This Part argues that it does, for reasons similar to those
advanced by international relations scholars who continue to defend the
concept of state sovereignty.
If, as this Article has asserted, state sovereignty cannot be measured
and is not independently verifiable, then sovereignty's relevance
ultimately depends upon its status as an institutional fact. Simply put, then,
the question, whether the context is domestic or international, is whether
state sovereignty helps to explain the ordering of the world.
Sovereignty does indeed serve this purpose for the relevant social and
political actors. Indeed, state sovereignty persists, domestically and
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abroad, precisely because it matters to states, diplomats, cttlzens, and
institutions. Sovereignty is part of the discourse of statecraft. It is "a claim
to ordering power." 516 It is "a way of speaking about the world, a way of
acting in the world." 517 This is so whether we are talking about states or
nation-states. Sovereignty effectively channels arguments and claims
about power. In terms of domestic state sovereignty, it forces
consideration of and attention to subsidiarity-the idea that there is a
"second sovereign." The concept has come to serve a similar function
internationally, as supra-national structures like the EU have arisen.
Indeed, the primary benefit of retaining some concept of state
sovereignty is that it contributes to order. As one international relations
scholar said: "Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at
establishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent
world." 518 The concept of sovereignty contributes to order by creating a
class of political entities that are expected to be permanent fixtures in a
governance system. Under the Constitution, for example, constitutive
rules-preservation, separateness, participation, and interpretive
independence-imply the permanency of states. But what actually makes
"dual sovereignty" a reality is the constitutive process, the manner in
which states move beyond these rules to stake claims to legitimacy,
deference, and recognition. The constitutive process makes the concept of
state sovereignty more than a merely symbolic check on federal authority.
It gives substance to sovereignty in such a manner that the label
"sovereign" does more than describe political and economic arrangements;
it explains and justifies them "as if they belonged to the natural order of
things. " 519
Sovereignty does more than merely help to protect the states against
elimination or annihilation. It provides a recognized legal and political
hierarchy. As the constructive dynamic demonstrated, the idea that the
states retain a "sovereign" status operates to, among other things, level the
playing field in interactions between state and federal authorities.
Sovereignty is in this respect a very powerful concept. It results in
deference to and respect for states even though the Constitution does not
mandate this in express terms; even though, in fact, Congress, for
example, is not required to defer or desist. Sovereignty allows the states to
bargain and negotiate as if they occupied a position of more or less equal

516. SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 6.
517. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at II.
518. /d.
519. !d.

334

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

83:229

bargaining power. This does not mean that states always succeed in
negotiations with federal authorities-far from it, of course. However, in a
variety of circumstances that touch on local concerns, states are often
given the "final say" whether or not the Constitution or empirical
circumstances formally entitle them to it. The institutional fact of state
sovereignty makes this possible.
Sovereignty contributes to order and stability in other ways as well. It
creates expectations of how political entities are to behave. States, for
example, recognize that they possess an "external" sovereignty in terms of
their interstate relations. As a result, states are aware not only of their own
latitude and power, but also of their obligation to respect the prerogatives
of their "peers." The doctrine of "separate sovereigns" codifies this
particular shared understanding. 520
Finally, by maintaining state permanence and order, the concept of
sovereignty promotes the self-determination of local political
communities. Advocates of "decentralization," as opposed to a system of
at least partially sovereign states, tend to downplay this critical conceptual
function. 521 But a state that is aware of its sovereign status is likely to be
bolder in terms of governance than some fungible unit in a decentralized
system of authority; it will be more confident of its legitimacy. This
confidence at least raises the potential for state innovation, the sort of
proactive competence sovereignty this Article has defended. It buoys
states to understand that an effective claim to control or deference might
be made to blunt central interventions. There is, moreover, a distinct honor
in maintaining a separateness and uniqueness. This is so not only for the
states, as states, but far more importantly for their citizens, who surely
have a greater stake in a sovereign community than one which is always
compelled to follow central commands and to conform.
Of course, for sovereignty to serve any of these purposes, it must reside
in the states, which of course act ultimately as representatives of the
people. As a theoretical matter, the locus of sovereignty is likely never to
be definitively fixed. However, as internationalists recognized long ago,
sovereignty has been "co-opted" and utilized by democratic and
republican states the world over. The Republican sentiment that the people
who consented to the social contract are the only "true" sovereign is an

520. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) ("When a defendant in a single act violates the
'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
'offences.'").
521. See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23 (arguing that decentralization of authority
would be more beneficial than maintaining the system of sovereign states).
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accurate statement of political theory so far as it goes; but it offers little
succor to states routinely faced with challenges and encroachments from
sub- and supra-state institutions and private actors. "The people" have no
means of expressing their "sovereignty" in response to these challenges, at
least not on a day-to-day basis or in any manner that allows for
contemporaneous expression of their will. The states do. In pragmatic
terms, the concept of sovereignty can only serve its purposes if we accept
that the states are the institutions that exercise "sovereign" powers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The concept of state sovereignty is controversial, both in terms of
international politics and, especially recently, in terms of domestic claims
that the states are "sovereign." Nations have rdied on claims to
"sovereignty" for centuries to maintain internal control and external
respect and recognition. States have done much the same thing
domestically. State "sovereignty" has risen to prominence mostly as a
result of the Supreme Court's recent invocation of the concept to vindicate
state claims to independence, autonomy, immunity, and other "rights." As
a result, the timeless notion that the Constitution establishes a "dual
sovereignty" has received renewed attention.
The general concerns raised by state claims to "sovereignty" are
remarkably similar in both the international and domestic contexts. As one
international relations scholar explained:
For many of us, the term seems unfortunate because it suggests
separateness and independence in an era increasingly marked by
togetherness and interdependence; it stands for freedom of action by
states when the need is for central coordination and control; and it
evokes the fear of unpredictable and irresponsible state behavior .... 522
The defenses of state sovereignty are also similar regardless of context.
For instance, the same scholar suggests that "we value sovereignty as a
protective mantle and deplore such disrespect for it as is entailed by acts of
aggression against states and arbitrary interventions into their affairs." 523

522. Inis Claude, Jr., Foreword to FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at ix.
523. !d.
The notion of sovereignty identifies the units that give the system its multistate character and
is the essential indicator of the currently asserted and currently accepted implications of the
status enjoyed by those units: the rights, immunities, responsibilities, and limitations
attributed to states. Sovereignty, in short, has much to tell us about statehood and stateliness.
/d.
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The enigma of sovereignty is that it is at the same time both troubling in
terms of its broad implications, and critical in terms of such things as
maintaining order and creating expectations of how political entities are to
behave.
State sovereignty has long been a topic of serious and sustained interest
in the field of international relations. Domestic considerations of state
sovereignty, on the other hand, are sporadic and relatively thin; they seem
to crop up only when, as has recently been the case, the Supreme Court
focuses attention on the concept. Unfortunately, domestic constitutional
scholarship has wholly failed to take advantage of the energy and
sophistication scholars of international relations and politics have brought
to their consideration of state sovereignty.
This Article has sought to bridge the scholarly divide. Specifically, it
has done two things. First, it has emphasized sovereignty's flexibility and
perpetual conceptual evolution. We cannot determine whether the states
are "truly" sovereign with regard to a classical model of sovereignty that
has been superseded the world over. Internationalists have acknowledged
the ongoing evolution of state sovereignty. Lawyers, legal scholars, and
judges should do the same. State sovereignty today can be partial,
relational, divided, even "pooled" as it is in the European Union. Yet
states can still exhibit the indicia of sovereignty, such as effective control
over territory or domain, performance of traditional sovereign functions or
competences, rights, and recognition. Thus, the mere fact that the states
enjoy only a residual and partial sovereignty ought not stifle further
consideration of the concept of state sovereignty.
Second, in addition to this conceptual updating, the Article has sought
to explain how states continue to successfully assert claims to sovereignty
despite their limited powers and material resources. The answer to this
question lies in understanding how "sovereignty" is generated and
maintained. This Article has suggested that social construction theory,
which some internationalists have applied specifically to the concepts of
statehood and sovereignty, provides one plausible answer. The theory
reconceptualizes state sovereignty as an institutional fact dependent, in the
end, upon the formation of shared understandings with regard to whether
states are "sovereign" and under what circumstances. Social construction
theory helpfully changes the focus from relative material authority (in
terms of, for example, personnel, power, and wealth) to the dynamics of
what states do, how they are represented, and how their claims to
sovereignty are justified.
With some adjustments necessary to account for the different contexts,
social construction theory can explain how the states continue to be
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perceived as "sovereign" despite their relative disadvantages in terms of
wealth and power. This Article demonstrated, in Part V, that state
sovereignty has been, and continues to be, socially, politically, and legally
constructed. It showed that states continue to be treated as sovereign-as
being essentially "in charge of a domain," or having the "final say" with
respect to substantial matters, or possessing certain rights-despite lacking
absolute and exclusive authority. Sometimes this is a matter of
competence; just as the international "new sovereignty" depends upon
bargaining, negotiation, and proactivity, so too does the states' sovereignty
depend on the perception of performance and exercise of typical
"sovereign" functions like exercise of police powers and the provision of
community benefits. At other times, state sovereignty is a juridical status
imposed upon states by the Court to defend them from lawsuits, or federal
"commandeering." Thus, states enjoy some of the same sorts of
"sovereign rights" as nations, or people. Both on the ground, in day-to-day
administration, and in the courts, shared understandings have taken shape
that the states are "sovereign" authorities.
This Article suggests that we stand at a crossroads with regard to what
state sovereignty is to be in the post-classical, post-modem era. It
identifies, as products of the constructive process, two distinct
sovereignties which it labels "competence sovereignty" and "status
sovereignty." The Article argues that the juridical concept of status
sovereignty is not sustainable, and should not be encouraged. A state
sovereignty based upon defenses to lawsuits and judicially imposed
recognition will not ultimately sustain the states, or satisfy skeptical critics
who maintain that sovereignty is a mere cover for power politics. In the
end, the states must generally administer and prop up their own
sovereignty. Insofar as they do so, and do so effectively, state sovereignty
will continue to be an important concept in terms of preserving the states
and ordering federalism.

